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Editor’s Note
The life span of man carries with it joys and sorrows that we cannot escape. In this
issue it is unfortunately necessary to begin with the sorrows. Two individuals closely
associated with the journal and with our parent organization, the International Society
for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, have died, and I want to acknowledge them
here. They are Lee Snyder and John Reilly.
Dr. Lee Snyder was president of the organization immediately before the term of Dr.
Andrew Targowski. Dr. Targowski has written a beautiful appreciation of the life and
service to this organization of Dr. Snyder which follows my remarks about John Reilly.
For myself, I note that Dr. Snyder was a very pleasant man who always came to the
annual meetings and contributed in a meaningful, significant, and penetrating way. He
was missed by all of us when he had to stop attending meetings, and his absence will be
permanently, and sadly, felt.
John Reilly was an Associate Editor of the Comparative Civilizations Review journal for
several years. On New Year’s Day I received a note from Dr. Nora P. Reilly, Ph.D.,
Associate Dean of the College of Graduate and Professional Studies and Professor of
Psychology at Radford University in Radford, Virginia. It carried wishes for a happy
new year and informed the organization that her brother, John Reilly, had died “from a
sudden and incurable neurological disorder” which “lasted eight weeks from start to
finish.” She concluded as follows:
I know that John very much enjoyed the topics in this journal. Simply
mentioning “Spengler” always made his ears perk up, though it did not much
engage the attention of my elderly mother.
In a response to her on behalf of the journal and the association, I noted his important
work as an Associate Editor of the Comparative Civilizations Review. Among his
recent writings for the journal had been a major piece entitled “The World After
Modernity” (2003); and reviews of Tony Blankley’s The West's Last Chance: Will We
Win the Clash of Civilizations? (2006); Kim Stanley Robinson’s The Years of Rice and
Salt (2006); and Carl Schmitt’s The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the
Jus Publicum Europaeum (2009).
Mr. Reilly also spoke on The World After Modernity under the title "Spengler's Future"
at the Sixth Annual Conference of the Center for Millennial Studies, held at Boston
University from November 3 to 6, 2001. A long-time futurist, he commented that:
A persistent and highly influential image of the future appeared in the late 19th
century. It occurred to a long list of people: I might mention Ernst von Lasaulx,
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Henry and Brooks Adams, Nikolai Danilevsky, Nikolai Berdyaev and Walter
Schubart, and for that matter Albert Schweitzer and Jacob Burckhardt.
They all shared the intuition that the Western world had entered a new
"Hellenistic" age, and the twentieth century was going to see a recurrence of the
less pleasant aspects of Hellenism. These would include such things as
demagogic tyrannies, annihilation warfare, and a relaxation of traditional
restraints in art and personal life.
Nietzsche had said as much, too, and in fact anyone who entered the 20th century
with this modest insight would have met with few surprises.

While I shared in my note some of what I knew about her brother, I hadn’t realized how
extensive his career had been outside of the ISCSC. A graduate of St. Peter's College
and the Georgetown University Law School, he wrote extensively on theology -- and in
particular eschatology, politics, alternative history, and the philosophy of science and
literature.
An orthodox Roman Catholic and a lawyer who lived in New Jersey, he published five
major books including Apocalypse and Future: Notes on the Cultural History of the 21st
Century, The Perfection of the West, The Perennial Apocalypse, and his well-received
Spengler's Future. One review noted that this latter book was “a Basic computer
program to predict the future of Western Civilization,” indicating that “the last Emperor
of the West will die in his sleep in A.D. 2601 and no successor will be elected.”
It was also reported that he had authored the following works of what one commentator
called “amusing short fiction and alternate history”:
President H. P. Lovecraft
Cthulluism and the Cold War
The Irish Empire
C. S. Lewis: An Alternative Obituary
The Stopping Problem (Alan Turing and the End of the World)
If Jesus Had Never Been Born
The Hour of the Laity (Lycanthropy in Upstate New York)
One blogger wrote that he had “played some role in prodding Mr. Reilly to write his
review of Kim Stanley Robinson's alternate history ‘The Years of Rice and Salt’, where
the Black Death reduces Western Christianity to an obscure sect.”
John regularly appeared in First Things, Kirkus Review, and he had been an editor at
Culture Wars before he withdrew to protest a drift toward anti-Semitism which he
publically denounced. Our Associate Editor also maintained a blog entitled The Long
View, where he covered very large subjects. In addition to The International Society for
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the Comparative Study of Civilizations, he was active with the Center for Millennial
Studies, the Simplified Spelling Society, and American Literacy Council.
What a polymath.
According to a thoughtful obituary in The Jersey Journal:
John explained himself thusly: After long thought, I realized that the most
important thing in life is to be helpful. So, I have taken to explaining things,
carefully and empathetically, and often at very great length. ‘Spengler with a
Smile’ is how I usually characterize the organizing principle.
The ISCSC and this journal were honored to have such a talented individual, such a
Renaissance Man, as an Associate Editor.
Joseph Drew, CCR Editor-in-Chief
---------------------

Lee Daniel Snyder, Civilizationist and the President of the ISCSC (2004-2007)
In his mind, Lee Daniel Snyder was as straightforward a civilizationist as you could
wish to see.
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He grew up in Hastings-on-Hudson, New York and graduated as valedictorian at
Williams College in 1955. He was elected a Danforth Graduate Fellow and spent a year
at Mainz, Germany, with a Fulbright grant. He earned a M. Div. in religious history at
Union Theological Seminary and a Ph.D. in History at Harvard University. Since then
he has participated in six NEH summer study programs in cultural history.
After five years at Ohio Wesleyan, he moved to New College in Sarasota, where he was
Professor of History and Director of Medieval-Renaissance Studies. An intellectualcultural historian known for his impressive range of interests and expertise, Professor
Snyder was a specialist in Medieval and Renaissance Europe with an alternating focus
on France, Spain, Italy and Germany, as well as the Protestant Reformation and the
history of religion.
He served as a full-time faculty member at New College from 1969 until his retirement
in 2003. Among his many accomplishments at New College is the founding of the
College's Biennial Conference on Medieval and Renaissance Studies, one of the leading
conferences of its kind in the United States. He was President of the International
Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations (2004-2007). He has presented
papers on the history of religion and historical theory.
In 1999 he published the book of his life, a monumental treaty titled Macro History: A
Theoretical Approach to Comparative World History. This volume explores and
documents Macro-History, the attempt to create a model of the cultural-historical
process that will explain historical change for all societies/cultures/civilizations. The
book, which appeared by the end of the 20th century, had a chance to synthesize
contributions of many 20th-century historians and scientists who made sense of world
history.
As the civilizationist Matthew Melko described this book, Snyder synthesizes world
histories beginning with H.G. Wells and continuing through William McNeill and Philip
D. Curtin; of course it touches civilizational studies beginning with Spengler and
continuing through Toynbee to contemporaries like David Wilkinson and Samuel P.
Huntington. It includes the more recent development of world systems analysis by
Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, Barry Gills, Christopher Chase-Dunn and
Thomas D. Hall. Snyder is familiar with general systems theorists like Ervin Laszlo and
T. Downing Bowler, and macro-sociologists such as Gerhard Lenski and Stephen K.
Sanderson. He applied these approaches by mostly modifying, correcting and
synthesizing for the purpose of comparative world history.
Snyder’s study of religion led him to Toynbee, who defines a civilization by its kind of
religion. Hence, reading Snyder reminds you of reading Toynbee, who is widely
considered as the father of civilizational studies.
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Snyder argues that the largest historic framework is a “culture-system,” called a Culture
or Civilization by many. However, his basic unit of study is the Historic Cycle of 300 to
400 years. Macro- and micro-history can be analyzed within a framework of five
dimensions: economic, socio-political, intellectual (insight, spiritual aspect, subjective
side, ideas, “culture”), geographic, and expressive (art, literature, and music).
Since his book is rather on World Macro-History than on Civilization, the author is
mostly preoccupied with the timing of the Historic Cycle and how it is influenced by
these five dimensions of culture-system. He is innovative in defining the role of an
individual in a culture-system.
I remember Lee Snyder from our conference in Alaska (2004) and later from Paris
(2006). Here at UNESCO’s large auditorium he really showed his class. We had
witnessed several long, similar and articulated presentations by the French members of
the conference Presidium. Even at one point I left the auditorium and said France est
mort (France is dead). Then I returned and heard Lee Snyder’s presentation as the
president of our Society. It was a very well done, impressive in terms of scholarship and
clarity, as well as management of the conference and so forth.
Lee Snyder surprised me by telling me that he was in my town Kalamazoo (Michigan)
many times, since my Western Michigan University has organized for the last 40+ years
the International Conference on Medieval Studies, which is attended by more than 3,000
historians each year, including him.
In 2007, I revisited him in his home town Sarasota. After a dinner, we walked around
his inspiring home and around the large garden full of trees and talked about world
civilization. He was aware that he was weakening but still full of world curiosity, just
recently having paid his the last visit to Europe, including northern Poland. I suspected
that his roots were there, but the city he visited he called Danzig rather than Gdańsk.
He was humble but at the same time proud of his contribution to the theory of
civilization, since he believed in the macro approach to the history, which allows us to
see our small picture within the larger picture of human development. We are grateful to
him for his effort to understand better our place in civilization.
We, at the ISCSC, are deeply saddened by Lee Snyder’s departure to another…
civilization.
Andrew Targowski
President of the ISCSC (2007-2013)
---------------------
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Now, the good news. First, this issue of the journal precedes our annual meeting, to be
held at Asilomar in California. Please make every effort to attend, if you can; it
promises to be an exciting conference, with many interesting debates.
Second, we are publishing in this number a set of fascinating papers. The opening paper
is one that brought many remarks of approbation when it was read at our last meeting.
Dr. Abbey Perumpanani of Australia made a big hit when he argued, as he does in the
paper, that we can logically arrive at a meaningful, clear definition of “civilization.” It is
his task in this paper to show us how to do so, and it is an especially significant venture
for the ISCSC since the topic has been debated vigorously and repeatedly ever since the
onset of the association. The definition that Dr. Perumpanani proposes is the following:
a civilization is a dynamical system that supports endogenous cultural developments
through economic interactions aggregated across elements of its data.
Next is another significant work in the editorial board’s judgment, this one by Prof.
Dario Fernandez-Morera. In this paper he challenges the widely accepted notion that
under Islam the Jewish community of Spain enjoyed a “Golden Age.” New facts are
adduced to show that this was not really the case. As he states in opening the paper:
Jews remained subject to the vicissitudes of their condition as dhimmis (“protected”
non-Muslims). If there was brief good treatment, it was because of tactical needs of
particular Muslim rulers, not out of legal considerations.
As editor, I would add that with the recent passing of Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu’s father, another well-known scholar on the subject of the Spanish treatment
of the Jews during the Middle Ages, and the Inquisition, in particular, this topic is most
à propos.
Dr. John Grayzel has led a dazzling career, first as a leader in the U. S. Agency for
International Development and then in academe as a professor and as the holder of the
Baha’i Chair for World Peace at the University of Maryland. With a J.D. from Stanford
Law School and his Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Oregon, he has
participated in, and led, major funding missions throughout Africa and Asia over four
decades, plus heading the Education Office of his agency.
In this article he argues persuasively that most Western scholars have misunderstood
African civilization and most diplomats have, as well. Now he adds the Chinese to this
list, maintaining that that in spite of what many observers might think, African
Civilization has found another dupe in Chinese efforts to buy long-term control of that
continent through short-term deals. In the process of this insightful presentation, he
presents and analyzes three separate African civilizations and how they have interacted
with the outside world.
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What is going on in contemporary China? Perhaps experts in international relations
have not fully understood that country recently. So argues Prof. Barbara Onnis, an
international relations expert and scholar in Italy. In her paper, she maintains that the
evolving Chinese vision of China’s role in international affairs has been indicated
through a series of significant policy statements. Many prominent Chinese scholars, she
reports, shade their intentions carefully. There has been articulated “China’s peaceful
rise,” but Dr. Onnis shows that this might merely be the vehicle through which Beijing
is trying to allay foreign apprehension of this resurgent old/new world power. We can
follow in the paper the series of arguments China has brought forward to convince the
world that her ascendancy is well-intentioned.
Dr. Pedro Geiger from Brazil begins his paper on war and peace conjunctures by
addressing the possibility that the German social democrat Karl Kautsky, whom we all
learned of in school as “the renegade Kautsky” – a term of opprobrium thrown upon him
when he refused to back the ultimately ill-fated Spartacist Revolt – may have been right
all along.
In spite of Lenin’s hectoring, Marxist intellectuals and others supported capitalist
expansion in the last century, surprisingly, and have helped capitalists to expand
worldwide lately via globalism. These Marxists postulated, and Dr. Geiger finds, that
the threat of another world war has been receding since 1945, perhaps as a result of
capitalist expansion. Is this a turn that could have been predicted by Marxists a century
ago?
Mariana Tepfenhart of Monmouth University in New Jersey provides an analysis of the
causes of ethnic conflicts worldwide over recent decades. In the wake of the collapse of
the Cold War, some third world countries lost their sponsors and, as a result, they also
lost much of their ability to stabilize their domestic strength and restrain ethnic tensions.
Unhappily, ethnic conflicts have broken out repeatedly in the former Communist sphere
of influence: we see evidence of this in the new republics emerging out of Yugoslavia,
in Chechnya, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. We also have witnessed violent internal
conflict burst forth in the developing world, with Rwanda being the most dramatic and
horrible example.
Globalism, anti-Americanism, large-scale migration, and the nature of the multi-national
state are all examined by Prof. Tepfenhart as she considers why ethnic conflict is so
present in our world today. Poverty and fear, she says, not cultural diversity, fuel ethnic
conflict. If violence, cruelty, and inhumane acts are accepted, the beginnings of
genocide cannot be far behind.
We conclude on a special note, with a brief essay sent in by Dr. Wallace Gray. Dr. Gray
is a longtime member of the ISCSC and an American expert on Japanese culture. In this
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paper, which he translated and annotated, we read of the journey of a Japanese
intellectual to the city of Nagasaki. There are many facts about the city to learn,
including that the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki was meant to strike a munitions
area, an important ship-building and servicing complex. Instead, winds carried the
atomic bomb to a Catholic area, to the north. As a result, the bomb apparently fell on a
Christian hospital and medical university.
In addition to the narrative, which includes an analysis of the introduction to Buddhism
in Japan and the attempt of Catholic leaders, such as the Pope, to encourage mutual
efforts regardless of religious differences in Nagasaki, the article we print contains
fascinating observations by the ever-trenchant Dr. Gray. This is both an aesthetic and a
cultural commentary. We publish this for its inherent value as an essay and observe that
it has not gone through peer review.
As always, these incisive essays are followed by book reviews that deal with significant
works of comparative civilization. There’s much to read in this issue, and the editors
hope that you will agree with us that this issue brings you a pleasant and rewarding
experience.
See you soon!
Joseph Drew, Editor-in-Chief
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Civilization Defined
Abbey Perumpanani *

Introduction

perumpanani@hotmail.com

A civilization is a dynamical system † that supports endogenous cultural development
through economic activity aggregated across elements of its data.
This paper proposes the aforementioned as an inclusive scientific definition that can
bring about a convergence in the widely differing historical views on civilization. As
this definition complies with the mathematical requirements of a definition, it will
empower rigorous analytical approaches to study civilizations. The paper argues that all
extant intensional historical definitions of civilization are partial implementations of the
above definition.
I am a mathematician. In this paper I will describe what I see as a major and
fundamental weakness in the historical approaches to study civilization — the absence
of a scientifically credible, consensus definition of the term civilization. I will offer a
mathematical solution to this historical problem.
Over recent decades, the term civilization has played an increasingly important role in
structuring historical, political and economic thought. More recently it has even been
suggested that our emerging world order is being morphed through a ‘clash of
civilizations.’ Despite its academic significance, and its perceived importance as a
determinant in global politics, the term civilization remains without a consensus
definition. In a symposium organised by UNESCO, the historian Felipe FernandezArmesto provided a scholarly survey of the historical efforts to characterize civilization
where he concluded that civilization “is a problematic concept because of its abuse, its
ambiguities, its partisan connotations, and the arbitrary nature of the ways in which it is
commonly characterized.” 1
For a person like me trained entirely in the sciences, this neglect of a consensus
definition is difficult to comprehend. In any scientific exercise, definitions have a
primacy which cannot be sidestepped. Yet historians, who have traditionally been the
custodians of the term civilization, have for decades pursued a vibrant and prolific
*

The author is an Indian physician and mathematician currently living and practicing medicine in
Australia. After medical training in India, he received a PhD. in Mathematics from the University of
Oxford, and he was then a Physician Fellow at Harvard Medical School. His research interests are in the
molecular biology of cancer and in the analysis of partial differential equations. Email:
perumpanani@hotmail.com
†
A mathematical construct used to describe an entity that changes over time; the term is more elaborately
described later in the paper.
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industry in the study of civilizations without being stymied by the absence of a
consensus definition. One of my earliest forays into history was reading A History of
Civilizations by Fernand Braudel. I realized after reaching the end of the book that
Braudel had, in fact, not offered any precise definition of the term which was the subject
of his book.
This definitional crisis in Civilization Studies is a consequence not of the absence of
plausible candidates, but rather arises from a surfeit of them. There are dozens, if not
hundreds, of definitions of civilization around. I am told by the members of the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations that they have made
numerous previous attempts at their annual meetings to generate a consensus definition
of civilization—without success 2. The problem of generating a consensus definition of
civilization appears to be intractable from within the scope of historical methods.
The absence of a consensus definition is not simply a matter of academic vexation, but
one that has had consequences for the study of history. The ambiguity caused by the
absence of a scientifically credible consensus definition of civilization has precluded the
interdisciplinary development of the study of civilizations. While internal clarity is
lacking within history on the definition of a civilization, it becomes impossible to
develop external interactions with other disciplines to foster the interdisciplinary
development of civilization studies.
This paper will use the mathematical paradigm of a definition to derive a definition of
civilization by marrying the common elements in the historical perceptions of
civilization with the theory of dynamical systems. This definition is based on the
characterization of civilization as a "dynamical system"—an evolving entity driven by
underlying processes within specified spatial and temporal boundaries.
Other areas of study which have previously been interpreted through dynamical systems
theory — population biology, oncology, and economics, among others — have been
dramatically transformed through a synergistic relationship with mathematics. Through
such interactions a vast repertoire of tools has been developed to study dynamical
systems. Formulating civilization as a dynamical system will allow the application of
this powerful array of scientific tools to historical analysis, albeit with some disciplinespecific differences. More importantly, the common language imposed by the theory of
dynamical systems will help foster interdisciplinary dialogue between historians and
mathematicians.
This definition provides the means for a scientific transformation of the study of history,
and—if the trajectory in population biology is replicated—the development of
"mathematical history."
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Mathematical view of the historical definitions of civilization
In a mathematical sense, a definition determines the membership of a specific set
through one of three mechanisms: intension, extension or recursion 3.
•

•
•

An intensional definition lays out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
an entity to belong to the defined set. An entity can also be intensionally defined
by first stating the broad category it belongs to and then distinguishing it by
specific properties.
An extensional definition involves a list which can simply be a set of instructive
examples (ostensive) or an exhaustive listing (enumerative).
A recursive definition states one (or a few) elements of the set and all things
bearing a certain relationship to elements of the set are also defined as members
of the set.

Convention demands that definitions avoid certain pitfalls. A definition must not
comprise terms that are synonymous with it, which will make the definition circular.
Definitions should not be too wide or too narrow and definitions should not be negative
where they can be positive. Definitions should also try to avoid arbitrariness and
obscurity, choosing to explain themselves in terms whose meanings are unambiguous.
Against this mathematical background of definitions, most historical definitions of
civilization stack up poorly. I will illustrate errors in each type of definition by adducing
examples chosen for their ability to showcase the class of error.
Intensional definitions: Arnold Toynbee, who was at the inaugural meeting of
the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations in Salzburg, despite
the somewhat indecent corpulence of his works, was much more concise in his
definition of civilization. He described the process of civilization as one where “mimesis
is directed towards the future, the cake of custom is broken and society is in a dynamical
motion” 4.
Oswald Spengler argued that a culture did not become a civilization until it was already
in decline. Then, it “suddenly hardens, it mortifies, its blood congeals, its force breaks
down, and it becomes Civilization.” 5
These are intensional definitions, which, though poetic and evocative, in a mathematical
sense are simply examples of obscurity and circularity.
Extensional definitions: Samuel Huntington enumerated a list of eight “major
civilizations” 6 but provided no clarity on why those on his select list were deemed
"major," particularly because, by inference, the rest are being deemed minor. This is an
extensional definition, plagued by obscurity and arbitrariness.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013
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Recursive definitions: Kenneth Clark, the British historian who reputedly wept
for fifteen minutes, overwhelmed by the favourable reception of his television series
Civilization, finally concluded that he still did not know what civilization was, but
thought he could recognize it when he saw it. 7 Though, as a definition, this would
appear vague, it is possibly the longest standing and the most commonly used method to
define civilization.
Essentially, it is a recursive definition—societies displaying features reminiscent of the
characteristics of their own societies are deemed “civilized”. It is through such a
definition that the Greeks considered the Persians uncivilized, Romans called the
Germanic tribes barbarian, and the Hindus referred to the foreigners as Mlechaas. These
notions are nothing more than the manifestation of ethnocentric bias. Despite their
ubiquity, such biases cannot pass for a definition.
While these examples were chosen—essentially for their egregiousness—in order to
illustrate the types of errors, all the historical definitions of civilization that I have come
across show similar types of errors, albeit to varying degrees.

Interdisciplinary approach to defining civilization
Civilization from a mathematical point of view
At a basic schematic level all civilizations have some common features (see Figure 1):
• they involve a group of people defined by certain boundary conditions—
geographic, religious, or linguistic, for example;
• whose initial state, which we deem uncivilized, or proto-civilized;
• over an interval of time;
• through interactions between them, or the institutions they create;
• result in developments which are manifest on the surface.

Figure 1: Schematic representation of a civilization
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So at a broad level, civilizations have a similar underlying architecture. It is this precise
architecture that mathematicians call a dynamical system. From a mathematical point of
view then, all civilizations have a common functional denominator—they are dynamical
systems.
Common elements in the historical definition of civilization
Despite the variety in the historical definitions of civilization, a recurring theme in the
majority of them is the identification of cultural developments as the sine qua non of
civilization.
However, many of the judgments about cultural developments lie trapped within
ethnocentric or racial biases. For example, Kenneth Clarke based his recognition of
civilization on the ability to create and value works of art. However, he was dismissive
of African works, which to him appeared to lack in confidence.
Such subjective biases can be exorcised from the judgment of cultural developments by
partitioning all human interactions and developments into two groups:
•
•

those that are primarily related to subsistence or profit are "economic", and
anything else, which is not done with an economic motive, is "cultural"

This segmentation represents a mutually exclusive and completely exhaustive (MECE) 8
description of all human interactions and developments.
An interdisciplinary definition of civilization
Now by marrying the implicit historical assumption in civilization studies and the
mathematical theory of dynamical systems, we can conclude that a civilization is a
dynamical system that supports endogenous cultural developments through economic
interactions aggregated across elements of its data.

Figure 2: The Dynamical Systems View of Civilization
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Two of the terms in this definition—"dynamical system" and "data"—need clarification.
A "dynamical system" is a mathematical construct that models interactions which
convert the initial state of an entity into developments within a defined boundary over a
specified period of time. Within this broad definition any time-dependent entity can be
characterized as a dynamical system.
•
•

The human heart is a dynamical system—through the interaction of electrical and
mechanical processes the state of the heart is continuously being modified, albeit
repetitively.
The stock market is a dynamical system, where the prices of financial instruments
are being modulated through the interaction of speculative and economic forces.

Dynamical systems, as modelling tools, are very versatile. They can be used to study
everything from molecular dynamicals on an atomic scale to planetary interactions on a
cosmic scale; from boundary layers that happen in a flash of the eye, to phenomena such
as evolution with aeonic spans. It is a powerful and flexible tool, and one that has
dramatically transformed many an area of study.
There are three elements that define a dynamical system: the initial conditions, the
boundary conditions and the interactions between its elements. They are collectively
referred to as the "data." Once these three elements are specified, we have a complete
definition of the dynamical system. If the data of the dynamical system is adequately
specified then it is called a “well determined” system; if not it is called "underdetermined".
A definition such as the above opens up a door which will allow us to connect the
worlds of history and of mathematics by building a mathematical formulation of a
civilization, in the form of a family of equations. The details are technical; for the
purposes of this paper I will keep the discussion to a conceptual level.
We can say about the economy that:
The rate of change
in economic
∞
development

Economic and cultural
interactions between its
people

Distribution of development
in the economy

+

And if we called E a measure of economic development, and C a measure of the cultural
development, then we can represent the above equation more concisely using
mathematical notation as
.
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We can write a similar equation for cultural developments.

Here fe and fc are the functions representing the interactions of economic and cultural
developments and
is the divergence operator representing spatial movement of
economic and cultural developments and x and t are independent variables measuring
space and time. The initial and boundary conditions are determined by the choice of
civilization and together they represent a full description of a civilization as a dynamical
system.

Advantages of the mathematical definition
By positing the idea of civilization within the paradigm of dynamical systems we can
connect the study of civilizations, and history in general, with the large array of
analytical approaches available to study dynamical systems. The application of such
techniques has revolutionized our understanding of many previously intractable
problems: the spread of cancer, the development of economies, climate change, and
ecological sustainability9. I will provide a few examples of the application of such
techniques to the study of history.
1. Metrics: Transparent and objective metrics of civilization-related phenomena can
be implemented through the computation of maxima, minima, areas under the
curve, averages, medians etc. Such metrics can be used to compare and
hierarchize civilizations in a scientific fashion. If, for instance, Samuel
Huntington's description of "Major Civilizations" was underwritten by such
metrics, then it would be amenable to meaningful scientific discussion and
disputation—in its absence, it can be argued as simply being an opinion, albeit
from a reputed scholar.
2. Measures: The metrics that describe civilizations can be combined to generate
measures of civilization (weighted sum of metrics). Mathematically these
measures can be represented as

Where A is a measure, ei(x,t) = Economic developments and ck (x,t) = Cultural
developments; and gi, and hi are weighted functions such as Maxima, Minima,
area under the curve, average, median, etc.
In the manner after the sciences these measures could be named through
descriptors or eponymously after their authors or famous historians. For
instance, the Body Mass index (BMI) is used by doctors to predict the risk of
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cardiovascular disease; the Reynolds number in fluid mechanics is used to
predict the possibility of turbulent flow. A rich and vibrant area of study
involving civilizational measures can be used to inform historical judgments and
direct policy decisions.
3. Expansion of the scope of civilization studies: The dynamical system approach
will provide a more flexible interpretation of civilization which will enable a
wider inclusivity than is currently the case. Within the dynamical systems
characterization, civilizations can be defined based on any of the three elements
of the data,




Based on the initial conditions: for example, as pre-Columbian or postReformation;
Based on their boundary conditions: for example, as Western, Indian,
Islamic or Riverine, and,
Based on their interactions: for example, as industrial, agricultural, or
informational.

And by transposing the three elements of the data on each other, we can define
an even greater array of civilizations—potentially thousands of distinct
civilizations. This will make civilization studies a much richer and more exciting
area.
While neither the term civilization nor the term culture has a precise scientific
definition, an implicit hierarchy is imposed through these terms. Larger entities
which are easily recognized through ethnocentric views are called
“civilizations”; others less easily recognized thus are simply referred to as
“cultures”. Yet this difference within the current historiographical frameworks is
entirely arbitrary. As Felipe Fernandez-Armesto noted, all definitions of
civilization "belong to a conjugation which goes, 'I am civilized, you belong to a
culture, he is a barbarian.'" 10 There is little reason for us not to refer to the
Medieval Kochi civilization, the Pitjantjatjara civilization, or the Bhutanese
civilization.
Each of these entities qualitatively possesses the structural and functional
elements seen in the more widely acknowledged civilizations. While spatial,
temporal and quantitative differences may separate Bhutanese developments
from the Egyptian civilization, for example, in most qualitative respects a direct
one-to-one mapping is possible. The wider inclusivity of the dynamical system
approach will not diminish the concept of a civilization any more than referring
to a local fish-and-chips-shop as a business will detract from the same term
being used for a large global corporation.
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4. Guide data collection: One of the turning points in historiography was von
Ranke highlighting the importance of assiduous collection of data from primary
sources 11. However, there are so many ways in which data can be collected and
the premise behind the post-modernist critique of history as simply an ensemble
of subjective perceptions is largely founded on this profusion of data. I face the
same problem when dealing with my patients in the hospital, but when one
knows what decision one is trying to make, the data that are relevant become
self-evident. The characterization of a civilization as a dynamical system will
allow us to interrogate the system for particular questions, questions that will
make the data to be collected self-evident.
5. Evolution of hypotheses: I am sure many a learned historian, from periods of
study and reflection, feel compelled by particular ideas. In history, however,
there currently are no rigorous means to evolve these hunches into theories, laws
or paradigms. In the sciences such ideas or hypotheses, as they are often called,
have a well-trodden evolutionary trajectory through which they are either
confirmed, negated or modified. This involves an iterative approach, where such
hypotheses are prospectively simulated (forward modelling) to find out what
inferences emerge. Reciprocally, the data pertaining to the system are
simultaneously analyzed (backward modelling) to see how they compare with
the findings of the prospective simulation.
If the two agree, then we have a credible theory; if they don't, we either reject the
hypothesis or modify it and iterate again. As this iterative process is repeated, through a
hierarchy of models, we progressively get closer to the truth because of the convergent
nature of the feedback loop between backward and forward modelling (see Figure 3).
Good examples of this type of modelling in the sciences are the works of Tycho Brahe
and Johannes Kepler 12.
Analyse
Analyse
data
data

Dynamical
System

Conjecture
mechanisms
Processes

Figure 3: The feedback loop between data analysis and process conjecture allows the
study of dynamical systems to develop in a convergent fashion.
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Discussion
Historically, and increasingly politically, civilization has been a divisive concept. The
dynamical system formulation of civilization provides a scientific explanation for this
divisiveness. A survey of the many available definitions of civilization (the International
Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations website lists 30 of them 13) shows
that they are incomplete or partial (under-determined) implementations of the dynamical
systems approach. None of them fully specify all the elements of the data -- the initial
conditions, the boundary conditions and the interactions -- at the same time. A specific
consequence of a system being underdetermined is that it allows multiple interpretations
(solutions) and the difference between these interpretations cannot be analytically
resolved.
A simple algebraic example of an under-determined system is the case of two numbers,
say x and y, whose sum is four. If that is all we know about the numbers, it would be
impossible to resolve a debate between two disputants who argue that x=3 and y=1 or
the other way around. No resolution is possible with any amount of arguments, unless
additional information which makes the system well-determined is available, say, for
instance, that x is greater than y.
Many historical disputes have been caught up in such essentially unresolvable debates.
They generate vibrant discussion and excitement, but being under-determined they are
essentially unresolvable debates. For instance, Toynbee saw civilizations as the creative
response of people to physical challenges imposed on them, in other words, a pattern
imposed by geography. Accordingly, people faced with few challenges produce little
civilization while those faced with insuperable challenges are crushed by it and have
little opportunity to produce civilization. Only those faced with an optimal amount of
challenge, according to Toynbee, go on to produce substantial civilizations.
The Eskimos, for instance, had not proceeded beyond rudimentary culture because of
the extreme adversity of their environment. On the other hand, in warmer climes, like in
India, the environment posed few challenges and therefore did not provide the
incentives required to produce complex civilizations. But in northern Europe, Toynbee
observed that people were ideally matched with their environment and consequently
went on to produce “high” civilization. 14
Others have tried to explain the rise of Europe based on the organizing influence of
ecclesiastical institutions, which through their organizing role in the community (regular
mass times, for example) made the development of institutions, and hence the Industrial
Revolution, possible. 15
There is no way that these ideas as they stand can be formulated into well-determined
models that can be pitched against each other and tested to see which one explains the
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observed fact—the rise of Europe—better. Describing civilization as a well-determined
dynamical system will foster a common framework within which objective analysis and
constructive dialogue (and disputation) on the subject of civilization will become
possible.
The dynamical system approach could have a significant impact on the course of
historiography. Traditionally historians have regarded a degree of subjectivity as an
inescapable part of the historical narrative, an idea that reached its zenith in the postmodernist view of history. The dynamical systems approach can be used to explain such
a view as a logical consequence of traditional historiographies being under-determined.
By creating a framework within which objectivity can progressively be enhanced
through continued iteration, the dynamical systems approach provides an escape from
the entrenched notions of subjectivity in the study of history and an effective counter to
the essentially scientifically nihilistic post-modernist interpretation of history.
Not having a consensus definition of civilization is not merely a matter of academic
vexation, but it is increasingly likely to have practical implications in the emerging
world order. History provides the backdrop to many global discussions on political
differences. While in a previous era the most contentious of such differences existed
between nation states, increasingly the most inflammable differences now reside
between civilizations. The existence of a consensually-agreed framework within which
such discussions can be fostered will make the resolution of such differences more
likely. In the absence of such a framework, misunderstandings are more likely to thrive
and, with that, the downstream consequences of such misunderstandings.
The two disciplines—history and mathematics—have had very different evolutionary
trajectories and have been separated for so long that connecting the two can pose a
challenge. Historians and mathematicians think very differently. There are two ways in
which the idea of dynamical systems can be implemented into history.
On the one hand historians could foray into mathematics and return to imbue history
with its methods and attitudes. A more efficient approach, I believe, would be to open
the door from the other side—to import from other disciplines academics with an
interest in history, and to foster interactions through them. This will be more expedient
than enjoining historians to rediscover tools for which the expertise already exists in
mathematics. Such importation of academics, from other disciplines into history, has
happened before, and to great success: von Ranke’s background in philology, for
example, significantly energized his approach to history.
And should the engagement between the two disciplines be fully consummated, we
should see the emergence of a new discipline, Mathematical History—a common
platform to objectively discuss our shared past.
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Some Overlooked Realities of Jewish Life under Islamic Rule in
Medieval Spain
Dario Fernandez-Morera

voltaire@northwestern.edu
It is widely accepted that under Islam the Jewish community of Spain briefly enjoyed a
“Golden Age.” However, it is far less widely understood that Muslim, Christian, and
Jewish legal and historical sources indicate that favorable treatment violated medieval
Islamic law and also that even under the best circumstances, Jews remained subject to
the vicissitudes of their condition as dhimmis (“protected” non-Muslims). If there was
brief good treatment, it was because of tactical needs of particular Muslim rulers, not
legal considerations.
Marginalized groups who side with a successful invader normally see their status rise
with a change in the political fortunes.1 The Jewish community of Spain was no
exception. Both Muslim and Christian medieval sources show that, reacting to the
Visigoths’ anti-Jewish legislation,2 Spanish Jews supported the Muslim invaders and
guarded major conquered cities left behind by Muslim troops during their rapid advance.
They were then rewarded with an improvement in their condition. They continued to
collaborate with the conquerors and function as a counterpoise to the large subject
Catholic population.3 This alliance of convenience followed an Islamic practice dating
back to the earliest Muslim conquests of the Christian lands of the Greek Roman Empire
(“Byzantine”) 4 in the Middle East and North Africa. It had an even earlier precedent in
the wars between Persia and the Greek Roman Empire.5
Therefore, favoring the Sephardic Jewish community continued at the discretion of
Muslim rulers as long as it was politically and economically helpful. At the same time,
they regarded the Jews as a “servant” group rather than as “allies,” and thus they
circumvented the prohibition from the Quran 5: 51.
Practical considerations, then, explain rather simply the difference in medieval Islam’s
treatment of Jewry at various times and places, or its better treatment when compared to
the treatment of Jewry by Christians — differences which even seasoned scholars have
6
found remarkable, and admirable. Practical considerations also trumped the theoretical
greater regard in which Islam held Christians, as expressed in Quran 5: 82 (a particularly
anti-Jewish section of the Quran). Under these circumstances, for some centuries
Andalusian Jewry thrived, producing a brilliant literary output.7
Nevertheless, Sephardic influence and visible material success as a largely urban and,
when compared to the really poor and illiterate peasant masses, relatively educated and
prosperous minority,8 elicited Muslim resentment, anti-Jewish riots, pogroms,
assassinations, and expulsions, and eventually a precipitous decline in status during the
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Almohad rule. By the late Middle Ages (13th --15th centuries), the Sephardic population
in Spain had shifted from Islamic lands to the Catholic kingdoms in search of a better
life, following a general migration pattern through which those living in Christian lands
became a majority of the Jewish world community.9
Nonetheless, Jewish life in Islamic Spain continues to be idealized by many scholars,
although it presented a number of cultural features that the majority of modern Jews
probably would not find congenial, or in some cases even recognizable.10
The People of “Protection”
As the Maliki school of medieval Islamic law prescribed, Jews were forced to pay the
Muslim rulers of al-Andalus the jizya, a yearly poll tax intended not only as the price of
their being ahlu dhimma (people of “protection” or simply al dhimma or dhimmis), but
also as a sign of their humiliation before Islam.11 As dhimmis, they were under the
supervision and “protection” of an Islamic functionary from the office of the Kitabatudh-dhimam, or “Office of Protection.”12 Jews were allowed to practice their religion
and rule themselves according to their religious laws, but only within their
neighborhoods and always under rules created and enforced by the hegemonic Muslim
culture.
In order to prevent the expansion of the Jewish community, building new synagogues
was seldom permitted. Jewish buildings were required to be lower than Muslim
buildings. Jews were not allowed to carry weapons or ride horses, and they had to show
deference to Muslims. They could not give evidence in court against a Muslim. No
Muslim life could be taken for killing a Jew, but a Jewish life could be taken for killing
a Muslim. Jews were not allowed to criticize Islam, Muhammad, or the Quran. They
could not proselytize.
They were not allowed to have sexual relations with or marry a Muslim woman under
penalty of death, although a Muslim man could marry a Jewish woman and their
children had to be brought up as Muslims. Jews could not dress as Muslim chiefs,
scholars, or nobility. They could not dress in such an ostentatious manner as to offend
poorer Muslims. They could not hold Muslims as slaves or servants, but Muslims could
hold Jews as slaves or servants.
They had to wear a distinctive sign on their clothes, usually a yellow band, badge, or
cap, so that they could not “pass” as Muslims (standard practice towards Jews in the
Middle East, eventually imitated by Christians—an origin often overlooked by
scholarship on Jewish-Christian relations: see my note 12). Eating implements used by
Jews could not be used by Muslims because they were polluted. The sum of these and
other conditions, under which Jews in Islamic Spain were allowed to live and prosper,
were part of the Muslim dhimma, or “writ of protection.”
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Of course, these were merely the official caveats on Jewish behavior, intended to keep
the infidels in their place and aware of their subordinate status. As in other societies,
including the Christian ones, such legal injunctions were not always enforced by the
rulers. But the point is that they both reflected and shaped the attitudes of the Muslim
masses towards Jewry. Certainly, Islamic scholars were unanimous in the assertion that
dhimmis (Jews and Christians under Islamic rule) must not be placed in positions of
authority over Muslims.
In a multicultural Islamic realm beset by ethnic conflicts (even among Arabs
themselves, Berbers, freed white slaves raised as Muslims, Hispano-Visigoth Islamic
converts or muladis of the first and later generations, various family clans within these
divisions, and class, religious, and political rivalries), Muslim functionaries often
selected Jews for their administrative skill, financial support, and a loyalty which, unlike
that of Muslim functionaries, was undivided by allegiance to the ulama or to other
Muslim clans and families. The precariousness of Jewish well-being ultimately
depended on the good will of the rulers.
The violations of Islamic law increased as Islam’s energy and power declined and legal
barriers against Jewish ascendancy sometimes went unobserved, especially after the
disintegration of the Caliphate of Cordoba in the early years of the 11th century, and the
subsequent rise of the weak Taifa kingdoms, when the Sephardic community in general,
and its leaders in particular, achieved positions of power unheard of before in alAndalus.13 Periods of weak Islamic faith coincided with periods of Jewish flourishing.
Even then, however, circumstances could adversely affect the Jewish condition, always
insecure because ultimately dependent on a given Muslim ruler’s favor.14
This insecurity of Sephardic life, even when most successful, or perhaps because of this
very success, is shown by several expulsions and pogroms in al-Andalus. Jews were
expelled from Cordoba in 1013 and their wealth confiscated, as punishment for their
having taken the side of a defeated Muslim leader in one of the frequent internecine
struggles of the Taifa kingdoms. As a result, the Sephardic community from Cordoba,
which included the then young rabbi Samuel Ibn Naghrela, fled to Granada, Toledo,
Zaragoza, and even to Catholic lands.15 Muslim sources tell of later anti-Jewish Muslim
riots in other Taifa kingdoms, one of them again in Cordoba in 1135.16
In 1039 the Jewish vizier of the Taifa kingdom of Zaragoza, Rabbi Yekutiel AbenHassan, was killed by a Muslim mob in his palace after the assassination of the ruler,
Al-Mondhir.17 The precariousness of Jewish life in Muslim Spain was confirmed when
Rabbi Joseph Ibn Naghrela, the son of the most powerful of Jewish leaders, Rabbi
Samuel Ibn Naghrela, “The Prince,” and like him a vizier at the service of the Muslim
ruler of the Taifa kingdom of Granada, was killed by the rioting Muslim populace in
1066, along with four thousand other Jews, in a pogrom that destroyed the city of
Granada’s Sephardic community, only a few years after the death of “The Prince.”18
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The alim Abu Ibn Ishaq (d. 1067) criticized the Taifa ruler of Granada for favoring the
Jewish community, but his satiric poem, which brings up both religious and political
issues, is representative of Andalusian popular views regarding the “power of the Jews.”
He has chosen an infidel as his secretary/ when he could, had he wished, have
chosen a Believer./ Through him, the Jews have become great and proud/ and
arrogant; they, who were among the most abject./ And have gained their desires
and attained the utmost/ and this happened suddenly, before they even realized
it./ And how many a worthy Muslim humbly obeys/ the vilest ape among these
miscreants./ And this did not happen through their own efforts/ but through one
of our own people who rose as their accomplice./ Oh why did he not deal with
them, following/ the example set by worthy and pious leaders?/ Put them back
where they belong/ and reduce them to the lowest of the low,/ Roaming among
us, with their little bags,/ with contempt, degradation and scorn as their lot,/
Scrabbling in the dunghills for colored rags/ to shroud their dead for
burial.../Those low-born people would not be seated in society/ or paraded along
with the intimates of the ruler..../ God has vouchsafed in His revelations/ a
warning against the society of the wicked./ Do not choose a servant from among
them/ but leave them to the curse of the accurst!/
…I came to live in Granada/ and I saw them frolicking there./ They divided up
the city and the provinces/ with one of their accursed men everywhere./ They
collect all the revenues,/ they munch and they crunch./ They dress in the finest
clothes/ while you wear the meanest./ They are the trustees of your secrets,/ yet
how can traitors be trusted?/ Others eat a dirham’s worth, afar,/ while they are
near and dine well..../ Their chief ape has marbled his house/ and led the finest
spring water to it./ Our affairs are now in his hands/ and we stand at his door./
He laughs at our God and our religion..../ Hasten to slaughter him as an offering,/
sacrifice him, for he is a fat ram!/ And do not spare his people/ for they have
amassed every precious thing..../ Do not consider it a breach of faith to kill
them,/ the breach of faith would be to let them carry on./ They have violated our
covenant with them..../ God watches His own people/ and the people of God will
prevail.19
These views were not uncommon. Ibn Hazm’s references to “the Jews” as corrupters of
religion not only had an Islamic theological basis but also political implications in the
context of his lamenting the disintegration of the Caliphate of Cordoba and the rise of
the Taifa kingdoms.20 Ibn Hazm was part of literary circles where these anti-Jewish
polemics were not unheard of, and he probably drew on Jewish Karaite anti-rabbinical
writings.21
Ibn Abbas, the Arab vizier of the ruler of the Taifa kingdom of Almeria, hated Berbers
and despised Jews.22 Arab poets in the Taifa kingdom of Seville accused the Granadan
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rulers of “believing in Judaism even though they called themselves Berbers.”23 The last
Ziri king of Granada, Abd Allah Ibn Buluggin (r. 1073-1090), virulently attacked in his
memoirs rabbi Joseph Ibn Naghrela, insisting on the vizier’s Jewish treacherousness and
favoritism towards coreligionists, all of which presumably justified the murder of the
vizier in the pogrom of 1066.24
All Muslim sources that mention this pogrom agree with king Abd Allah’s assessment
of “the Jews.”25 Jewish documents from Islamic lands in the Middle Ages even show the
existence of a word not found in the Torah, but coined to designate such Jew-haters:
sone (“a hater”).26 Medieval Islamic anti-Judaism had both a religious and a political
origin fueled by Muslim narratives and traditions.27
In spite of such generalized anti-Jewish attitudes, the Sephardic community managed to
prosper, as long as rulers in the Taifa kingdoms continued their practice of using the
services of capable Jewish functionaries, bankers, and tax collectors. Thus Rabbi Isaac
Ibn Albalia, after escaping the Granada pogrom of 1066, served as astrologer of the
Abbasid prince of the Taifa kingdom of Seville, al-Mutamid (also known as Albukassim
Muhammad; he was deposed by the Almoravids in 1091). Ibn Albalia became leader
and protector (“Nagid” or “Prince”) of all the Jewish communities of the kingdom and a
Maecenas (cultural advisor) to a number of Jewish luminaries. 28
Nevertheless, such favor went against the feelings of the Muslim masses and the
judgment of the ulama class. In al-Andalus, the religious and, therefore, civil authorities
(in the Islamic world there was no distinction between civil and religious law in
everyday life) were a class of educated people in charge of developing and interpreting
fiqh, that is, of interpreting the body of applications of divine law—sharia, unlike the
separation of these powers in the Catholic West. These educated people were the ulama(sing. alim), meaning “wise” or “learned.” In short, the ulama were Islamic clerics,
from among whom were drawn the legal experts, men, and only men,29 learned in the
eternal Holy Book, the Quran, and in the variously authoritative traditional narratives of
the Prophet’s sayings and deeds--sunnah.
As with the Umayyads before, the Taifa kings may have been led to their practice of
using Jewish functionaries in part because these functionaries would be more loyal to
them than to the ulama, or even to Islam itself, since they did not share the faith; and
also, and for the same reason, because they were not potential challengers to the Muslim
rulers, who were always looking over their shoulder for potential enemies from their
own people or from another Muslim group (Berber, Arabs, freed Muslim white slaves,
etc.).30
Moreover, Taifa kings tried to compensate for their political and military weakness by
attracting and subsidizing intellectuals, poets, and artists of all creeds, to enhance the
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prestige of their courts.31 This search facilitated the presence of gifted Jewish leaders
among the aristocracy of the Sephardic community.
In the Catholic kingdoms, monarchs such as Alfonso VI of Castile also made use of and
protected the Jewish community; but upon this king’s death, there were riots against
Jewish neighborhoods, as the masses’ pent up resentment erupted.32 In the medieval
courts of the Catholic kingdoms, Jewish notables could occupy important positions and
the Sephardic population at large benefitted from the rulers’ favor.33
During the Almoravid invasion, Jewish contingents fought on the side of the Catholics
of Alfonso VI at the battle of Zalaca (1086, North of Badajoz), as well as on the side of
the victorious Berbers. In later centuries, Jews who had converted to Christianity
(conversos) likewise enjoyed the favor of monarchs and the nobility, and some members
of formerly Jewish families reached important positions within government, such as the
wealthy Luis de Santangel, tax collector and financial officer to Ferdinand and Isabella,
and Gabriel Sanchez, treasurer and counselor to the kingdom of Aragon.
Jewish converts to Christianity could also rise within the ranks of the Catholic church,
such as bishop Pablo de Santa María, formerly known as Solomon Halevi, and also, to a
lesser extent, Abner of Burgos, who became Abner of Valladolid, and Joshua Ha-Lorki,
who adopted the name Jeronimo de Santa Fe upon being converted by the influence of
Saint Vincent Ferrer. None of this, however, stopped members of the largely peasant
Catholic masses from looking with suspicion and envy upon both Jews and conversos.
In Islamic Spain, the Taifa rulers’ generally favorable treatment of the Jewish
community continued to elicit complaints from the ulama. One anonymous document
from the 11th century complains that the “princes of the Believers” were giving
themselves up to pleasure, while handing over their power to “the Jews.”34 An
anthologist, Ibn Bassam (XII c.), complained that someone had told him of having seen
the ruler of Granada, Badis, and his Jewish vizier, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Naghrela, together
in Cordoba, and that one could not tell who was the ruler and who was the subject.35
Later Arabic sources insistently lament the hegemonic status of the Jewish community
in the administrative echelons of the Taifa kingdoms, and they offer this perceived
Jewish control of things as the explanation and justification for the various anti-Jewish
Muslim riots in the Middle Ages as well as the political decline of Islam.36 Thus
historian Ibn al-Kardabus, complaining of the Sephardic influence in the Taifa kingdom
of Seville, connected this presumed “Jewish power” to the increasing danger of the
Christian Reconquest: “The affairs of the Muslims were given to the Jews; then they
caused in these affairs the destruction of lions, as they became chamberlains, viziers,
and secretaries. Meanwhile Christians every year went around al-Andalus, pillaging,
burning, destroying, and taking away prisoners.” 37
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This popular unhappiness with the Taifa monarchs’ favoritism towards Jewish leaders,
combined with the inability of these monarchs to stand up to the growing power of the
Catholic kingdoms, was a factor in the general support given by the ulama class and the
Andalusian masses to the invasions of the Berber Almoravids and Almohads, which
would eventually prompt the exodus of many Jews towards the Catholic kingdoms.
The arrival from Africa in 1086 of devout Muslim warriors from the Sahara desert, the
Almoravids (al-murabitun, “those dwelling in frontier garrisons”) 38 initially threatened
the precarious well-being of Judaism in al-Andalus. However, skillful maneuvering by
its leaders, and lavish contributions to the coffers of the Almoravid Emir, Yusuf Ibn
Tashufin (whom only El Cid, among Catholic leaders, was able to defeat), turned the
situation around---in spite of the enmity of the ulama. After the death of Ibn Tashufin,
his son, Ali Ibn Yusuf (1108-1143), once again began to rely on Jewish functionaries as
administrators, bankers, and tax collectors.39
Less fortunate were the Catholics, already a minority, who under the Almoravids
suffered persecutions and mass expulsions to Africa.40
But the conquest of al-Andalus by the also fanatical Muslim warriors, the Almohads (alMuwahhidun, or “Those who assert the unity of God”), under the military leadership of
their formidable Caliph, Abu Yaqub Yusuf, endangered Judaism once again. Yusuf
captured Seville from its Almoravid rulers in 1147, and soon afterwards the entire
Almoravid Empire fell in the hands of these new Berber invaders from the Atlas
Mountains of North Africa.
After 1148, in an effort to unify their quarrelsome multicultural domains, the Almohads
gave both the Jewish and the Catholic communities the choice of either conversion to
Islam or expulsion to Africa ---- as the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella would
do with the Jewish community in 1492, in imitation of the Almohads. And again as
would happen in 1492, many Sephardim chose false conversions, as the great
Andalusian rabbi and philosopher Moses Maimonides had advised.41
But some might not have given up without making an effort to resist: Muslim historian
Ibn Sahibi-s-Salat accused the Sephardic community of Granada, led by Rabbi Sahr Ben
Ruiz ibn Dahri, of having opened the doors of the then Almohad-controlled city to the
rebel Andalusian chieftain Ibn Humushk around 1161.42 As for Catholics, what was left
of their dhimmi population in Granada was exterminated in the aftermath of a revolt
against the Almohads in 1164, and Yusuf boasted that he had left no church or
synagogue standing in al-Andalus.
Those Sephardim who refused to convert escaped to the Catholic kingdoms, Africa, and
the Middle East, while the remaining practicing Catholics fled to the Christian kingdoms
in a movement that ended Catholic dhimmi (“mozarabic”) life in al-Andalus for all
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practical purposes.43 Many Catholics and Jews would eventually return, however,
during the rapid advance of the Reconquest, following the defeat of the Almohads at the
decisive battle of Navas de Tolosa (July 16, 1212) by the joined armies of the Catholic
kings of Castile, Navarra, and Aragon.
In 1492, Granada king Boadbil capitulated to the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and
Isabella. Boabdil belonged to the Nasrid dynasty, of “Arabic” origin—the founder of the
dynasty, Muhammad b. Nasr, was called al-Hamar, or “The Red,” because of his red
beard, which betrayed the frequent Caucasian slave ancestry of the “Arab” rulers of alAndalus. But this “Arabic” Boabdil made sure to include in the treatise of surrender to
the Catholics a clause which reflected Islamic law and which stipulated that “Your
Highnesses will not allow Jews to have any authority over Muslims nor collect any kind
of taxes from them.”44
All these Muslim perceptions of Jewry in medieval Islamic Spain, from Arabs and
Berbers alike, do not seem different from those that some scholars, concentrating solely
on medieval Catholic Europe, have identified as among the root causes of modern antiJewish prejudice and persecution.45 Moreover, Maribel Fierro has pointed out how the
actions of the Almohads towards other religious groups were in fact consciously
modeled upon the actions of Muhammad and early Islam towards other religious groups
as recorded by the Muslim tradition.46
It should be clear, then, that such assertions as “Jews lived happily and productively in
Spain for hundreds of years before the Inquisition and the Expulsion of 1492,” are
creations of Jewish lore, originating in wishful thinking and superficial scholarship.47 So
are representative statements such as this one: “The generally harmonious relations that
prevailed between the Muslims and Jews throughout the Muslim world in the early
medieval period were brutally interrupted with the emergence of a fanatical sect in the
12th century in North Africa: the Almohads (al-Muwahhidun, “unifiers,” i.e. strict
believers in the unity of God).”
Relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in medieval Islamic Spain were certainly
not “harmonious.” They could not have been otherwise, however, because as was the
case also with the Christian dhimmis, these so-called “relations” were not among equals.
Rather, they existed under rules created by a hegemonic religion and culture —
medieval Islam — and were intended not only to keep the dhimmis in their proper place
as a social class subordinate to the dominant one, but also to remind these infidels of
their subaltern status. Violations of contemporary Islamic rules by opportunistic princes
in need of service and support did not alter and could not alter the legal framework
developed by a dominant and domineering medieval religion and its culture.48

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol68/iss68/12

32

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

29

Notes
1

Variations on this tactic can be found from ancient times to the 20th century, used by the United
States toward the Montagnard Hmong against the Marxist-Leninists, to the 21st century invasion
of Iraq by the United States, where initially the invaders favored the majority Shiites against the
Sunni, the Kurds against both, and then for a while the Sunni militias against the al-Qaida
organization and the Shiite militias. In the Congo, colonizing Belgians favored Tutsis against
other groups. Hernan Cortes favored his Indian allies against the Mexica Empire. As a
counterbalance to the Islamic Algerians, French authorities favored Jews, who “were given a
superior status by the colonizing French from the start:” Peter Scholliers, Food, Drink and
Identity. Cooking, Eating and Drinking in Europe Since the Middle Ages (Brussels: Berg,
2001), 207-208.
2

As a result of these discriminatory laws, many Jews converted, some sincerely, but others only
in order to remain in Spain rather than live elsewhere (made difficult anyway because of
expulsions elsewhere as well), while practicing Judaism in secret. The reiteration of these
Visigoth laws in each successive royal Council suggests that they were not being very effective.
In fact, the Muslim invasion of 711 found a Jewish community strong enough to be of help in
the conquest. Benzion Netanyahu’s “The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain”
(New York: New York Review of Books, 2001) traces back to the 6th and 7th centuries in Spain
the origins of the European anti-Jewish ethos, points out that it was mostly the lower classes
who felt economically threatened by Jews and vented their animosity against them, and argues
that many Jews had sincerely converted to Christianity. See also the best study of the Spanish
Inquisition: Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition: A Historical Revision (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1999): and Bernard Hamilton, The Medieval Inquisition (New York: Homes
and Meier, 1981).

3

See also next note. Several Muslim sources confirm what appears to have been a customary
procedure: Ajbar Machmua, trans. Emilio Lafuente y Alcantara (Madrid, 1867; rpt. Madrid: El
Bibliofilo, 1984), 25, 27, 29; Al-Makkari in his The History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in
Spain, trans. Pascual de Gayangos (London: 1840; rpt. London: Johnson Reprint Company
Limited, Company Limited, 1964), vol. I, 280-82; Ibn Idari al-Marrakusi, Historia de alAndalus, trans. Francisco Fernández González (1860; rpt. Malaga: Aljaima, 1999), 17-42; Ibn
al-Qutiya, Historia de la conquista de España de Abenalcotía el cordobés, trans. Julián Ribera
(Madrid: Revista de Archivos, 1926), 8. Gayangos and other scholars argue that Jews invited
Muslims to invade the Visigothic realm and afterwards “everywhere made common cause with
them” (al-Makkari, I, 531, n. 18).

Francisco Cantera Burgos states that Jews constituted a fifth column before the invasion:
“Christian Spain,” in Cecil Roth, The Dark Ages: Jews in Christian Europe, 711-1096 (Tel
Aviv: Jewish History Publications Ltd, 1966), 357, 450, n. 1.
According to Salo Baron, Spanish mistrust of Jews and conversos in the Middle Ages and
beyond was perhaps based on Jews having been a fifth column for the Muslim invasion of
Spain: A Social and Religious History of the Jews (New York: Columbia University Press,
1958), vol. V, 135-36. According to Alan Harris Cutler, “the Christians of Franco-Germany
also saw the Jews as a potential Islamic fifth column and at times persecuted the Jews very
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severely for this precise reason:” The Jew as Ally of the Muslim: Medieval Roots of AntiSemitism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 395 n. 17.
Norman Roth rests importance to the Jewish part in the Islamic invasion of Spain: “The Jews
and the Muslim Conquest of Spain,” Jewish Social Studies 38 (1976): 145-158. Elyahu Ashtor
points out that Jews supported Muslims against Catholic rebels (such as Umar ibn Hafsun, St.
Eulogius, etc.) and against Christians in the North (such as King Alfonso III of Asturias circa
866-910) who attacked Muslims in the South, and that Jews sat with Muslims in the Christian
Council of Cordoba (863) to make sure the council did not encourage Christian rebelliousness:
The Jews of Moslem Spain (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1973; trans. Jenny
Maklowitz Klein of Korot ha-Yehudim bi-Sefarad ha-Muslemit ), I, 68-69, 92-93, 98-99.
According to Arthur J. Zuckerman, there was a Judeo-Islamic conspiracy to seize Catholic
Barcelona in 852: Jewish Princedom in Feudal France, 768-900 Study in Jewish History (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pages 316-318. A contingent of Jewish troops from
Africa under the command of Kaula-al-Yehudi was part of the Muslim army that defeated the
Visigoths at Guadalete (Jerez), and the Muslim conquerors favored Jewish immigration from
many lands as part of their political design against the Spanish Catholics: Amador de los Rios,
Historia social, politica y religiosa de los judios de España y Portugal (Madrid: Fontanet,
1875), vol. 1, 116-117, notes 1 and 2 and 118-119. None of this endeared the Jewish
community to the Catholics in the North and to the Catholic dhimmis under Muslim rule
(Amozarabs).
4

Sidney David Markman, Jewish Remnants in Spain: Wanderings in a Lost World (Mesa:
Scribe Publishers, 2003), 7. In North Africa and the Middle East, Muslims soon realized that
they could use the Jewish community, unhappy with its treatment in the Greek Roman Empire
(Byzantine), to help keep the Christians under control. A. S. Tritton cites several Muslim
sources on the matter: The Caliphs and their Non-Muslim Subjects. A Critical Study of the
Covenant of Umar (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1930; rpt. 1970), 94-95. Alan Harris Cutler
and Helen Elmquist cite Christian primary sources attributing the persecutions of Jews in
Europe in 1010 and the 1060's to the widespread belief in the collusion of Jews with Islam and
argue that the “association of Jew with Muslim was the crucial factor in the persecution of
1096" as well: Cutler, 400-402.
News of the alleged joint attack by Jews and Muslims against the Church of the Holy Sepulchre
in 966, and of the Muslim Fatimids’ actual destruction of the same Church in 1010, had reached
Europe, and fostered animosity; it was a motivation for the eventual massacre of Jews during the
conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 during the First Crusade (Cutler, 403-405). The Christian Greeks
had long accused Jews of being in collusion with Muslims, and when Jerusalem capitulated to
Islam in 638, the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronios, requested and obtained Muslim
protection against Jews to avoid a repetition of the massacres of Greek Christians that took place
in the city in 614: see my next note and Joshua Starr, Jews in the Byzantine Empire (Research
and Source Works Series, No 386) (Farnborough: Gregg, 1969), 109.

5

Like Muslims later, Persians took advantage of Jewish-Christian enmity: Elliott Horowitz,
“The Vengeance of the Jews Was Stronger Than Their Avarice; Modern Historians and the
Persian Conquest of Jerusalem in 614,” Jewish Social Studies Vol. 4, No. 2, 1-25; Reckless
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Rites: Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
229. A number of primary sources claim Jewish retaliatory killings of Christians upon the
Persian conquest of Jerusalem: Theophanes the Confessor (d. 818) in The Chronicle of
Theophanes Confessor. Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284-813, ed. Cyril Mango and
Roger Scott with the assistance of Geoffrey Greatrex (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 431;
Antiochus Strategos of Mar Saba in “Antiochus Strategos, The Capture of Jerusalem by the
Persians in 614 A.D.,” trans. F.C. Coneybeare, English Historical Review 25 (1910), 502-517;
the Armenian bishop Sebeos, in The Armenian History Attributed to Sebeos, trans. R.W.
Thomson (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), Part I, 68-69.
See also Heinrich Graetz, History of the Jews (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of
America, 1894), vol. 3, 18-22. The Jewish Encyclopedia states that the story of Jews buying
Christians and then massacring them at the Mamilla Pool in Jerusalem is fiction (see
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com article “Chosroes (Khrosu) II. Parviz.”
Recent Israeli archeological excavations in Jerusalem have discovered thousands of remains of
men, women, and children, with a majority of them of women, in the site of the Mamilla Pool,
dating back to the times of the Persian conquest of the city: Yossi Nagar, “Human Skeletal
Remains from the Mamilla Cave, Jerusalem,” Israeli Archeological Authority website, who
attributes the massacre to the Persians
http://www.antiquities.org.il/article_Item_eng.asp?sec_id=17&sub_subj_id=179
Israeli archeologist Ronny Reich does not exonerate the Jewish community and estimates the
total dead at 60,000 before the Persians stopped the carnage: see Gil Zohar, “Massacre at
Mamilla,” Jerusalem Post, March 2, 2006.
6

For example, Bernard Lewis, “The Judeo-Islamic Heritage,” Pe`amim 20 (1984), 3-13.

7

Much has been written on the subject: Menahem Mansoor, Jewish History and Thought
(Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 1991); Angela Navarro Petro, Literatura hispanohebrea (s.
x-xiii) (Cordoba: El Almendro, 1988); Angel Sainz-Badillos, Literatura hebrea en la España
medieval (Madrid: Fundacion Amigos de Sefarad, 1991). More sober is the excellent M. R.
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University Press, 2010).
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9

Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 67.

10

To this idealization, Jewish writings have contributed which, at least until recently,
overlooked daily oppression and played up Jewish prosperity in order to contrast it to the
situation under Christianity. For studies of this phenomenon, see Tudor Parfitt, ed. Israel and
Ishmael: Studies in Muslim-Jewish Relations (Richmond, England: Curzon, 2000), 207-225;
Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984); I thank Daniel Pipes for
calling my attention to another excellent critique of Jewish scholarship’s favorable treatment of
Islam: The Jewish Discovery of Islam; Studies in Honor of Bernard Lewis, ed. Martin Kramer
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The Cash of Civilizations:
How African Civilization Has Found Another Dupe In Chinese Efforts
to Buy Long-term Control Through Short-Term Deals
John Aron Grayzel

jagrayzel@aol.com
Background

Today there is increasing speculation concerning the consequences of the emergence of
the Peoples Republic of China as a major power. This was exemplified by the theme of
the 2012 ISCSC conference: “The Coming Clash of Civilizations: China versus the
West.”
In engaging in such speculations, it would be wise to remember the explanation of
Arnold Toynbee that:
“I reject the present-day habit of studying history in terms of national states;
these seem to be fragments of something larger: a civilization. In so far as man
needs to classify information before interpreting it, this large scale unit seems to
me to be less distorting than a smaller scale.” 1
Unfortunately because so much study and data is compiled under the rubric of the nation
state, this can be harder to accomplish than conceive. Thus it is that the growth of the
nation of China, and the relative change in the conditions of the United States of
America as a nation, are so often cited as examples of the historic transformation that is
occurring in today’s world.
It is often stated that in Africa, China is displacing, and potentially clashing with, both
former colonial powers and the U.S. It has become the continent’s largest provider of
development funding and provides, as well, a stream of Chinese immigrants. These
immigrants are establishing themselves as individual economic actors across a spectrum
of African economic sectors, small, medium and large.
Forty years ago, when I first went to Africa, the Chinese were present as small teams
that Mao Zedong sent to build and run power plants, hospitals, industrial plants, and
other major infrastructure assets. What then characterized the Chinese in Africa was
their insularity from the Africans themselves.
Back then, while many Chinese had been taught the local language, they only used it in
their formal functions. Otherwise, when they did venture beyond their official locations,
they would walk together in groups, closely huddled next to one another, and not
directly engaging anyone else on the street.
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Though the Chinese built important infrastructure for the continent of Africa, and sold
large quantities of cheap goods there, the greatest influence – the dominant foreign
presence – in Africa over the last years of the Twentieth Century were the Western
donors, especially the former colonial powers. The Westerners didn’t have to speak the
local language because the elite spoke theirs – often the direct result of massive
assistance for overseas studies in American and European universities. Western donor
assistance also included significant investment in both “hard” concrete infrastructure
and “soft” institution building in terms of operational, managerial and technical
assistance.
The “soft” aspects were seen as key to both immediate operational efficiency and longterm sustainability by Africans themselves. Private Western companies made money
from assistance-related activities. However, they generally shied away from long term
commitments and substantial in-country investment; this was due to their general
discomfort with Africa’s highly uncertain investment climate, its lack of a wellestablished rule of law, and the capricious demands and changing personalities of local
politics.
Today, dramatically, much has changed.
The Chinese are present not only officially but also informally. They are private
business people, heads of large construction firms, restaurant owners, food and flower
farmers, and sellers of assorted sundries in local markets. It is estimated that more than
one million Chinese men and women may live in Africa today. 2
In addition, large Chinese state corporations have ever-growing interests in extracting
African oil, timber and minerals. We note: Chinese state companies, unlike Western
companies, feel very much at home working through the machinations of centrally
controlled political economies. Moreover, the Chinese government itself has tried to buy
large tracts of land to produce export food for the Chinese mainland market.
Selective African regimes today receive substantial imports of Chinese military
equipment. In 2012 China pledged twenty billion dollars in investments to Africa over
the next three years. 3 China has also signed approximately fifty education assistance
agreements with African nations and is negotiating with the Seychelles its first use of
African port facilities for military vessels. 4
Meanwhile, Western nations have increasingly withdrawn from providing significant
state-building support. The United States is obsessed with “the war on terror” and
therefore increasingly directs its foreign assistance to programs that it feels help to win
minds and hearts – mainly health and education. Large foreign assistance expenditures
have swung to the establishment of a significant American military presence in Africa.
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What remains of classical development aid is only a shadow of a past that centered on
substantial nation-to-nation investment in the promotion of cultural connectivities and
the education of future African leaders. Today, when the U.S. looks at both militant
Islamic fundamentalism and the growing Chinese influence in Africa, it sees growing
potential political-military adversaries. No longer does it see cultural and spiritual
competitors.
Western and Chinese views diverge, not only on what should be done but also on the
likely consequences of their different orientations.
•

•

The West, especially the USA, thinks that by promoting Western democratic
ideologies, focusing on immediate political / military interests, they will be able
to weaken perceived competitors. They hold that China, economically, and
Islamic fundamentalism, militarily, will fail. Africa will “evolve” socially and
politically, with increasing Westernization and as part of the prevailing global
political economy.
Specific African nations and leaders are seen as
instrumentally, but not fundamentally, important. So, funding comes with
advice, admonitions, and conditional ties. The West call these part of a policy
dialogue. African elites see this as hypocritical annoyances.
Conversely, the Chinese act as if by accepting African leaders and African
leadership practices as enduring, and by focusing their investments on
penetrating into African commerce, they will establish long term integration into
Africa itself. Unlike the West, the Chinese are short on overt intervention but
long on relentlessly building economic dependencies.

Put another way, the West seeks to transport Western institutions into Africa, especially
through African civil society. By contrast, China appears in the process of
demographically infusing, rather than integrating, into Africa. They are doing so in a
fashion that will lacquer their presence across multiple socio-economic layers.
The United States is betting on the creation of military alliances, cultural addictions and
institutional intertwinings. The Chinese are seemingly betting on creating economic
addictions, demographic intertwinings and personal leadership alliances. The West
thinks it can transform African society and institutions. The Chinese think they can
outfox African society and institutions.
Both the West and China give little credence to the strength of traditional African
society and institutions. Yet in both of these strategies there may lie poison pills.
Efforts to induce change through influence and admonition are easy to undercut by
ignoring in practice what is accepted in theory. Concomitantly, efforts to seduce though
enticement and ingratiation are easy to undercut by simply accepting the benefits and
then refusing to reciprocate with the expected response.
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The bias of the West, especially the United States, is in their seeing China’s actions in
Africa as clashing with Western civilization, and the bias of the Chinese rests in their
seeing themselves as able to replace Western influence by cajoling Africans rather than
trying to convert them. I suggest that, at least in Africa, not only is there is no clash of
civilizations, or even interests, between the U.S. and China, but that, in fact, China, if
not intentionally then inadvertently, is taking on the greater responsibility. Its task will
be to maintain the Western-created nation state system in Africa and the continent’s
post-colonial national political economies.
However, I also believe that in the long run the Chinese are not going to be any more
successful in “conquering Africa”, than was the West before them. Rather, it is African
Civilization that will be the real victor and Africans the power holders of that
civilization.
The Academic Devaluation of African Civilizations
We can understand present and evolving Africa through concepts of civilization,
especially those of Arnold Toynbee. Specifically helpful is the approach of conceiving
civilizations as units of analysis above the nation state, built, nurtured and consciously
expanded by elites. 5
Begin by asking why sub-Saharan Africa is not regularly viewed as a separate
civilization. Highly popular thinkers typically emphasize African “failures.” Thus they
are led to assume that Africa does not, has not, and cannot, play in the same league of
civilizations as the West or China. In addition, there is the sad reality that many
discount Africa’s importance due to factors such as racism, ethnocentrism, and the
relative paucity of material manifestations of Western and Asian classic civilizations,
particularly writings and material monuments.
Here is an ironic example: it denies the existence of African civilization while it
envisions a role in Africa for both the West and China. It is from a letter Sir Francis
Galton, cousin of Charles Darwin, and a geographer, anthropologist, eugenicist and
statistician, wrote in 1873:
My proposal is to make the encouragement of the Chinese settlements at
one or more suitable places on the East Coast of Africa a part of our
national policy, in the belief that the Chinese immigrants would not only
maintain their position, but that they would multiply and their
descendants supplant the inferior Negro race… (which) possess too little
intellect, self-reliance, and self-control to make it possible for them to
sustain the burden of any respectable form of civilization without a large
measure of external guidance and support.
The Chinaman is a being of another kind, who is endowed with a
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remarkable aptitude for a high material civilization…. The natural
capacity of the Chinaman shows itself by the success with which,
notwithstanding his timidity, he competes with strangers, wherever he
may reside….
The Anglo-Saxon race … are restricted to … where the climate is
temperate. …to inhabit permanently; the greater part of Africa is the
heritage of people differently constituted to ourselves....
I wish to see a new competitor introduced-namely, the Chinaman. The
gain would be immense to the whole civilized world… 6

Now while we may empirically condemn Galton’s phrases and principles, one has to be
struck by Galton’s premises: (1) Africa’s future should be decided by the West and
China, and (2) Africa has little real power to affect the situation itself. This apparently
manifests itself today with Chinese money and immigration. The Chinese are replacing
Africans in a host of traditional Africa roles – such as in the fields of trade, small market
retail and agriculture. 7
The Importance of Borders and Thresholds
It is ironic that many of the negative factors, so often stated as obstructions to the
emergence of African civilization, actually have provided a unique form of protection
for Africa. Africa has incubated its own civilization and has cast its relationship with
other civilizations in a unique fashion. Thus, it differs dramatically from other great
civilizations.
For example, one of the most frequently repeated concepts associated with civilization
concerns cities. The emphasis on cities marginalizes, by definition, non-urban
civilizations. Polynesia stretches over thousands of miles and years, with continuous
efforts at expansion and consolidation. It is composed of a myriad of cultures -- but no
identifiable cities. So, too, it is with the more hybrid case of Africa, which has had
cities that were largely manifestations of, consolidations of, what were really village
civilizations within each local area. The African Civilization’s structure thus has been
somewhat analogous to that of the separate Polynesian Islands.
In additions to having cities, most civilizations have extended themselves across a
variety of large spatial entities defended by military troops and fortifications. Toynbee
makes a point that the frontiers of these entities have acted to both block and provide
entry points between those civilizations and external “Barbarians”. “Limes” is the Latin
word for military frontier but Toynbee also characterizes its importance as a
“threshold”.
“If the cultural ‘limen’ of a growing civilization is aptly described as the
hospitable threshold of an ever open door, the military limes of a disintegrating
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civilization can no less aptly be compared to a forbidding barrage astride a no
longer open valley” 8
“…the erections of limes sets in motion a play of social forces which is bound to
end disastrously for the builders; and for them, the only way of avoiding ultimate
disaster would be to preclude this fatal course of events by insulating completely
from one another, the two incompatible societies whose respective domains the
limes artificially demarcates.” 9
Africa’s Naturally Protected Frontiers
Such insulation between groups is rarely possible in history. Even such formidable
barriers as the Great Wall of China or Hadrian’s Wall in Britain are eventually breached.
What makes the African case so different is that its civilization, and its competing
societies, have largely engaged each other in the interior.
1. Africa south of the Sahara did not create “limes” but was instead largely
defended by natural obstruction to which Africans themselves had adapted.
Thus, the immense desert that separates sub-Saharan Africa from North Africa
was only passable with arduous and hazardous effort.
2. Africa was once known as “the white man’s grave.” One reason was the
especially virulent strains of malaria for which many Africans have partial
immunity through mild sickle cell anemia. This encouraged non-Africans to
limit contact and residence to defined coastal forts and settlements. 10
Similarly, the tsetse fly, which breeds under the shade of dense forest cover, and
which carries deadly equine sleeping sickness, limited the use of military
cavalries. Further, the density of the forests and the lack of navigable rivers
made systematic penetration into the interior insufferable. Finally, ocean travel
was dependent on sailing vessels and was therefore slow and convoluted due to
the nature of prevailing winds and currents. 11
The result was the creation and adaptation of an African civilization centered in the
interior of the continent. Africa‘s civilization has never been coastal. It has rather been
based in the hinterland and focused on associated villages and groups, with only a few
rare large urban communities. But the coast, the ocean, the desert sands, served their
purpose as a meeting ground for the African and the stranger. The African participants
emerged from the interior and the stranger (till colonialism) did not even attempt to
enter into, let alone change, the real world of African civilization.
The Nature and Control of the “Cash and Carry” Trade
What the stranger and the African did was to engage in what can be denoted as a “cash
and carry trade. By “cash and carry” I mean trade in wholesale quantities at specific
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locations rather than in an open market. The goods were paid for in full, with the buyer
transporting the goods away in their entirety. There is no credit, no necessary long term
or repeated transaction, no attached service element, no mandatory knowledge by each
party as to what, for whom, or how the other either obtained their goods, or what they
are going to do with the goods obtained in trade.
Each party in “Cash and Carry” basically comes with what they have to offer and takes
away as much of what they want as they can get in return. In the case of Africa, the
goods coming out of Africa varied, but they included ivory, gold, hard woods, pepper,
cotton, indigo cloth, animal hides and slaves. Europeans provided weapons, beads, iron
and copper bars. Asians brought silk and ceramics.
Those controlling the border contacts carefully guard their positions, and then introduce
the traded goods into their own societies for their own purposes. The preponderance of
goods provided by Africans to Westerners was of value as productive assets in Western
production systems. In contrast, the European goods provided Africans were
predominantly of value as means of enhancing political or social power by Africans
within African societies. In Africa, such traditional relationships, psychological and
social, still prevail under the guise of what are seen, by outsiders, as modern capitalist
market transactions or as national and corporate financial dealings between Africans and
non-Africans.
The Natures of African Civilizations
Traditional civilizational theorists maintain that civilizations have edges, boundaries and
thresholds that need to be established, cultivated, and protected. I agree. African
civilization drew its edges at the choke points of the wholesale “Cash and Carry” trade
with outsiders, (i.e. the rim of the Sahel and its cities, the coastal towns for slaving and
trading).
Within those boundaries there developed a genuine African civilization defined by
elements quite different from those of either the West or the East. The challenge is how
best to characterize these civilizations. Frequently they are equated with African
political entities: Ghana, Mali, and Greater Zimbabwe; with geography, such as Western
Sudan, East African, or Congo; 12 or via linguistic families such as Bantu, Swahili, and
Hamitic. But none of these truly have the coherent authentic, dynamic, and purposeful
qualities found in the concept of “civilization.”
I propose is to take seriously Toynbee’s conclusion that religion is at the foundation of
all civilizations.13 If we so identify African civilizations, we can speak of three African
civilizations: African animistic civilization, African Islamic civilization, and African
Colonial-Christian civilization.
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I. Afro-Animist Civilization
The most unusual of these three civilizations is the one I label the Afro-Animist
civilization. Afro-Animist civilization is built upon a religious vision of the world as
being an expression of an all-encompassing vital force. One of the great challenges to
recognizing African animism, as a religion, is that its institutions and organization are
most clearly expressed in what Europeans consider African “art.” However, what to
Europeans is seen as decoration, or the personal expression of the fabricator, to Africans
is actually a combination of creation, performance and possession. These are directly
tied to achieving real purposes, including economic benefit, community unity, rites of
passage, bodily health and association with ancestors.
Afro-Animist civilization often shares the characteristics of other civilizations in reverse
order. That is, its communities are much more relational than they are spatial. Its art is
much more a tool of direct transformation than a manifestation of phenomena in
everyday life. It is the spirit world that is considered ever present and the material world
that is seen as truly fleeting and uncertain. When Animistic practice creates material
things such as masks, fetish statuary, and sacred areas, it does not see these as “real”
until they are imbibed with a spirit reality. Then, even after it is both materially and
spiritually real, it is expected that the concerned item will eventually become worthless
when the spirit reality leaves it.
The difficulty with understanding the presence and operation of the African Animist
vision is that its characteristics are so obscure. It is easier to see the walls of a city than a
nebulous secret society, or an actual performance rather than the internal sense of the
performer. Logical and empirical descriptions cannot really express Animism
experientially. One needs to look at the arts themselves, including writings, such as
Camara Laya’s “The Radiance of the King,” to sense the mystery that goes beyond
intellectual understanding. 14
Like “Cash and Carry,” the characteristics of African Animism continue to play out
today in everyday life in Africa. This includes the political economy today hidden under
the façade of the nation state and a supposed modern capitalist market system.
Even though other civilizations have layered themselves upon it, Afro-Animism is still a
dynamic factor in what happens throughout much of Africa today. 15
II. Afro-Islamic Civilization
Afro-Animist civilization is almost completely an African creation, what Toynbee calls
an “unaffiliated” civilization. But the second African civilization, Afro-Islamic
civilization, is what Toynbee would call a "satellite” civilization. 16
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The initial attraction of Islam to Africans was that it created a new basis for
“community” among groups that needed to operate over extensive areas beyond and
outside their Animism communities. Thus it was the traders and high political elites who
initially adopted Islam in Africa; they established urban settlements in selective areas in
the Sahara, throughout the Sahel, and on the coasts of East Africa, to serve as resting
and exchange points for the trans-Saharan and seaward trade.
Though it occasionally tried, Islam did not destroy Animism in Africa. Even today, one
finds that Islam and Animism can co-exist among the same believers. Under these
circumstances, Islam is the religion that most serves purposes outside the family and
village, and allows interaction across groups in urban areas in the pursuit of economic
opportunity. Such “Islam” has historically been generally simple, flexible and nonfundamental. Meanwhile, Animism in practice reigns within the family and community
as the life force of the relationships that bind and make them one unit, and as the
foundation for longstanding clan claims to land and resources.
III. Afro- Colonial Christian Civilizations
Dramatic things happened between the 1870s, when Galton wrote his note, and the
Conference of Berlin in 1885, where the major Western powers reached agreement on
how to divide up Africa. By 1885, through a series of critical technological
breakthroughs, the West was final able to breach the natural fortresses of Africa -- its
deserts, unnavigable interior rivers, dense forests, disease-ridden settlements and
difficult ocean currents.
These breakthroughs included the steamship that provided rapid large scale
transportation of goods and people directly between Europe and Africa; the railroad, that
provided a means of access and direct transporting to the coast of resources from the
interior; and medical progress such as refined forms of quinine to treat malaria and
public health practices that significantly ameliorated the incidence of many
transmittable diseases.
Last but not least was the machine gun 17, invented by Hiram Maxim in 1885 and whose
role in colonialism was immortalized in the lines of the English poet and politician,
Hilaire Belloc, who wrote:
"Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not.” 18
The expansion of European colonial empires into Africa ushered in what I term the
Afro-Colonial Christian civilization. Afro-Colonial Christian civilization was a satellite
civilization of Western Christianity. In Afro-Colonial Christianity, the vision is of God
the Father as the white man, with salvation obtained through subservience to his
commands and administration, and delivered through his established political and
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religious orders and hierarchy, including the nation state, and the church. 19
Colonial Rule and the Relation between African Civilizations
The Colonial Era replaced African controllers at high levels with Europeans. It
subordinated locals to clearly defined roles of influence or service on the local level.
The Europeans controlled power, often through the indirect rule of subservient African
leaders, as well as all large investments, from plantations to mines to trading companies.
On the intermediate level, several outside groups, such as Lebanese, Indians, Jews and
Greeks, carved out specialized niches that established themselves as both forward and
backward links between the clearly bounded European colonial spheres and native
African markets and African-managed small production units.
As regards Afro-Animism, the Europeans tried to replace or suppress it – from
missionaries destroying ritual fetishes to the Belgians outlawing secret societies because
they saw them as a competing with allegiance to Belgian administration. As regards
Afro-Islam, colonial authorities felt more at home theologically with Islam as a higher
religion. In West Africa, their actions against Animism actually resulted in an increase
in Muslim as well as Christian believers. Colonial authorities generally followed a
policy of accommodation to Islam as long as the respective Islamic authorities did not
interfere or undermine colonial rule.
In the end, the colonial era provided neither a respite nor an end to Africa’s animists and
Islamic civilizations. Rather it controlled the time, place and extent of their relative
expression. It established frontiers and thresholds within Africa in ways that it saw as
most beneficial for the assertion of European control over high value production and
resources and for the control of the cash economy. The African elites, who in previous
times controlled the Cash and Carry trade between Africa and the outside world,
dissolved into a host of different roles according to their abilities and possibilities.
Colonialism, Cash and Civilization in Africa
However, cash itself remained a critical element in the transfer between spheres. The
colonial powers wanted cash for the cost of governance, while Western settlers and
business interests wanted cash as profits. The problem was that the political economy of
Animist Africa, and even Islamic Africa – outside of traditional traders – was a world
where riches were accumulated through enduring relationships, not monetary
transactions.
The colonial system, therefore, had to make a conscious effort to create a need for cash
on the part of the majority of Africans in order that the different populations and
civilizations could economically engage. The answer was to create for the average
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African a host of previously unknown cash needs: head taxes, household taxes, school
fees, and the monetization of traditional African agricultural commodities. These taxes
had “relational” as well as financial ends, and were perceived by Westerners as part of
the process of civilizing the Africans.
Sir Frederick Luggard, the first British Governor General of Nigeria wrote:
“Even though the collection of the small tribute from primitive tribes may at
first seem to give more trouble than it is worth, it is in my view of great
importance as … the contact with officials, which the assessment and
collection necessitates, brings these tribes into touch with civilizing
influences….” 20
William Ponty, the Governor of French West Africa, said:
“For the native … taxation, far from being the sign of a humiliating servitude, is
seen rather as proof that he is beginning to rise on the ladder of humanity, that he
has entered upon the path of civilization.” 21
The Consequences of Decolonization
Through such Western eyes, Colonial Afro-Christian civilization was clearly a new
stage in the advancement of civilization in Africa and an arrangement with enduring
benefits and capacity for long-term sustainability. Such was not, however, to be the
case. Thus, World War II and its aftermath carried over the unfinished business of
World War I in Europe and extended it to the entire world. A major factor in the rapid
transition was that in the aftermath of World War II, America’s will was dominant. The
creation of the United Nations, and the clearly anti-imperial ideology of Roosevelt, and
then Truman and Eisenhower, meant that the largely arbitrary borders of African
colonies were rapidly transformed into the frontiers and thresholds of newly
independent states.
Unfortunately, most of the new African states were unprepared to be independent
nations. They lacked the human, institutional and physical infrastructure for effective
governance. Though their “statehood” was largely a façade in terms of capacity to
govern, it did provide them with new sovereign frontiers – the artificial borders
established by their colonial masters. It also provided them the corresponding power to
manage access by both foreigners and their own citizens to power, privilege and
resources within their boundaries, under the guise of the doctrine of Westphalian
sovereignty.
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The Rise of African Nations -- New Roles in the New World Order
Decolonization was choreographed through a set of new international institutions,
beginning with the United Nations systems and the international financial structure.
Thus was framed the beginning of a new world order, with international institutions that
over time stewarded the expansion of the number and diversity of independent
sovereign states. Yet these new international institutions, through their actions in the
name of now emerging global policies, practices and standards, also gnawed away at the
classic, supposedly absolute, sovereignty of states as understood under the Westphalian
order.
The various concerned parties, across the spectrum of the participating civilizations,
scrambled to create new niches for the old African ways. Africans moved up in the
Afro-Colonial Christian hierarchies. African Animism reemerged from obscurity, now
more open. Afro-Islamic civilization began to expand its community-based activities,
moving into more prominent urban roles. Europeans devised new neo-colonial roles as
advisors and managers. Especially critical was that the end of the Age of Colonialism in
Africa provided opportunity for Africans who had been trained in European political
and military style but who retained the values of Afro-Animistic, Afro-Islamic and
Afro-Colonial-Christian civilizations: they created a new power elite.
Along with somewhat novel modern state responsibilities such as “president”, minister”,
and “general,” they assumed the traditional role of controllers of the new choke points
of the wholesale cash trade under the guise of government responsibilities and powers
that they increasingly de facto privatized for the benefit of themselves and their
relational group.
International Development and African Nations
Yet that encapsulating facade of modern statehood was a vital charade that had to be
supported and managed. In response to that need arose one of the yet most
unappreciated and uniquely new forces for global change – the concepts, practices and
consequences of international development assistance.
While inspired by the Marshall Plan and then adapted for assistance in the
modernization of selective nations by Truman, the final international development
model took form under President Eisenhower with the creation in 1957 of the
International Cooperation Agency. Eisenhower believed international assistance could
be a vital tool in the cold war arsenal. Eisenhower felt the strongest force influencing the
former colonies was neither communism nor capitalism but nationalism, and it was to
that motivation that foreign assistance needed to respond.
Largely with that understanding, for over three decades, the institutions and donors of
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international development assistance provided the means for African nations to maintain
and function as political states. But regardless of the mechanisms: grants, loans,
technology assistance, technology imports, education scholarships, and the construction
of infrastructure - African elites found ways of skimming for their direct personal
benefits. Such skimming was de facto accepted under the political justification of the
cold war and the humanitarian argument that such aid still assisted needy populations
and purposes that would otherwise go unaddressed. Thus, geo-politics and pan-national
humanitarian became the two supporting pillars of international development.
The End of the Cold War and Repositioning African Civilization
The sudden end of the Cold War pulled the pillow of national security support from
under the canopy of international development assistance. As a compensatory reaction,
there was a scramble to reinforce the humanitarian pillar through the creation of a new
set of justifications around what became officially known as the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). This was accompanied by an expansion of the
understanding of humanitarian assistance to encompass emerging ideas of human
security and the right of international humanitarian intervention, independent of the
wishes of the concerned sovereign state. Ironically, in Africa, the result was an actual
collapse of the national facade of specific African states such as Sierra Leone, Congo,
Liberia and Zimbabwe. Such governance collapses resulted in a self-reinforcing tilt
away from assistance that supported the failing state towards even more humanitarian
and human security interventions. This resulted in a growing vacuum of political,
economic and social stability.
So it was that the various elements of Africa’s three civilizations were inevitable drawn
in to fill this vacuum when they saw the “cash equation” in tumult and up for grabs.
The responses, however, often went beyond the nefarious to the pathological. AfroAnimist civilization responded with the emergence of non-state actors, including various
militias.
These militias actually used distorted animistic rituals to dismember functioning social
units and communities. They then reconstituted new groups with allegiance to
themselves. Next, they focused on the control of the choke points for the extraction of
valuable natural and mineral resources. Afro-Islamic civilization began to fall prey to
the cash rewards provided by foreign political Islamic interests, in return for accepting
the guise of more pro-Arab and fundamentalist Islamic doctrines and practices.
Afro-Colonial-Christianity increasingly separated itself from official governing
structures and its components began to restructure themselves as independent
evangelical movements aligned in many cases with fraternal movements in the United
States. The United States itself became so totally captivated by war in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and the idea of a war on terror, that it proved incapable of generating
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creative responses to the changing dynamics in Africa. The vacuum that it did not fill,
the missing support of governmental structures of the state system, China rushed in to
fill in its stead.
China has been able to move very fast. This is because it has the cash – much of it
derived from its trade imbalance with America. America has run out of cash, like the
French and British before them. 22 What African governments want are big cost items –
roads, stadiums, power plants, that are necessary to revitalize their nations and which
also provide immense opportunities for “a large cut of the money.” These big ticket
items were once provided by Western aid but they have since significantly degraded
through mismanagement, lack of maintenance and the excess stress of increasing
population demand.
Current Chinese thinking is that China can significantly displace the West by providing
desperately needed aid in the reconstruction of African infrastructure and in the
development of African industry without interference in the prevailing systems of
African governance. In return, those in political power are rewarding the Chinese with
access to African resources and expanded markets for Chinese goods and services.
In addition, one cannot discount longer-term Chinese strategic thinking in terms of
gaining an influential presence on the African continent. Lastly, there are Chinese
ambitions to obtain significant economic opportunity for large numbers of Chinese to
permanently settle in Africa on purchased agricultural land and through local business
markets.
The permanent migration of Chinese today is actually fulfilling Sir Francis Galton’s
suggestion that Chinese civilization be brought to Africa. In this sense their movement
does not represent a “clash” with the West or America. To the contrary. Precisely as the
West, in the face of increased globalization and international economic interdependence,
is retreating not only from Africa but from a strict interpretation of the rules of the
Westphalian State System, the Chinese have become the most influential champions of
that traditional Westphalian system’s continuation.
Challenges to Sustained Chinese Success in Africa
Why do the Chinese believe that they will succeed, and be able to sustain their
achievements, when the past experience of the West -- including even Asian participants
such as the Indian immigrant populations – has been otherwise?
After all, it has been repeatedly demonstrated, with exceptions such as Botswana and
South Africa, that once African controllers have gotten what they have wanted, or have
they decided they want more than they are going to get, they are willing to pull the plug
on foreign participating populations. They then retreat back to their internal African
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dynamics, taking with them both their share of the benefits received and the repossessed
benefits of the non-Africans.
The Chinese seem to be proceeding on the presumptions of past Chinese civilization.
That is, they aver that hard work, family unity and close-knit Chinese community ties
can withstand and endure the occasional onslaughts of opposition that the expansion of
Chinese populations have long experienced in a variety of situations. 23 In addition,
present Chinese expansion in Africa largely supports state-managed capitalism and is in
harmony with official Chinese beliefs that governments can, in the end, overcome
popular and individual resistance.
On the other hand, because the Chinese propping up of African governments is
accompanied by a massive introduction of Chinese themselves, and because it is taking
the form of the insertion of large numbers of Chinese into the most fundamental aspects
of Africa’s internal cash economy, a clash between the three residual African
civilizations and Chinese culture is probably in the process of brewing. It will likely
foam over at some time in the future.
The first likely clash between the Chinese and the Africans will be either when Chinese
cash begins to dries up or when the Chinese begin to edge out excessively the non-elite
Africans from their niches. Precisely because of the extensive spread of Chinese
ambitions, they risk becoming the force behind the coalescence of discontentment
across a wide spectrum of African society: business people, peasants, the unemployed,
labor, civil servants, middle class professionals, religious groups, tribes, clans,
unemployed youth, the disenfranchised uneducated, and still functioning traditional
groups.
At the same time, when such a clash occurs, it will inevitably be limited in time and
space. Eventually a new accommodation will be reached. With this, the real “clash of
civilization” will then begin. It will be between Africa civilizations themselves. In fact,
elements of it are already occurring in Somalia, Nigeria, Congo and most recently Mali.
Religion and the Clash of African Civilizations
The real and coming clash between African civilizations will be between the
traditionalists, who are continuing to drag their nations back to the Africa of personal
power, and modern Africans, who wish to join the new global civilization but cannot do
so until Africa civilization recreates itself in ways that are harmonious with that
aspiration.
The challenge is, how do you create a new civilization? For Africa, simply building a
new structure on the old foundations is not an option. From all perspectives, economic,
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social, spiritual, political, organizational etc., the old structures have lost their
foundational integrities.
Here that we might take seriously Toynbee’s conclusion that: “new spiritual insights
allow for the birth of a new religion and ultimately a new civilization.” 24 As we have
seen, this has been the case in the past in Africa, with Animism, Islam and Christianity.
However, today, these three faiths in Africa have themselves largely become cash
religions. Animism is used to destroy traditional communities and establish new control
over resources. Islam is on the payroll of Islamic fundamentalist politics. Christianity is
increasingly evangelistic “pay as you go” entertainment and solace.
Nor can these failing religions be replaced by unsustainable Western neo-classical
economic materialism, which produces enormous individual capacities at the expense of
social solidarity. Nor can they be replaced by Chinese neo-capitalist Confucianism,
which squashes the capacities of individuals, especially in groups, whenever they
attempt dynamic experimental alternatives to party-approved ways. These propositions
may temporarily serve for select modern sectors, as in South Africa and Kenya, but not
for the majority of Africans who are struggling with social disintegration, massive
urbanization, lost of dignity, lack of opportunity, and absence of purpose.
As a Baha’i, I first discovered the Baha’i Faith in Africa when I was intellectually
attracted to it precisely because it seemed so suited for what is needed by both Africa
and the world. Toynbee, himself, has been cited as saying that the Baha’i Faith might be
"the world religion of the future." 25 But while my belief is an expression of faith, and
Toynbee’s belief is an expression of thought, Toynbee’s analysis of the role religion per
se has played in the genesis of civilizations of the past is a conclusion from fact. As
such, we would seem to be on fairly sturdy grounds in believing that religion may likely
be an important element in how future civilization unfolds in Africa, China, America
and the world.
Conclusion: Preparations for a New Civilization
The Chinese would be wise to remember the past massacres of overseas Chinese tied to
grievances concerning perceived economic exploitation. The West might be wise to
begin thinking of the potential need for international intervention when potentially
diverse political and armed conflict explodes. A wise pre-emptive response would be to
take actions that support the development of a new robust system of international
economic and political cooperation, based on foundational principles of fairness for all
parties.
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Perhaps this would make possible a future civilization, one that will emerge not from
clash and conflict but from a willed positive common journey for all humanity. To pray
for this to happen is easy. For it to become a global reality is the real challenge of today
and tomorrow.
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Has China Plans for World Domination?
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Since the end of the Cold War, both the structure of the international system and the
ranking of major powers have gone through a series of dramatic changes. Among these
changes, there is probably no topic of greater importance to the analysis of
contemporary international politics than the rise of China and the Chinese vision of
China’s future role in the international world system. As China started to strengthen its
national power and remake its place in global affairs, the questions of how its rise will
transform the current international system and whether it will become the next
superpower have become two of the most controversial issues in the field of
international relations. Many analysts are skeptical about the orientations of the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) growing national power.
Actually the tremendous economic success that the PRC has sustained in the last
decades has alarmed many analysts and has prompted politicians – both in Western and
in some Asian countries – to wonder what kind of power would an increasingly stronger
and bolder China become. “Will a more prosperous and powerful China be an irrational,
bellicose nation that will challenge the existing international order” or “will it be a
peaceful, responsible and constructive member of the international community,
respectful of international society’s rules?”. 5 In more recent years one of the most
debated issues in Western discussions about the future is “whether China will replace
the United States as the leading world power.”
The Western Debate
Such a prediction seems to be taken for granted among economic forecasters, policy
makers and a part of the IR community scholars. Actually many analysts have
interpreted the 2008 global financial crisis as the beginning of the American decline and
the beginning of a new era dominated by China. According to a 2007 Goldman Sachs
report China will replace the United States as the largest economy in the world by
2027, 6 even if in terms of GDP per capita China has still a long way to go to match the
5

For an overview of both argumentations see H. Yee and I. Storey, eds., The China Threat: Perceptions,
Myths and Reality, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002; D. Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major
Arguments”, Asian Survey, 38, 8, 1996, pp. 767-770; A. Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting
China’s Arrival”, International Security, 23, 3, Winter 1997/98, pp. 62-71; A.I. Johnston, “Is China a
Status Quo Power?”, International Security, 27, 4, Spring 2003, pp. 5-56.
6
Goldman Sachs, The N-11: More than an Acronym, Global Economics Papers No. 153, March 2007,
available at: http://www.chicagobooth.edu/alumni/clubs/pakistan/docs/next11dream-march%20'07goldmansachs.pdf, p. 8. The latest Economist projection foresees China overtaking the United States
within a decade, exactly in 2018. See “You’re On”, The Economist, March 30, 2012, available at:
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USA. In 2050 China will belong to the “upper middle income group”, not to the “rich”
club. 7 In November 2008, a National Intelligence Council (NIC) report – Global Trend
2025: A Transformed World – stated that in 2025 the United States, while probably
remaining the single most powerful country, would probably be less dominant and the
whole international system would be revolutionized by the rise of emerging new
players, reunited together in the BRIC’s forum. 8 Interestingly, the NIC’s report assessed
that rather than emulating Western models of political and economic development, more
countries might be attracted to China’s alternative development model, and in general to
the so-called “state capitalism” which China, India and Russia were following, and that
other rising powers, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, had followed in the
past to develop their economies. 9
The Enthusiasts’ Position: A New “Model” for the World
Among those authors that in the last few years have accepted and boosted the
assumption that China will unquestionably replace the USA as the dominant global
power in the next few decades are the British journalist and scholar Martin Jacques, the
Indian economist and former assistant director in the Research Department of the
International Monetary Fund, Arvind Subramanian (named in 2011 one of foreign
policy’s top 100 global thinkers by the Foreign Policy Magazine), and the American
scholar Stefan Halper, Director of American Studies in the Department of Politics at the
University of Cambridge. They are authors, respectively, of these best sellers: When
China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global
Order (originally released in the UK with the subtitle The Rise of the Middle Kingdom
and the End of the Western World); Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic
Dominance and The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will
Dominate the Twenty-First Century.
The leitmotiv of these works may be found in their firm belief that China’s dominance is
not only imminent, but also much larger in magnitude than is currently imagined. In
other words, China’s impact on the world will not simply be economic; rather it will
also have profound political, cultural and ideological effects. In particular, Halper
demonstrates that the Beijing experience – the so-called “China model” which
represents a successful co-existence of a free market and an authoritarian state in order
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/03/china-will-overtake-america-within-decadewant-bet.
7
Goldman Sachs, The N-11: More than an Acronym, p. 11.
8
National Intelligence Council, Global Trend 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008, available at:
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf, pp. iv; vi, 12.
9
Ibid., pp. iv, vii. In a 2009 article published in the American review Foreign Affairs (“State Capitalism
Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?”, 88, 3, May/June 2009, pp. 40-55), Ian Bremmer, the
Eurasia Group’s president, gave an interesting analysis on the crucial shifts occurred in world economy’s
map following the overtaking of free market by state capitalism, a system in which the state is the leading
economic actor.
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to maintain economic growth and political stability – has provided the world’s most
irrefutable, high-speed demonstration of how to liberalize economically without
surrendering to liberal politics. In other words, instead of playing by America’s rules as
did the Soviet Union, China has redefined the rules of the game in its own terms,
showing the world how to achieve economic growth while maintaining an illiberal
government, and presenting the world’s despots with a viable alternative to the so-called
Washington Consensus. 10
The Skeptics’ Position: Contradictions and Challenges of China’s Rise
The “skeptics’ front” include, among the others, eminent scholars such as Joseph Nye,
François Godement, Susan Shirk and the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
To all of them China’s dominance in the 21st century should not be taken for granted,
since there are many obstacles that could derail China’s growth as well as many political
uncertainties that should be taken into account in such important future prevision. Both
Nye and Kissinger agree that while it is currently fashionable to compare the United
States’ power to that of the United Kingdom a century ago and to predict a similar
hegemonic decline, the United States is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms,
there is a reasonable probability that it will remain more powerful than any other state in
the coming decades.
According to Joseph Nye, China has still a long way to go to equal the power resources
of the United States; and even if overall China GDP passed that of the United States
around 2030, the two economies, although equivalent in size, would not be equivalent in
terms of equality. As to Henry Kissinger, who took part in June 2011 in one of the
Munk Debates specifically dedicated to “whether or not the 21st century will belong to
the world’s most populous country”, he believes that in the near future China will be
preoccupied with economic problems, domestic problems and also with its international
environment, at a point that it will not have the time to dominate the world. 11
Actually, as the PRC’s Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng has recently pointed out
at a Forum organized by the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), “China is
the second largest economy but not the second strongest economy,” adding that “China
is unable to fully play the role of a major country.” 12

10

S. Halper, The Beijing Consensus. How China’s Authoritarian Model will Dominate the Twenty-First
Century, New York: Basic Books, 2010, p. 32.
11
A. Morrow, “China’s economic shifts will hinder it from dominating world, Kissinger argues”, The
Munk Debates, June 17, 2011, available at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/munkdebates/chinas-economic-shifts-will-hinder-it-from-dominating-world-kissinger-argues/article2066332/.
See also H. Kissinger, On China, New York: The Penguin Press, 2011, chap. 18.
12
“China’s Relations with the World at a New Starting Point”, Speech by Assistant Foreign Minister Lee
Yucheng at the CIIS Forum, 10 April 2012, available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t925181.htm.
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The country must create several millions of jobs every year; it must reduce the growing
gap between rich and poor. Statistics show that the Gini coefficient in China has risen
from 0.16 (urban) and 0.21 (rural) at the beginning of the reform era (1978) to 0.46
(national average) at the beginning of the new millennium, well above the recognized
warning level of 0.4. Interestingly, for the eleventh year in a row, at the beginning of
2012 Chinese officials declared they could not publish the nation’s Gini coefficient
because of incomplete data on high-income groups.
However, some experts criticized the announcement, saying the government was
looking for reasons to de-emphasize China’s significant wealth gap. 13 China faces many
problems domestically. Important segments of Chinese people are in turmoil and
Chinese society may blow up at any time. According to several government-backed
studies, the number of “mass incidents” (quntixing shijian) 14 recorded by the Chinese
government grew from 8,700 in 1993 to about 90,000 in 2010. Some estimates are even
higher, but the government has not released official data for recent years. The crucial
importance of such a matter is witnessed by the announcement made during the annual
National People’s Congress meeting last March, concerning an 11% increase in
spending on domestic security, making China one of the few countries in the world to
spend more on internal security (US$ 111 billion) than on defense (US$ 106.4 billion). 15
China must also wrestle with internal politics. Beijing is in the middle of a leadership
transition which will bring into power a new political leadership (the so-called “fifth
generation”) and it is not clear what its system of government will look like in the
future. Over the next months, more than 70% of China’s top jobs must be turned over to
new leaders in accordance with recently introduced rules on retirement and tenure. 16
There are increasing rumours that the designated successors to Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao may not be up to their jobs. 17 There are also rumors that China’s 18th
Communist Party Congress may be postponed as a result of intensified infighting
sparked by the Wang Lijun (the former Chongqing Public Security Chief) incident,
whose failed defection attempt at the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu on February 6th led to
13

Fang Xuyan and Lea Yu, “Gov’t Refuses to Release Gini Coefficient”, Caixin Online, January 18,
2012, available at: http://english.caixin.com/2012-01-18/100349814.html.
14
This is the term officially used by the Chinese government to indicate the growing number of incidents
of civil unrest which occur every day in the country and that official media cannot ignore anymore.
15
“China domestic security spending rises to $111 billion”, Reuters, March 5, 2012, available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/05/us-china-parliament-security-idUSTRE82403J20120305. It is
worth mentioning that such increase was decided amid continuing tensions in Tibet and in the wake of an
armed attack in Xinjiang at the end of February when nine terrorists armed with knives suddenly attacked
a crowd on a pedestrian street on Xingfu road, in Kashgar prefecture’s Yecheng county, killing 13 people.
See Cui Jia, “No mercy for terrorist acts in Xinjiang”, China Daily, March 8, 2012, available at:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/08/content_14783945.htm.
16
For more information on this subject, see Cheng Li, “Preparing for the 18th Party Congress: Procedures
and Mechanisms”, in China Leadership Monitor, 36, 2012.
17
D.H. Paal, “Will China Rule the World?”, Carnegie Commentary, September 2, 2010, available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2010 /09/02/will-china-rule-world/2rgx.
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the dramatic fall of former Chongqing Communist Party Secretary Bo Xilai, a likely
candidate for promotion to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee in Autumn
2012. 18
At the same time China has to face an increasingly strained international environment.
Starting from 2009 various crises have emerged between China and many of its regional
neighbors since Beijing has adopted a more assertive posture, contributing to China’s
strained relationships with its neighbours and indirectly with the USA to the great
detriment of its regional and global image as a “responsible” actor. 19 Among these
disputes are the increased friction with ASEAN over the South China Sea, the sharpened
tensions with New Delhi over territorial disputes, the diplomatic crisis with Tokyo
following the Chinese fishing boat intrusion into disputed waters (in the contiguous
zone of the Senkaku Islands, also known as Diaoyu Islands or Diaoyutai Islands, which
are Japanese islands also claimed by China), the aggravation of Sino-South Korean ties
after the Cheonan sinking, and the bombing of Yeongpyeong Island in 2010.
According to Henry Kissinger: “A country facing such large domestic tasks is not going
to throw itself easily, much less automatically, into strategic confrontations or a quest
for world domination.” 20 François Godement, founder of the Asia Centre, a Paris-based
think tank, and Susan Shirk – the chair of the 21st Century China Program and Ho Miu
Lam Professor of China and Pacific Relations at the School of International Relations
and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego also come to similar
conclusions - that China will be concerned for a long time with its domestic agenda.
According to Godement, for China “International questions are an afterthought. Instead
for a Communist Party whose overriding priority is to stay in power, domestic problems
threatening social stability at home are infinitely more important.” 21
As for Susan Shirk, she argues that “like all politicians, China’s leaders are concerned
first and foremost with their own political survival,” 22 but in China’s case, the national
leaders are facing a “troubling paradox”, that is “the more developed and prosperous the
country becomes, the more insecure and threatened they feel.” Shirk recognizes that
18

On April 11, Reuters published an article reporting that: “In one sign of Party’s unease, a source with
ties to top leaders said the Communist Party was considering a proposal to delay the opening of the Party
Congress to ‘shorten the transition period”. C. Buckley and B. Kang Lim, “China braces for next act in
leadership drama”, Reuters, April 11, 2012.
19
D. Shambaugh, “Coping with a conflicted China”, The Washington Quarterly, 34, 1, Winter 2011, pp.
7-27, esp. pp. 7, 15-16.
20
Kissinger, On China, p. 525.
21
Quoted in Peter Ford, “Rise of an Economic Superpower: What Does China Want?”, The Christian
Science Monitor, November 5, 2011, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/AsiaPacific/2011/1105/The-rise-of-an-economic-superpower-What-does-China-want; see also F. Godement,
“Thirty years of Chinese reforms: a historical perspective”, The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 28,
1, 2010, pp. 7-19, esp. p. 10.
22
S.L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower. (How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail its Peaceful Rise),
New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2007, pp. 5-6.
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“viewed objectively, China’s communist regime looks surprisingly resilient,” however,
beneath the surface there are many critical aspects that could derail China’s peaceful
trend in the foreseeable future. 23
China’s domestic debate
As for China’s plans for the future international order and governance, which represent
the current paper’s main topic, it must be said that within the Chinese IR scholars’
community there is a lively and contradictory debate over objectives, principles and
values of China’s foreign policy, and more generally on the best course for China in the
near future. This strategic debate revolves around the many foreign policy implications
of Deng Xiaoping’s “peaceful trend” strategy. It concentrates on the distribution of
world power, China’s identity as a foreign policy actor, and the course of action that
should consequently be pursued. “Should China pursue the policy of peaceful rise and
help create a constructive international environment” or “Would its interests best be
served by acting as a traditional big power?” “What role should China play and what
responsibilities should it take on the world stage?” All these are some aspects of the
current Chinese debate on China’s international identity. According to David
Shambaugh, no other nation has engaged “in such an extensive, animated, and diverse
domestic discourse about its role as a major rising power as China did during the past
decade.” 24
China’s Rise: a Chinese Perspective
While the consensus on the nature of China’s ascent has yet to be reached among
China’s domestic scholars – some argue it is still a developmental country while others
affirm it is only a regional power at best – the preponderance of domestic discourse
recognizes that China is a major power or at least on the way to becoming one. 25 The
overwhelming majority see China’s modernization as a process of “re-emergence”.
China has in fact a long history of economic supremacy. In the last 2000 years it has
enjoyed superpower status several times, and on the eve before the First Opium War
(1839-1842) and the subsequent imposition of the “unequal treaties” (bu pingdeng de
tiaoyue 不平等的条约) which precipitated the so-called Chinese “century of shame and
humiliation” (bainian chiru 百年耻辱), China had the largest GDP, accounting for
about 25-30% of the world GDP. For this reason Chinese believe China’s decline is a
kind of historical mistake which they should correct and that is why, according to Yan
Xuetong, for Chinese “the rise of China is granted by nature.” 26

23

Ibid., p. 60.
Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China”, p. 8.
25
Ibid.
26
Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes”, Journal of Contemporary China, 10, 26, 2001, pp.
33-39, esp. p. 33.
24
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Since the beginning of the 20th century the Chinese elites have called upon the Chinese
people to fight for national “rejuvenation” (zhenxing 振兴), a term that refers to the
psychological power contained in the concept of China’s rise to its former world status.
Of course, Chinese leaders were well aware that China’s rise was going to be a longterm historical process. That is why Beijing has adopted a moderate foreign policy since
the end of the 1970s. Deng Xiaoping frequently told the Chinese people to be very
cautious and modest and warned Chinese leaders that it was a national policy not to be
the leader of the Third World. 27 The so-called “28-character guidelines” (ershiba zi
fangzhen 二十八字方针), formulated in the aftermath of Tiananmen (and coincidentally
with the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the end of the Cold War)
were also largely inspired by prudence.
Some of the guidelines are: watch and analyse developments calmly (lengjing guancha
冷静观察); secure our own positions (wenzhu zhenjiao 稳住阵脚); deal with changes
with confidence (chenzhuo yingfu 沉着应付); conceal our capacities (taoguang
yanghui韬光养晦); be good at keeping a low profile (shanyu shouzhuo善于守拙);
never become the leader (juebu dangtou绝不当头); and make some contributions
(yousuo zuowei 有所作为). 28 The more recent theories of “China’s peaceful rise”,
“peaceful development”, “harmonious society”, and “harmonious world” are also
largely inspired by prudence aiming to create a stable international environment which
represents the conditio sine qua non for its internal development which is necessary for
the country’s stability and indirectly the leadership’s legitimation to power. 29
The End of the Cold War and the New World Order: the PRC Perspective
In order to better understand the contents of the current Chinese domestic debate and
clarify China’s plans for its future role in the international world system, it may be
useful to spend a few words about China’s reaction immediately after the implosion of
the former Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War. The collapse of the
Soviet Union created a new geopolitical context, leaving the Chinese leaders “without a
clear definition of their place in the world”. 30 Whereas during the 1970s and 1980s
China had played an important role within the triangular system with Washington and
Moscow, after the end of the Cold War the “Chinese card” lost its importance for both
the USA and their allies.

27

Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, vol. III, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993, p. 363.
Ibid., p. 326.
29
Actually, the contemporary Chinese political thinking continues to be largely inspired by the ancient
Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu (or Sunzi) – traditionally believed to be the
author of The Art of War, one of the most influential Chinese books on military strategy – who considered
“prudence” one of the basic principles of strategic thinking.
30
M. Oksenberg, “The China Problem”, in Foreign Affairs, 70, 3, Summer 1991, pp. 1-16, esp. p. 9.
28
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In fact, the demise of the strategic triangle weakened its strategic leverage in the global
balance of power, and the Chinese leaders felt marginalized, as it appeared difficult for
Beijing to carve a satisfying niche in an international system dominated by the USA.
However, an analysis of the Chinese international relations literature reveals that at the
beginning of the 1990s both the Chinese scholars and the leadership agreed that the end
of the bipolar world order resulted in a transition process towards a new multipolar
world system. 31
The overwhelming majority of Chinese scholars saw a multipolar world order as a
useful bulwark against unilateralism, being one in which big powers were mutually
checked and constrained; for that reason multipolarism has been represented as an ideal
international paradigm for power relations, even if there were different opinions
regarding the number of the “poles”. 32 Chinese analysts proposed mainly three possible
types of multipolar system: a tri-polar system (USA; EU; Asia-Pacific); a five-polar
system (USA, Germany, Japan, Russia, and China); and a system with “one superpower
(USA) and four big powers (Japan, Russia, China, and EU)” (the so-called yichao
duoqiang 一超多强structure).
This last structure, which proposes a simultaneously unipolar and multipolar world, was
the preferred one. Actually, even after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, it
continues to be seen as the only viable structure in the foreseeable future. Most Chinese
scholars agree that the crisis has certainly weakened American financial and economic
power, but at the same time they recognize that it has impacted other powers more.
Furthermore, according to them the United States has demonstrated more resilience in
coping with the crisis. That is why they believe that, in the short-term, the US will likely
remain as the single superpower, and the yichao duoqiang structure will substantially
remain unchanged. 33
The Post-Cold War International System: A New Place for China
The new posture aiming to regain China its former world status led many foreign
observers to demand what kind of power a rising China would become; at the same
time, in China IR scholars and policymakers started to discuss China’s future role in the
international system - the risks of becoming a global superpower and the opportunities
to “simply” be a major power.
31

See among the others Chen Qimao, “Shilun shijie cong liangji geju xiang duoji geju” (A Study of the
Development of the World System from Bipolarity to Multipolarity), Guojiwenti Yanjiu (International
Studies), 1990, 4, pp. 1-6; Huang Dingyi and Wang Yulin, “Jisu bianhua zhong de guoji xingshi” (The
rapid change of the world situation), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations),
1990, 3, pp. 1-8.
32
Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates”, Chaillot Papers, September 2010, p. 26.
33
Li Changjiu, “Guoji geju duanqinei buhui fasheng genbenxing bianhua” (Fundamental changes will not
take place in the international structure in the short term), Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary
International Relations), 2009, 4, pp. 11-13, esp. p. 12.
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Such discussions took place primarily at the academic level, with a series of lectures on
the subject given to the Communist Party members between 2003 and 2006; they were
subsequently developed in a CCTV documentary series entitled Rising powers (Daguo
jueqi 大国崛起). The program concerned the rise and the fall of big powers in history;
the means of their rise and the causes of their fall; and so on. The big question was:
“What lessons could China draw from those historical precedents?” Also, “How could
China avoid the historical repetitive ‘asymmetry trap’ between the major established
power and the primary rising power in which the latter challenged the former’s
hegemonic position in the international system?”. In other words, “how could China
obtain the status of major power without triggering a counterbalancing reaction?”
Reassuring the World: The “Peaceful Rise” Theory
An answer to such a crucial issue was formulated through the articulation of the
proposition of “China’s peaceful rise”, which Beijing thought might be useful to allay
foreign apprehensions over its growing power. The proposition was first used by Zheng
Bijian (at that time Chair of the China Reform Forum and Executive Vice President of
CPC Central Party School) in late 2003, during the Boao Forum for Asia and soon
reaffirmed by China’s top Party and military leaders, signaling its official endorsement.
The “peaceful rise” (和平崛起) theory was used primarily to reassure South-East Asian
countries and the United States that the rise of China’s military and economic
prominence would not pose a threat to peace and stability, and that other nations would
benefit from China’s rising power and influence. 34 Explicit in the doctrine was the
notion that China’s economic and military development was not a “zero-sum game” and
that China was as much an economic opportunity as an economic competitor. The
doctrine emphasized the importance of soft power and was based in part on the premise
that good relations with its neighbours would enhance rather than diminish its overall
national power (zonghe guoli综合国力). 35
In diplomacy, the doctrine underlined multilateral cooperation through institutions and
warned against the risks of a direct confrontation with the United States. In another
article published in 2005, Zheng offered the assurance that China had adopted a
“strategy to transcend the traditional ways for great power to emerge,” arguing that the
34

Zheng Bijian, “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia”, Boao Forum For Asia
(2003), in China’s peaceful rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2004, The Brookings Institution, 2005,
available at: http://www.brookings.edu/ fp/events/20050616 bijianlunch.pdf., pp. 13-7.
35
The zonghe guoli or Comprehensive National Power (CNP) is an original Chinese political concept
used to measure the general power of a nation-state. CNP can be calculated numerically by combining
various quantitative indices to create a single number held to measure the power of a nation-state. These
indices take into account both military factors (hard power) and economic and cultural factors (soft
power).
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new international political and economic order China was seeking was one that could be
achieved through incremental reforms and the democratization of international relations.
According to Zheng, China would “not follow the path of Germany leading up to World
War I or those of Germany and Japan leading up to World War II, when these countries
violently plundered resources and pursued hegemony. Neither will China follow the
path of great powers vying for global domination during the Cold War.”36
Contemporaneously, Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the UN Summit marking its 60th
anniversary, by which, while reiterating that China favored the trend toward
democratization of world affairs (which implied a relative diminution of American
power in the direction of a multipolar world) insisted that China would pursue its goals
peacefully and within the framework of the U.N. system. 37
From then on the so-called “path of peaceful rise” has become a sort of political
“mantra” that Chinese leaders did not miss to repeat at every occasion. Actually the
reference to “peaceful rise” was very soon replaced by the more neutral formula of
“peaceful development” (heping fazhan 和平发展), because of its aggressive impact
especially in regards to a foreign public opinion increasingly worried about China’s
rise. 38 Yet China’s leaders continued to use it in a modified form, with similar if not
identical conceptual substance. 39
A New Nationalist Pride: The “Peaceful Path” Opponents
However, in the last few years, especially as the global economic crisis spread across
the West in the period after the Olympics, new voices in China began to challenge the
thesis of China’s “peaceful path.” Some of its opponents started to contend that China’s
main objective should not be economic prosperity but power itself. In other words, to
become powerful and achieve recognition China should not only be concerned with
36

Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, 84, 5, Sept/Oct 2005,
pp. 18-24, esp. p. 22
37
“China will, as always, abide by the purposes and principles of the U.N. charter, actively participate in
international affairs and fulfill its obligations, and work with other countries in building towards a new
international political and economic order that is fair and rational. The Chinese nation loves peace.
China’s development, instead of hurting or threatening anyone, can only serve peace, stability and
common prosperity in the world.” See Hu Jintao, “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace
and Common Prosperity”, speech at the UN Summit, New York, September 15, 2005, available at:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t213091.htm.
38
The term jueqi was seen as provocative rather than reassuring; in fact, the character jue崛 in jueqi
崛起contains the radical for mountain and carries the connotation of “abruptness”. The use of that term
could thus easily cause suspicion and wariness among other countries, especially those using Chinese
characters, in particular Japan and Korea, which actually expressed concern about the phrase.
39
For a detailed statement on the ascension and demise of the theory of “peaceful rise”, see B.S. Glaser
and E.S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: the Ascension and
Demise of the Theory of Peaceful Rise”, The China Quarterly, 190, June 2007, pp. 291-310.
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economic development but with military might as well. 40 They were rather in favour of
a much more assertive policy, especially towards the U.S., according to its newly gained
status.
Earlier examples of this line of thinking appeared during the 1990s with the so-called
“China Can Say No” (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu 中国可以说不) school that complained
about the influence of the West, and the U.S. in particular, on China, and the new genre
of “nationalist literature” known as “shuobu shu” (说不书), inaugurated with the
publication of the bestseller The China that Can Say No: Political and Emotional
Choices in the post Cold-War Era (Zhongguo keyi shuo bu: Lengzhan hou shidai de
zhengzhi yu qinggan jueze 中国可以说不冷战后时代的政治与情感抉择). 41
The most recent expression of this tendency is the increase in popular books that might
be described as “dissatisfaction literature” which include two widely read nationalistic
books: an essay collection titled China is Unhappy: the Great Era; the Grand Goal,
and our National Anxieties and External Challenges [Zhongguo bu gaoxing: da shidai,
da mubiao ji women de neiyou waihuan 中国不高兴大时代,大目标及我们的内忧外患] (2009),
whose authors (Song Xiaojun; Wang Xiaodong; Huang Jisu; Song Qiang; and Liu
Yang) include some who contributed to the “China Can Say No” series; and China
Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era
[Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlue dingwei
中国梦后美国时代的大国思维与战略定位] written by Liu Mingfu, a PLA Senior
Colonel and professor at China’s National Defense University – an elite academy tasked
with training senior PLA officers.
The authors of Unhappy China point to specific examples of continuing foreign disdain
for the Middle Kingdom, such as the protests along the route of the Olympic flame, or
continuous complaints about pollution from China by Western nations that consume far
more resources per capita. In their view, since China has already risen as a superpower
(at least in economic terms) it must be recognized as such and act accordingly. For this
reason China should stop debasing itself, shake off its self-doubt and passivity, abandon
gradualism, and recover its historic sense of mission by means of a “grand goal” (da
mubiao 大目标) which Liu Mingfu defines “become a number one in the world” (shijie
di yi 世界第一) restoring China to a modern version of its historic glory, which will
require the displacing of the USA.

40

Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates”, pp. 8-9.
It was soon followed by the publication of other popular “say no” books such as The China That Still
Can Say No (Zhongguo hai shi neng shuo bu 中国还是能说不, How China Can Say No (Zhongguo heyi
shuo bu 中国何以说不), Chinese Currency Can Say No (Renminbi keyi shuo bu 人民币可以说不).
41
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Both books are deeply nationalistic and both have been criticized in the Chinese press,
on the web, and in the academic community. According to some authors (such as Jin
Canrong) these books do not reflect the intentions of the top leadership or, in the case of
Liu Mingfu’s book, of the Chinese military. Nor are they expression of the Chinese
public sentiment, which is much more involved in domestic issues like the rising cost of
housing or food prices. On the contrary, they represent no more than an isolated
nationalistic tendency which advocates that China should adopt a more confrontational
attitude in dealing with international society. 42 Actually, such tendency is becoming
increasingly stronger especially among netizens, which are currently one of the most
dynamic and critical new foreign policy actors in China. 43
These books are the latest example of impressive books which represent a growing
profitable mass market in China. In fact, over the past decade, parts of the Chinese
media have become more commercialized and willing to publish a range of content
designed to generate profit rather than promote political orthodoxy. This has led some
publishers to focus on publishing sensationalist and nationalistic views that can attract a
mass audience. 44 As admitted by one of the authors of China is Unhappy, the publisher
chose the title of the book, because it would sell well. 45
The Chinese Official Response
That said, some authors argue that the importance of these books relies on the fact that
the Chinese government felt the necessity to respond, distancing itself from their
nationalistic and enthusiastic tones, especially considering that there was a perfect
coincidence between the publication of these works and the emergence of the already
mentioned tensions in China’s neighborhood, which prompted speculations on whether
the episodes were the product of a deliberate policy. 46 All the more so as both books
became bestsellers, which implied that their contents represented the point of view of at
least a portion of China’s institutional structure. However, to chase away any doubts
about it, China’s leadership decided to clarify officially its position.
In December 2010, State Councilor Dai Bingguo (the highest-ranking official
overseeing China’s foreign policy) released a comprehensive statement of policy
(Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development) intended as a reply both to
foreign observers concerned that China harbored aggressive intentions, and to those
42

Chito Romana, “Does China Want to Be Top Superpower”, ABCNews, March 2, 2010, available at:
http://abcnews.go.com/International/china-replace-us-top-superpower/story?id=9986355.
43
L. Jacobson and D. Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China”, SIPRI Policy Paper, 26, 2010, p. vii.
44
Ph. C. Saunders, “Will China’s Dream turn into America’s Nightmare?”, China Brief, 10, 7, April 1,
2010, pp. 9-12.
45
A. Ramzy, “A New Book Reveals Why China Is Unhappy”, Time, March 20, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1886749,00.html.
46
Kissinger, On China, p. 505.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol68/iss68/12

70

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

67

within China who argued that China should adopt a more assertive posture. 47 In
particular, this was directed toward Chinese neo-cons who had always firmly opposed
the “peaceful rise” theory because it risked giving potential adversaries (including
Taiwan) a wrong message, that is, that China would not act forcefully in order to protect
its national sovereignty and interests. 48
Dai explained that the decision to stick to the path of peaceful development was not an
impulsive one, but rather “a carefully considered choice based on our analysis of the
great changes that have taken place in the world, in China and in China’s relations with
the rest of the world”. In other words, “peaceful development” was neither “a
smokescreen for its real intentions before it gets strong enough”, as some foreigners
suspected; nor was it a policy trend that risked to compromise China’s advantages (as
some within China charged). On the contrary, it was China’s genuine and enduring
policy because it best served the country’s interests. In Dai’s view, peaceful
development had to be a task for many generations, since China’s main goal was for the
Chinese people to “bid farewell to poverty and enjoy a better life” and for China to
become “the most responsible, the most civilized and the most law abiding and orderly
member of the international community.”
Most important, according to Dai, was the fact that China had “no reason whatsoever to
be conceited or arrogant” because it still faced tremendous challenges domestically.
Moreover, he rejected the claims that China would seek to dominate Asia or displace the
USA as the world’s preeminent power as a pure “myth” (shenhua 神话) that
contradicted the country’s historical record and its current policies. One month later,
during his visit to the U.S., in a speech at a Washington D.C. lunch with senior US
officials and business leaders from firms like General Electric and Coca Cola, the
Chinese president Hu Jintao pledged that China would “remain committed to the path of
peaceful development” and that it would “never seek to dominate or pursue an
expansionist policy.” 49
In September 2011, both Dai and Hu’s assertions were reiterated in a government white
paper on “China’s peaceful development” (Zhongguo de “heping fazhan” baipishu

47

“Zhongguo guowu weiyuan Dai Bingguo: jianchi zou heping fazhan zhi lu”, State Councilor Dai
Bingguo: Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 6
December 2010. The original version is available at: http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/201012/06/content_1760381.htm; for the English version see
http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2325&AspxAutoDetect CookieSupport=1.
48
M. Leonard, “What Does China Think?”, New York: Public Affairs, 2008, p. 90.
49
“Hu says China not seeking arms race or domination”, BBC News, 21 January 2011, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12246161.
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中国的和平发展白皮书). 50 According to Wang Yajun, head of the Central Foreign
Affairs Office (which advises the top leadership), who presented the document to the
press, the white paper’s publication was intended to reiterate the “defensive” nature of
China’s military policy and thus to reassure that China threatened no one, that its rise
would contribute to world peace, and that the “central goal of Chinese diplomacy” was
“to create a peaceful and stable international environment for its development”. Even
admitting that China could become strong in the future, peace would remain critical for
its development; thus China had no reason to deviate from the path of peaceful
development. Wang insisted that “China does not want to, nor will China, challenge the
international order or challenge other countries,” pointing to the white paper declaration
that China has “broken away from the traditional pattern where a rising power was
bound to seek hegemony” (Zhongguo heping fazhan dapo le “Guoqiang bi ba” de
daguo jueqi chuantong moshi 中国和平发展打破了国强必败的大国崛起). 51
A New Perspective for the Future: A Selective Diplomacy
In the last few years – especially after the decline of the American power in the wake of
the international financial crisis and the extraordinary performances played by China –
also Deng Xiaoping’s main dictum “conceal our capacities” (taoguang yanghui) has
increasingly been under discussion. Some Chinese scholars, in particular, have
challenged the current relevance of Deng’s foreign policy prescriptions considered out
of date and inadequate to China’s newfound international status. According to them,
China should do “more things” (dasuo zuowei 打所作为). 52
In a sort of reply to the above mentioned perplexities on the persistent relevance of
Deng’s views, the eminent scholar Wang Yizhou, Vice Dean of the School of
International Studies at Peking University, has recently introduced a new diplomatic
concept – the so-called “creative involvement” (chuangzaoxing jieru 创造性介入) –
calling on China to actively play a bigger role and voluntarily get involved in
international affairs. In a recent interview with Beijing Review reporter Ding Ying,
Wang explained the relevance of the concept and its significance for China and the
world. According to him the new concept stresses a new and active attitude that should
50
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characterize China in dealing with regional and international questions on the basis of a
selective analysis of the country’s core interests.
Wang specifies that “although advocating active participation in international affairs,
“creative involvement” differs essentially from interventionism. In fact, it calls for
active contact and involvement instead of intervention by force, which means that
“creative involvement” should be conducted on the basis of international legitimacy;
moreover the strategy should be carried out according to China’s capability after
cautious deliberation, which means that there should be a selective move that China
makes when dealing with affairs concerning its vital interests. 53 In this regard, Wang’s
position reflects faithfully the point of view of the so-called “Selective Multilateralist”
school (one of the seven schools of thinking within China’s international relations
community) according to which China should expand its global involvements,
commensurate with its newfound position and power, but selectively, and only on issues
that involve directly China’s national security interests. 54
Conclusion
Misreading about China are a quite common. One of the most frequent ones concerns
the re-emergence of China as a great power, which is unquestionably one of the most
important geopolitical events in this century. The extraordinary economic growth that
China has sustained in the last decades has not been followed, as many had hoped, by
democratic reforms. It has witnessed instead an exponential growth in its political and
diplomatic weight, under the one-party rule, aiming to regain the central role it had
played for millennia as the Middle Kingdom which was undermined by the incursions of
imperialist Western Powers starting from the second half of the 18th century. However
China’s economic success has alarmed many analysts and has prompted politicians –
both in Western as well as in some Asian countries – to wonder what kind of power
would an increasingly strong and assertive China become.
Many observers have subscribed to the realist argument that its rise would be a kind of
“zero-sum” game where the rise of one power leads to the decline of another. Indeed,
over the past decade there has been a heated debate in the West over the potential
challenge of this rising power, not only to the Asia-Pacific region but also to the entire
world. The common perception in the West, and especially in the USA, is that China is
both a voracious economic competitor and a threatening political and military
challenger, an emergent superpower with growing indefinite intention that acts
exclusively in its own interests, even to the detriment of the international order.
However, the Chinese leaders persist in reiterating the “peaceful” intentions of their
53
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http://www.bjreview.com/world/txt/2012-03/05/content_439626.htm.
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country, arguing that in an integrated global economy, China’s stability and
development is essential for world peace and prosperity. 55
To reduce distortion about China’s current and future plans for world domination, it
should be wise to try to understand the thought of China’s leaders – past and present –
instead of analyzing only what they say or what they do. And, more importantly,
Westerners should understand China’s domestic situation and the growing challenges
the country is facing. This would certainly help to better comprehend the fact that in
spite of all projections which foresee China overtaking the United States in the next few
decades as the largest economy in the world, it is unlikely that China will also be
automatically the leading nation.
More likely, in the close future we will probably see the country’s efforts in finding the
solution to its numerous problems, both at national and international levels. It is quite
probable that China will continue to strive to carve itself a niche commensurate with its
international status as a “responsible great power” (fuzerende daguo, 负责人的大国),
without seeking world domination.
As Mark Leonard points out in the last chapter of his book What Does China Think?,
which gives voice to many Chinese thinkers, writers and officials with regard to both
internal and international issues, “The twenty-first century” will see a more selfconfident China joining “the USA and the European Union as a shaper of world order,
challenging Western influence in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the
former Soviet Union with a different model of globalization.” 56 This is exactly what
China has been pursuing in the last decade through its soft power strategy for the
purpose of boosting its international image, spreading its influence and contributing to
build up its desired international world order. 57
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War and Peace Conjunctures, An Essay
Pedro P. Geiger

Pedro.geiger@gmail.com
A Controversy between Lenin and Kautsky
In a sharp 1914 attack against Karl Kautsky, Vladimir Lenin, calling him the German
“Marxist,” denied his ideas about the possibility of peaceful deals between democratic
capitalist states. According to Kautsky, wars had become too costly as a means of
solving opposite interests; thus, in the end, the democratic capitalist states could reach a
collective deal to control the capitalist system. Kautsky wrote that “tendencies of
capital expansion may be favored through peaceful democracy and not by violent
imperialist methods” (Lenin, 1975). Further, wars between capitalist democracies
would be replaced “by a common universal exploitation by financial capital united in an
international scale” (Kautsky, 2008).
Kautsky´s statements followed the presentation of the same ideas in The Great Illusion,
written in 1910 by Norman Angell, a British economist and Nobel Peace Prize winner of
1933. Norman Angell considered the advances of the global economic interdependence
between the powerful states. Further, because the source of wealth related to
international trade could not be controlled, war was becoming innocuous, without sense
(Angell. 1910). For Lenin, imperialism and wars would be inevitable inside the
capitalist system.
Actually the political divergences between Kautsky and Lenin were larger and not
restricted to this issue of war and peace among capitalist states. Kautsky´s general ideas
about the path of socialism were closer to those of Edouard Bernstein and Rosa
Luxembourg, who also maintained sharp arguments with Lenin (Magnoli and Barbosa,
2011). Rosa Luxembourg considered the German Spartacus revolution an adventure,
but took part in it and was murdered. Kautsky, who opposed the Spartacus revolution,
was finally expelled from the Marxist establishment and labeled by his former
colleagues the “renegade Kautsky.”
Leninists still maintain that wars are inevitable between the capitalist states. Some
debate about over the causes of the two World Wars; others mention the invasions of
Iraq and Afghanistan, while most Leninists omit the non-declared wars in Korea and
between China and Vietnam which were started by non-capitalist countries (Fontes,
2010). However, one can reply that the First World War occurred when the influence of
the aristocratic class on European governments was still very high and played a major
role on the outbreak of the war.
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About the Second World War, we can recall the appeasement policy of Chamberlain
during the 1930s in face of violent Nazi aggressions; one can also point to the American
attempts to stay out of the European war and to negotiate a deal with Japan. These
policies expressed the search by the two leading democratic capitalist powers for
peaceful solutions at that time. The recent wars in Iraq or Afghanistan cannot be
considered as occurring between capitalist powers. They express more a resistance
along the peripheries of traditional cultures to the world order imposed by the capitalist
system.
Thus, the facts apparently lend credence to the statements expressed by Angell and
sustained by Kautsky. However, one may concede that (1) since the end of the Second
World War and until the 1990s, capitalists were engaged as a bloc in a confrontation
with the USSR; (2) after the War, the US emerged with disproportionate strength
relative to that of the other capitalist states combined; and (3) the existence of nuclear
bombs created an enormous deterrent to war. At the beginning of the Cold War,
Churchill pronounced famously that it is better to have built a divided world than have
destroyed a united world. The atomic weapon plays a major role in removing chances
of war between the leading world states. A danger lies in the case of atomic weapons
falling into the hands of people who care more about life in Heaven than on the Earth.
Let us remember that a number of international institutions were created in the wake of
the Second World War to sustain the cohesion of the capitalist states as a unified bloc.
After the war, the Marshall Plan was offered in order to rebuild both the victims of the
war and its perpetrators -- Germany, Italy and Japan. At the 1944 Bretton Woods
conference, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD, were created. By 1947, the US held 34.25% of
IBRD´s capital and, together with the UK, 48.3%. IBRD was the basis for the World
Bank Group, composed of the World Bank and other financial agencies, such as the
Agency for International Development, AID (Pereira, 2009).
Non-Marxist thinkers, since they do not rely upon the deterministic role of the economic
base, generally do not have theories or questions about whether or not there can be a
permanent state of war or peace. Freud, for instance, thought the fight between Eros
and Thanatos was permanent since it involved human impulses; he argued, though, that
education can reduce the strength of Thanatos (Freud, 2009).
The Cold War influenced Toynbee, who feared a third world war, making him
pessimistic about mankind’s practices. He wrote that neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union is suffering from economic deprivation. However, “they hardly enjoy
freedom from mutual fear” and “The West and probably the entire human race depend
on the disruption of that fateful succession of major wars whose basic pattern already
points in a direction of breakdown and ‘suicide’” (Mason, 1958:54).
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However, Toynbee maintained the hope that fear of the Atom Bomb, along with the
work of international institutions, rising internationalist beliefs and the decline of violent
ideological aggressive nationalism, could keep the peace. He believed in a long term
solution provided by a government of the oecumene (Mason, 1958). He also believed
that religion could lead the way to a more peaceful world. He never predicted the
present rise of militant religious fundamentalism, which is beginning to erode
previously firm nation states.
Henry Mason wrote that “Most authors appear to agree with Toynbee that war in the
nuclear rocket age has become tantamount to suicide for human civilization.” For
instance, he cited F. L. Schuman´s The Commonwealth of Man, 1953, which said that
“war in the atomic age is obsolete, since no statesman can anticipate its course of
consequences” (Mason, 1958:105).
Determinant and Dominant Levels
Contemporary Marxian theory defines the social structure as being constituted by a
deterministic economic base and by diverse other levels of social systems, including
practices or instances. In a given moment, one of these other systems, such as the
cultural, the ideological, or the political, takes a dominant role in guiding social
movement, but the economic level still acts as a deterministic force from below. One
will say, for instance, that the economic crisis after the First World War was behind the
growth of the fascist ideologies among Italian and German populations during the 1920s
and 30s.
The dominant social level can be defined as a conjuncture. For instance, when Galileo,
utilizing the telescope, discovered and stated that it is the Earth that moves around the
sun, a new conjuncture was being established. And, because it was introducing a new
conjuncture, it raised strong reaction from the Church that almost cost Galileo his life
for heresy. The new conjuncture was characterized by giving an upper hand to science
rather than religion in explaining the world, and if such truths could change, so could
social structures.
By the 1930s in Europe, with the rise of Nazism, political ideology became a new
conjuncture. Despite the appeasement policies of France and England, the Nazis’
aggressive policy led to the Second World War.
After the War, an ideological fight was used in the competition for hegemony between
the former USSR and the US, in the Cold War. The Soviet Union represented
nationalism and socialism; the US represented capitalism and democracy. These two
ideologies came close to real conflict in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a war
only deterred by the threat of a mutually destructive nuclear war.
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Since then, nuclear war has served as a strong deterrent, preventing war between the
current major world powers. A concept of responsible states was created, referring to
the first atomic powers and the world’s leading powers. Among the big current world
powers, only Brazil does not possess nuclear military power. A danger of a
proliferation of nuclear capacity was recognized, and following a succession of UN
conferences, a treaty of nonproliferation was signed by the majority of its members. A
danger lies in the use of nuclear power in local wars between minor powers, with the
risk of major power involvement in such a war. Also, there is the danger of having such
weapons fall into the hands of terrorists.
Although contention still existed between the US and the USSR, revelations about
Stalinism, growing hostility in Central and East Europe against Soviet impositions, and
the apparent economic decline of the USSR and its satellites culminated in 1991 with
the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile, by the 1970s and 1980s, a new
economic capitalist cycle started to operate and guide the process which would be called
globalization.
While the Soviet Union was moving toward its demise, Communist China, on the
contrary, was becoming a second superpower, replacing the former Soviet Union.
However, instead of building once again an iron curtain or promoting political
propaganda around the world, China became a main sustainer of the capitalist system
and its globalization. Thus, China’s model further destroyed the former communist
ideology of a common political system for the masses and the Leninist view of the class
struggle. National economic growth became the new ideology.
The only exception to joining the capitalist global system appears nowadays in the
Muslim world. In most Muslim countries, the strict observance of religion and very
high birth rates has been maintained to a high degree. Secular Muslim regimes, with
large presences of military personages in the governments, have failed to provide
economic wealth for a fast growing population or address enormous inequalities of
income; instead, they were more often involved in practices of corruption.
Since the end of the last century, religion has been used as a political weapon, an
alliance of religion and authoritarian rule. Unlike the secular values of Western culture,
these religious dictatorships have scorned what appears to them to be permissive
regimes which allow forbidden behaviors (sexual equality and human rights). The
ideological framework of this movement contains anti-Western and anti-globalization
principles. However, the low rank of the Muslim states in the world hierarchy of power
is not enough to give them a direct role of influencing the path of war or peace on a
world scale. Regional military conflicts inside the Muslim world during recent decades
have not permitted that world to directly oppose the leading world powers militarily.
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The Economic Level Being Simultaneously a Determinant and Dominant Level
After the Cold War, a kind of hegemonic condominium was established between the US
and the USSR, called “bipolarization.” Later, as the USSR dissolved, and globalization
was being established, we reached a phase of the US becoming the world’s monopolar
power based on its economic and military strengths.
As globalization with its flows of capital advanced, one saw a continuous growth in the
periphery of the historic centers of capitalism. It gave place to the appearance of the
developing countries. A prominent place was reached particularly by the emergence of
countries with either continental size or population: Brazil, Russia, India and China,
called the BRIC countries. Emphasis is put on China, for being now the second
strongest economy and on its gross domestic product, still growing above 8% per year.
In statistical terms, if the current pace is maintained, by 2030 China may surpass the US
as the leading world economy.
The diffusion of economic growth among major world countries has pushed their
governments to what John Friedmann once called competitive cooperation (Friedmann,
1999). Different from the former Soviet Union, Communist China appears today as a
fundamental pillar of the world capitalist system. In Brazil, the anti-American
ideological movement led by leftist parties, very strong during the 1990s, has declined
as a government guided by a leftist party aims to occupy higher economic and political
positions in the global system. The developing powers realized their economic
advantages as they were becoming leading partners within the world economic system.
Their confidence increased when the economic crisis of 2008 exposed a dominant role
played by the developing countries in the efforts to reach a needed global solution.
On the other hand, the socio-cultural environment of globalization became characterized
by the formation of “cognitive-cultural” societies (Scott, 2007). Every day, the media
bombards the populations with sets of numbers related to the economic, financial, and
social conditions of each country and of the world, to be consumed. More and more
people relate their satisfaction with the management of the economy and public affairs
by the private and governmental sectors.
The constant stream of comparisons contributes to a common effort of countries to solve
the current crisis of the world capitalist system. The current crisis started in the US at
the end of 2008, and spread quickly around the whole world. The reactions of the
leading states of the capitalist system did present a picture very different from what
happened during the 1930s. At that time, each state tried its particular solution, as did
the US with the New Deal, or Germany with its rearmament and conquests. Now, one
sees orchestrated international action to reverse the recession by states with extreme
social and political differences, such as the US and China, or the UK and Brazil. A
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group of the 20 most developed states, the G-20, meets regularly to reach coordinated
economic measures.
The present economic crisis is more damaging inside the old historical capitalist centers
than inside the BRIC countries. China still grows at an annual rate of 8% and is sharply
increasing its military power. Therefore, one sees the development of the idea that one
moves from a monopolar world, led by the US, to a multipolar world with a large
equilibrium of forces. However, all these countries are reconsidering now that their
fate, growth, is tied to the health of the entire capitalist system.
Thus, the present world conjuncture is favorable to the maintenance of peace among the
major global powers.
Hegel, Marx and Engels, and the State
In Hegel’s view, at its end history will culminate in a universal state. For Marx and
Engels, on the contrary, history will return to its beginnings, but at a higher level, with
the establishment of societies that have neither classes nor states, thanks to
Communism. For Marx and Engels, the state appeared to be a class instrument, one
which was taken up after the Industrial Revolution by the capitalists of each country.
Instead, today, everywhere in the world, the state is getting larger, except in some
particular instances. The direction of the state and of society is currently the subject of
debate inside the developed and developing countries, alike. And while, in general,
private economic entrepreneurs and executives favor a smaller role for the state, popular
and leftist parties favor a more pronounced presence for the state.
In the economic crisis facing the European Union, for instance, leftist parties are
viewing the recovery as dependent on a larger involvement of the state, promoting
expenditures and consumption to stimulate production, even at the costs of an increase
in the public debt and inflation. Meanwhile, the other party sees the solution through
policies of austerity, cutting debts, and diminishing the role of the state as a provider of
wealth.
Looking to the world framework, one observes that the developing countries, such as
Brazil and especially China, have historically and currently featured a dominant role for
the state. On the other side, the US appears as the model of a country that since its
foundation aimed to have a state that plays a minimum role in domestic affairs.
However, in face of the current universal economic conjuncture, the US now faces a
new dilemma of giving the state a larger role. Often, one sees President Barack Obama
being called a “socialist” as a strategy by the right wing to prevent any growth in the
role of the state. For instance, the Affordable Care Act is increasing the number of
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people covered by medical insurance; it is doing so gradually by raising income taxes on
the rich, with the rationale that the inequality of income distribution is reaching its
historically high levels. Actually, one may think that the future of the US, as the
number one nation of the world, lies in the choices it makes about the role of the state in
economic and social practices.
Potential Future Dangers
Although air transportation is considered very secure today, in every airplane seat one
finds recommendations “in case of.” The same can be said about the dangers of having
world war. Since the end of the Second World War up to the present decade, the world
conjuncture has furthered conditions of world peace among the hegemonic powers. It is
not easy today for any of the developed or developing countries to mobilize citizens for
wars of conquest or to resolve differences not serious enough to put their national
survival in danger. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for instance, were fought mostly
by American professional soldiers.
However, some dangers are still present, even if they appear to be small in the face of
the larger interests of the majority of the world population for peace. Let us list some of
the dangers.
The European Union is having difficulty in overcoming their current economic crisis,
where some countries have rates of unemployment above 20%. This is a framework
that has consequences, including the rise of right wing parties hostile to the EU.
Germany, with its 80 million people and with the world’s fourth largest gross domestic
product, has started to have great influence over EU policies. The result is an increase
of animosity against Germany in some of the weaker states of Europe, reviving
resentments once held against Germany for its role in World War II. For many
economists, one of the components of the present European crisis lies in the fact that the
free movement of people, merchandise, and capital between states with a common
currency is producing enormous economic concentration in Germany. The currency is
common, but not the duties of administrating the states.
At present, the political opposition between centrist and leftist parties includes their
views in regard to the strengthening or the weakening of EU political ties. The current
positions taken by the European left is increasingly anti-globalization and antiAmerican, with a resurgence of past nationalistic ideologies.
“Opposed extremes are approaching,” writes Anne Applebaum, about current elections
in European countries. The European leftist parties, such as the Greek leftist coalition,
urge distancing their country from Europe and then approaching Russia (Applebaum,
2012). As it is well known, there is conflict of interests between Russia and NATO,
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particularly about a rocket shield intended to be established by NATO in eastern
European states.
However, these opposition movements in Europe are unlikely to shift to military
hostilities, because the population is less interested in socialism than in the realization
that wars between states will be disastrous.
The case of China presents two main political issues: the present structure of power in
the country and the continued role of the Communist Party and of the People’s Army.
The army is the guardian of the revolution led by Mao. The party is the provider of
government leaders and the setting wherein the political intelligentsia acts. This party is
managing the country and introducing modernity.
Since the modernizations introduced by party leader Deng Xiaoping, China as a whole
has benefitted enormously (Zenin, 2002), and domestic politics are relatively peaceful.
However, Chinese urbanization and growth is introducing regional and social
inequalities and more social demands. Thus, for some analysts, some questions are
asked about these inequalities and how a long continuation of the world economic crisis
could affect Chinese political evolution.
Increasing domestic demands can influence current policy and political movements in
two different directions. They may distract the country’s attentions from external
disputes, or on the contrary, the external issues could be used to divert the population
from its domestic problems. In the case of China, internal troubles, a sharp fall of its
economic growth, may bring back ideological struggles for power and might involve an
army that has a particular political role. Given that China has very sensitive questions
on its international agenda, harder or softer ideological political lines may affect its
external policies, more or less aggressively (The Economist, 2012).
A second issue has to do with Taiwan, a very important Chinese issue. This issue began
in 1949, when the Communist revolution took power in continental China. China claims
sovereignty over Taiwan; Taiwan has claimed independence (with unification perhaps
an ultimate goal), its status protected by treaty with the US. The fact that the impasse
has remained static for more than 60 years can be viewed in two ways. One way is that
traditional Chinese patience still works. The other way, also decisive, is that the neither
the US nor China is interested in a war. The independence of Taiwan is maintained with
the support of a large portion of the island population. It is certainly possible to reach
an agreement on the issue of Taiwan by following lines somewhat similar to what was
established for Hong Kong.
A danger lies, however, in the linkages between this issue and the questions raised
above. In the case of a strong internal struggle between harder and softer sectors of the
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Communist Party and of the People’s Army, the issue of Taiwan may become hot. Any
sector in power might be obliged to emphasize the Taiwan question for its legitimacy.
Another danger of a large world war lies in armed hostilities started by belligerent
smaller countries with nuclear capability. A conventional war could escalate into a
nuclear one, drawing in major powers.
At present, North Korean threats of imposing its domination over the whole Korean
Peninsula and Iranian nuclear weapon developments seem to be the most dangerous
threats to world peace. They appear to be very dangerous because these countries seem
to be reluctant to open negotiation about their aims. The nuclear issue is potentially the
worst, considering commitment of Islamic fundamentalism to terrorist practices and the
danger of transferring nuclear explosives to terrorist groups. And one must also
consider the possibility of India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, inadvertently going
to nuclear war.
Closing Remarks
The threat of a new world war has receded since the end of the World War II. We have
seen the spread of capitalism to most of the developing countries. It has diminished the
power of traditional aristocrats, enlarged the influence of corporations, and facilitated
the rise of a new class of executives. It is this class that has guided the movement to
globalization.
One does not desire to give the impression of a rosy picture of the capitalist mode of
production and globalization. The critical emergence of income disparity, such as that
in the US, is dangerous. However, throughout history, war has never established a better
life for the people of the world. The most important shield against war is the
strengthening of peaceful ideologies as civil societies develop into cognitive cultural
societies.
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The Causes of Ethnic Conflicts
Mariana Tepfenhart

mtepfenh@monmouth.edu
Ethnic conflicts are not new phenomena. Such conflicts have existed all over the world
for centuries, but in the last 20 years, after the fall of Communism, they are in the focus
of public attention due to the war in Rwanda, the events in Eastern Europe, and the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union.
The post-Cold War world showed signs of decline with respect to the power of states to
maintain political stability. Since the two superpowers were no longer competing for
sphere of influences in the world, Third World countries suffered primarily because they
lost the support of their former patrons. What had once served as a stabilizing force was
gone.
The resulting conflicts are violent, bringing suffering, death, destruction, and terrorism.
They can escalate from local to regional areas. The casualties resulting from ethnic
conflicts are often in hundreds of thousands as one ethnic group tries to eliminate
another. The consequences can last generations.
This article discusses the most common causes that can trigger violent ethnic conflicts.
The author uses as examples two countries: the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and Rwanda. Although the literature on this topic is quite large and politicians and
scholars come with different interpretations, generally there is not only one cause for the
conflict, but a combination of factors. This paper emphasizes the role of belligerent
leaders in triggering the wars.
Many states are made up of numerous ethnic groups, defined as groups that share
common heritage, interests, beliefs, historical experience, and cultural traits. An ethnic
conflict is a conflict between two ethnic groups within a state, one dominant and one
subordinate. Often the dominant group is the state and the subordinate one is
challenging its legitimacy.
States do nation building by integrating their ethnic groups, usually through coercion.
Sometimes, ethnic groups benefit from integration such as opportunities for better jobs.
In this process, ethnic groups acquire a double identity; they don’t lose their identity. If
assimilation fails, then ethnic groups can be declared illegal (e.g. Kurds in Turkey or
Turks in Bulgaria in the 1970s). 1 The state might resort to genocide of a group,
deportation, or relocation, as has happened in Rwanda and Chechnya. 2
1
2

(Gevork 1999, 3)
(ibid, 2-3)
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There are different ways to eliminate an ethnic group. Genocide is massacre organized
by the state with the goal to totally eliminate the members of a certain ethnic group. In
the 20th century, the world witnessed the Holocaust and the genocide in Rwanda. Other
forms of confrontation are less violent, such as cultural genocide, which is still used to
destroy a group culturally. It involves the destruction of the churches, monuments,
documents, and houses connected with the existence of a certain ethnic group. Ethnic
cleansing is a combination of cultural genocide and forced relocation. In certain cases,
ethnic cleansing is accompanied by genocide, as it was in Yugoslavia. 3
Depending upon the relations between enemy groups, these kinds of conflicts can be
categorized into ethnic conflicts in a collective setting, an individual setting, or an
interpersonal setting. These categories do not establish rigid barriers. A conflict can
start in one type of setting and shift to another one, depending on the given situation.
Collective ethnic conflicts are absolute and fixed. The bonds between the members of
these ethnic groups are dogmatic. They fear contamination by another group and
attempt to prevent any infiltration from outside. The Nazi Party or the Bolshevik Party
acted as a group, and, if one member was injured, the whole group retaliated. Conflicts
in such a setting are more likely to be involved in violence which does not end until one
side is annihilated. 4
Conflicts in an individual setting are relative, not absolute. Members of the group act as
individuals. Their identities can switch among different political, cultural and religious
entities. These types of conflicts are seldom violent. 5
Interpersonal conflicts exist where there is no discipline and no definite authority, such
as in the “frontier setting.” These identities are violent and criminal. This setting has a
low level of organization and lack discipline. An example of this type of setting is
Afghanistan and the situation in Rwanda during the beginning of the conflict. 6
Many politicians explain the causes of the conflicts through “ancient hatreds,” 7 feelings
of hostility of one group towards another one based on past historical experience. Jens
Rydgren, from Stockholm University, wrote an article which analyzes the formation of
belligerent beliefs. According to the author, the past can influence the perception of the
present. The argument is that people’s beliefs depend on whom they trust, and so most
often they adopt the ideas of their own ethnic group using analogies to a current
situation. Political elites can use analogies to attract supporters to their side. Rydgren
also states that memories are simplified, and missing data are filled in with details that
3

(ibid, 4)
(Jowitt 2001, 28)
5
(ibid, 29)
6
(ibid, 30)
7
(Brown 1996, 3)
4
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attempt to make sense of the present events. Memories will reflect common ideas in the
group. There is also a tendency to glorify one’s own past, and omit the events that
would not fit a positive image. This process creates distortions that alter reality.
The result is that ethnic groups may feel resentment and fear at the same time, and when
this happens, they will mobilize to protect themselves. The political elites use
propaganda to demonize the enemy group and the connections between the two groups
are cut gradually. 8 These “ancient hatreds” provides an easily accepted explanation for
some conflicts, but there are other factors that can lead to ethnic wars.
Michael Brown, the author of “Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” identifies
four major causes of ethnic conflict: weak states, political issues, economic issues and
cultural issues. 9
Weak governments can create conditions favorable to the emergence of ethnic conflicts.
Governments might become weak because of corruption, because foreign aid stopped,
or because of incompetence. Other causes for weak states include criminal
organizations such as drug cartels, epidemics, and a flood of immigrants and refugees.
The former Yugoslavia provides a good example where a weak government enabled the
emergence of ethnic conflict. With the fall of the communist regime, individual groups
suddenly had a security dilemma regarding their life in the future, since the protection
from the center ceased to exist. Both those who were oppressed and those who were
protected felt threatened. The oppressed demanded political rights and those who were
protected were afraid to lose their status.
The fear for the future is expressed in the following statement: 10
Those who lived peacefully together under a central government suddenly view each
other with suspicion; but efforts to make one’s group more secure by arming creates
insecurity for others, who in turn arm, and in the end all are less secure.
A Serb describes the crisis like this: 11
Once the Yugoslav communist state began to split into its constituent national
particles the key question soon became: will the local Croat policemen protect me if
I am a Serb? Will I keep my job in the soap factory if my new boss is a Serb or a
Muslim? The answer to this question was “no,” because no state remained to enforce
the old ethnic bargain.
8

(Rydgren 2007, 231)
(Brown 1996, 3-11)
10
(Oberschall 1996, 121)
11
(ibid, 121)
9
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The Serbs, Croats, and Muslims wanted a centralized state to guarantee their well-being.
They were suspicious of each other. Under these circumstances, politicians who wanted
to promote their own agenda pointed to other groups as a scapegoat for the unease.
Hostility between groups intensified. This process makes ethnicity more salient, and the
competition for political power becomes increasingly intense.
Priejdor, a district in Bosnia, modeled the formation of collective violence. It was a
community composed of Serbs, Muslims, Croats and small numbers of other ethnic
groups. During the communist regime, these people lived peacefully, with no
discernible conflict amongst the ethnicities. The Serbs were not a minority, nor were
they discriminated against. In 1991, the Muslim candidates won the election for the
district. The Serbian party candidates came in second. The Muslim officials believed in
power sharing, so they did not take all the important positions in the local government.
At that time, the federal government had an army and units of it were transferred to
bases in Bosnia, under the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs. After the election, the Serbs
organized a parallel government. They asked the Serbian people in Bosnia to hold a
referendum to decide if they wanted to be part of Yugoslavia, or if they wanted to create
a Greater Serbia. Eighty-five percent of the Bosnian Serbs voted for Greater Serbia. 12
A committee was set up to form an army. In April 1992, without any warning, the Serbs
attacked Prijedor. Non-Serbs who were in leadership positions were arrested and later
executed. Some others were taken to a prison where they were tortured until they
confessed whatever their Serb interrogators wanted to hear.
Anthony Oberschall, the author of the article “From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and
War in Yugoslavia,” explains the apprehension of the Serbs and other ethnic groups
after the fall of communism. He argues that the transition to democracy was not an easy
one. Some former communists wanted to remain in power but they faced challenges. To
gain power, they resorted to ethno-nationalism. 13
“Patriotic journalism” had an important role in the rise of populist nationalism. 14 After
the Communist regime fell, reporters wanted to present the news objectively. Some
started to change the stories to favor their own ethnic group, which led the others to do
the same out of fear of being accused of not demonstrating enough patriotism.
Politicians used the media to promote their agenda, and many people believed the
fabrications they read in the newspaper. They were exposed to hateful messages. There
was no communication between the ethnic groups. This situation failed to provide for
an accurate perspective of events. A media analyst stated the following: “In Serbia and

12

(ibid, 123)
(ibid, 135)
14
(ibid, 135)
13
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Croatia, TV fabricated and shamelessly circulated war crime stories…the same victim
would be identified on Zagreb screens as a Croat and on Belgrade screens as a Serb.” 15
A polarization occurred, as competition for economic and political positions intensified.
Fear and hate dominated the mind of the people. Leaders, using peer pressure and all
kinds of coercion, tried to persuade the moderates that they were fighting for their life,
and that they were fighting to defend themselves. This is what Misha Glenny said about
the political elites: 16
Slobodan Milosovic and Franjo Tudjman successfully manipulated millions of
people into joining, passively or actively, a crusade of nationalist violence in order
to consolidate their position and further their political aims. To do this they required
three instruments-a subservient bureaucracy, absolute pliant electronic media, and
control over the legal system.
The Serb and then the Croat leaders first established unlimited administrative power
in the areas they controlled; they softened up their public by emitting an endless
stream of violent images on television; then they ensured that the legal system was
turned on its head---the murder of certain groups was sanctioned by the state, and
attempts to prevent murder were regarded at best with hostility and at worst as
treasonable.
The media would emphasize and repeat certain beliefs to persuade the moderates to get
involved in the fight. Some examples of the messages they delivered were: 17
•
•
•
•

“The enemy group acts in unison; children grow into adults, women give birth to
future warriors, even old people stab you in the back.”
“‘They’ massacred ‘us’ in the past and are about to do it again.”
“Disable them before they strike, which is what they are about to do, despite
appearances, because they are secretive and treacherous.”
“Ordinary people and militias are justified in taking extreme measures because
the authorities have not come to the defense of our people.”

Not only politicians were affected by nationalism, but scholars and representatives of
the Orthodox Church got involved, too. Other ethnic groups such as Slovenes, Croats,
and Bosnians reacted with their own nationalism to the Serbs. Populist nationalism
spread quickly.

15

(ibid, 135)
(Glenny 2001, 159)
17
(Oberschall 1996, 143)
16
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Lake and Rothchild in their article, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of
Ethnic Conflict,” summarized the situation: 18
… intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears for the future
… and when central authority declines, groups become fearful for their
survival…state weakness... is a precondition for violent ethnic conflict to erupt.
Weakening of a state can be a consequence of external factors. During colonial times in
Africa, countries were artificially carved into regions without regard for ethnic identity.
Ethnic communities were partitioned across two or three different countries and were
thus forced to live within other groups who were previously considered enemies. After
the Cold War, foreign aid and commitment of the major superpowers decreased. This
contributed to the economic decline. Other conditions that contributed to weakening of
the states were incompetence, corruption of the governments, human rights violations,
and famine. These combined to create conditions favorable to ethnic struggle.
Political factors are also important in explaining ethnic conflicts. In countries with
democratic governments, people have equal representation in politics. Discrimination
and exclusionary ideologies are not acceptable. In countries with authoritarian regimes,
not all ethnic groups are treated similarly. When oppression and discrimination are used
by the government against one group, there is little doubt that it will lead to internal
conflict.
Violence is more likely to happen when the ethnic groups are ambitious for power and
have strong ethnic identities. Opportunistic politicians take advantage of political
instability and economic turmoil to divert attention from the real problems besetting the
country.
Before colonial times, the Tutsi and the Hutu in Rwanda maintained a balanced social
system. When the Belgians took over the country they destroyed the system to make the
administration more efficient. The Belgians made the Tutsis overlords, creating deep
inequality between the two groups. The Tutsis became a privileged group who received
education, power, and prestige. Ironically, it was this group that started the anticolonialism struggle. As a result of Tutsis’ recalcitrance, the Belgians shifted their
sympathy to the Hutus. Violence started between the Hutus and the Tutsis. After
independence from Belgium in the 1960s, the government became mono-ethnic – all
Hutus. Each person was required to have his ethnicity written on his identity card.
An economic crisis started in the 1980s. The population grew after independence by
2.5%, but foreign aid started to slow down. 19 The price of coffee, a main product for
export, also dropped, further contributing to economic decline.
18
19

Lake and Rothschild quoted in (ibid, 135)
(Prunier 2001, 114)
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Hutus were fighting among themselves for resources. They resented the Tutsis who,
because of their education, could still get better jobs, despite being kept out of the
administration, politics, and army. When the international community pressured the
Hutus to share the power with the Tutsis, the Hutus took this as proof that the Tutsis
were favored by the international community. This further increased tension between
the two groups. The Hutu mono-ethnic government took drastic measures to keep its
position at any cost.
In 1990, Tutsi exiles from Uganda attacked Rwanda in an attempt to reclaim their
position. There were fights between the two groups before but they did not constitute
massacres. The Hutus were afraid that they might lose their jobs. They were afraid that
the Tutsis would try to take revenge, because as one of the Hutus said: “We killed some
of their parents and they will somehow come and try to reclaim their possessions and
avenge old scores.” 20
The massacre that followed was well organized. Hutus were rewarded for killing Tutsis,
and the nation’s media reinforced the belief that these enemies must be eliminated by all
means.
This conflict had various dimensions. There was an economic dimension: the Hutus
viewed themselves as persecuted economically. There was a political dimension:
Political elites exploited grievances of the group and worked to mobilize the Hutus to
achieve control of the country. There was the fear of revenge from the Tutsis who lost
relatives in the fight with the Hutus.
Prof. James Fearon, from Stanford University, has argued that the main causes of ethnic
conflict arise as matters of commitment. He said “…problem arises when two political
communities find themselves without a third party that can guarantee agreements
between them.” 21
The war between the Serbs and the Croats further illustrates this argument. Before the
Croats declared Croatia an independent state in 1991, the two ethnic groups lived in
relative peace. As long as the country was a Tito dictatorship, ethnic antipathies were
tamped down. After Tito, initially, they did not want to go to war, since they recognized
the cost of it, and the danger that comes with war. Once the declaration of
independence occurred, the war started. Serbs did not feel safe within a Croat state.
Tudjman, the Croat leader, wanted to assure the Serbs that their rights would be
respected, but his words were not backed by his actions. 22 Serbs were fired from
20

(ibid, 115)
(Fearon 1994, 2) See Ethnic War as a Commitment Problem, page 2.
22
(ibid, 119)
21
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governmental jobs in administrative positions and the police. Croats used Nazi
symbols, still fresh in the minds of those who had lived through the Nazi occupation.
The lack of commitment was caused by a couple of factors. According to Fearon, the
base of the Croat party was against giving equal rights to Serbs. Their views were
supported by Croat emigrants, who were very nationalist. Another factor was the fact
that the Croats were helped by Germany with weapons. They underestimated the
determination of the Serbs to fight. 23 The fact that Germany recognized the
independence of Croatia created a domino effect; Bosnia wanted to have a separate
state, and the Serbs in Bosnia pushed for war to build a Serbian independent state.
In the two examples presented, the concept of ethnicity is very intense. The leaders of
the opposing groups never tried to attract members of other ethnic groups. Toleration,
or assimilation, was not acceptable. Extremist groups, on both sides, put pressure on
their members to be active participants in the fight, not observers. They were constantly
reminded that abandoning the fight would result in their own massacre.
Economic issues have the potential to increase tension between groups. High
unemployment, inflation, competition for resources, influx of immigrants, and
discriminatory policies towards one particular group provide conditions for violent
conflicts. Both Rwanda and former Yugoslavia faced economic crises that led to a
general decline in the standard of living and high unemployment.
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union after the fall of communism are further examples
where economic crises led to instability The transition from a central planned economy
to a market economy was very traumatic for the people of these countries. They faced
hyper-inflation, high unemployment, and competition for resources. These economic
reforms led to cuts in subsidies from the state and welfare services. Susan Woodward,
the author of “Intervention in Civil Wars: Bosnia and Herzegovina,” stated that the
decline of quality of life in Eastern Europe started earlier, in the 1970s.
She argues that: 24
…this growing sense of material insecurity, that there was no sign of relief, occurred
in the context of international change and domestic and political reform that also
pulled the rug from under the mechanisms by which social peace had been
guaranteed in the country since World War II.
The economic crisis creates instability, but also provides an opportunity for politicians
to use ethnic hatred under the pretext that they are working for the benefit of the group
they represent.
23
24

(ibid, 119)
(Blagovic 2009, 20)
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Global debt can also contribute to the emergence of ethnic conflicts. A debt crisis
occurs when a government cannot pay external debts. The loans acquired by the
governments of poor countries are intended to provide basic needs for the citizens.
However, because this money is often used inappropriately and external factors (such as
oil prices, high interest rates, decline in export prices and volume) reduce income,
countries can end up in a position where they are unable to pay off these loans. This
leads to budget deficits; they are then forced to choose between paying off the loan, thus
failing to provide basic needs to its citizens, or default on the loan. To prevent the
country from defaulting on the loan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduces
measures called “structural adjustments” which, in fact, represent a cut in aid involving
diminished food supply, layoffs, and cuts in government spending. 25
The consequences of debt and budget deficits are a decline in the standard of living,
which is followed, many times, by political instability and violence. Elite politicians
can use this crisis and ethnic conflict to identify a scapegoat for government
mismanagement.
Globalization is a controversial topic. Some supporters point to the increased flow of
goods, development of new markets and the spread of democracy in the world as being
positive consequences of globalization. Others, such as Amy Chua, a Yale professor,
argue that free markets and democracy do not cure hatred and violence, but it is exactly
these two concepts that can lead to violent ethnic conflicts. 26
Globalization can force relocation of workers, unemployment, uncertainty, and a
disrupted life. It can also contribute to inequality among people. Workers in
industrialized countries are in competition with low-wage workers in the other
countries.
Amy Chua exposes the disturbing consequences of globalization. She refers to the
“market dominant minorities”– ethnic minorities that dominate certain markets. 27 They
concentrate huge wealth while the majority increases its political power through such
social media as the Internet, U-Tube, and Facebook. This majority could be easily
manipulated against the wealthy ethnic minority by politicians.
Anti-Americanism, in many parts of the world, is a result of global markets. American
culture is perceived as a dominant force which works against established traditions, with
more and more people excluded from the economic elite. The people will turn antiAmerican. This feeling was obvious after the attack of September 11 when many people
rejoiced around the globe. A student from Vietnam interviewed after the event said:
25

(Ferraro Vincent 1994, 339)
(Chua 2006, 488)
27
(ibid, 488)
26
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“America deserves this because of all the suffering it has caused humankind.” 28 In
Nepal, a well-known commentator stated:
Those men who carried out the plane bombings… chose specific targets. The World
Trade Center was the High Temple of capitalism. It housed thousands of highly paid
financial workers who were seen as soldiers fighting an economic war that forces
80% of mankind to live in poverty. The bombers did not see them as innocent
civilians. They felt the workers were directly responsible for the suffering of
millions… We should never rejoice in the death and suffering of other people even
if they are our enemies. But America should not ignore the widespread hatred that is
felt against it. 29
Osama bin Laden issued a statement after September 11 saying that the victims of the
attack were “killers, who abused the blood, honor, and sanctuaries of Muslims.” 30
Much of the hatred for Americans is based on envy and frustration as well. Many feel
frustrated that they cannot live a prosperous life, that they have no opportunity to better
their lives. This is very well explained in an Internet issue of a Brazilian magazine:
My theory regarding the reactions of Brazilians and, in fact, of people in many other
third world countries, is that those reactions are a mixture of envy and frustration.
These are countries that failed to move forward in economic development.
Even though Americans are always the first to arrive with help at a scene of a
disaster anywhere in the world, that is not what people think about when they think
of the United States. They just want to live the way Americans live without
realizing that the Americans worked hard to get to where they are and still work
hard, and do things the right way to stay there. The dubious nature of the human
mind makes these people feel good when the so-called all mighty is brought down
because they somehow irrationally believe that that would make everybody equal. 31
Another interesting interpretation is offered by the Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk:
Today, an ordinary citizen of a poor, undemocratic Muslim country, or a civil
servant in a third world country, or in a former socialist republic struggling to make
ends meet, is aware of how insubstantial is his share of the world‘s wealth; he knows
that he lives under the conditions that are much harsher and more devastating than
those of the “Westerners” and that he is condemned to a much shorter life. At the
same time, however, he senses in the corner of his mind that his poverty is to some
considerable degree the fault of his own folly and inadequacy, or those of his father
28

(Chua 2005, 246)
(Ibid, 147)
30
(Ibid, 156)
31
(Ibid, 149)
29
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and grandfather. The Western world is scarcely aware of this overwhelming feeling
of humiliation that is experienced by most of the world population. 32
The desire for homogenization of the world is a trend that can tear apart old cultures.
While some world corporations are amassing huge wealth, small businesses around the
world are swept away. The backlash against this is the violence of the majority that will
be directed to eliminate the dominant elite. Croatia in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
prove the point. The prosperous elite was attacked by the majority incited by the leaders
who used populism as a uniting concept.
Michael Mousseau also analyzed the effects of globalization and the polarization that
occurs due to trade. He contrasted two types of societies: the clientalist society and
societies based on market economies. High-income countries developed market
economies. In these societies, people shared common liberal values. In market
economies, strangers and even enemies can cooperate based on some legal agreements.
This type of market has “liberal values of individualism, universalism, tolerance, and
equity.” 33 Trust is based on a legal contract, not on friendship.
In clientalist societies, cooperation is based on friendship and it takes place within a
certain group. They perceive those in the market economies as outsiders, therefore not
trustworthy. They are enemies. They appear greedy, since they seem to be interested in
material gains only. When these clientalist societies begin to break down, the people in
the developing countries resent the Western societies, including America. Under these
circumstances, leaders in the clientalist society rally the people by appealing to an antimarket ideology. Cultural isolationism, combined with economic problems, can lead to
conflicts between societies in the developing countries and those associated with the
market economy, the West.
Professor Fred W. Riggs also analyzed the causes and the consequences of globalization
and described the emergence of two different types of nations: the existing states that
created themselves by assimilation or destruction of the elements that do not fit in and
communities that want to be recognized as nations but don’t have a state. 34 The first
type encourages state nationalism and the second type promotes ethnic nationalism.
This process of increased nationalism has been accelerated by the fall of Communism
and the intensification of globalization in the post Cold War period. The wave of
migrations that is a consequence of globalization has dispersed people all over the
world. Many of them are not assimilated and they feel marginalized in the countries
they have adopted. These minority groups mobilize and express their demands while
the established societies reject their demands.

32

(Ibid, 149)
(Mousseau 2002, 11)
34
(Riggs, 41)
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Western Europe attracted people looking for a better life from all over the world. The
war in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the fall of communism in Eastern Europe,
increased the number of immigrants. The euphoria in the West at the end of the Cold
War disappeared, and it was replaced by fear and rejection of immigrants. Immediately
after the fall of communism, about five million people from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union left their own countries for the West. 35
France has a large population of immigrants from southern Europe and northern Africa.
The North Africans are mostly Muslims. Many French feel hostility towards the
Muslims who seemed to have little desire to integrate. Conflicts arise over the
construction of mosques, work relationships, claims for welfare, and religious symbols
in schools. A new anti-foreign movement has emerged and gained considerable
support.
The French model of citizenship is based on assimilation and secularism. To become
citizens, immigrants must adjust to French culture. They must embrace it. However,
even after they get citizenship, they are still viewed as “immigrants.” Many people of
the host country complain that the immigrants do not want to integrate and that they
expect the natives to accommodate them.
When ethnicity becomes a component of group identity, it can be easily manipulated by
political leaders who are trying to build and consolidate their power base. This can lead
to ethnic nationalism, which is different from civic nationalism. In his article, “Causes
of Ethnic Conflict,” Jack Snyder explains the difference between ethnic and civic
nationalism: 36
“Civic nationalism normally appears in well-institutionalized democracies. Ethnic
nationalism, in contrast, appears spontaneously when an institutional vacuum
occurs. By its nature nationalism based on equal and universal citizenship rights
within a territory depends on a supporting framework of laws to guarantee those
rights as well as effective institutions to allow citizens to give voice to their views.
Ethnic nationalism depends not on institutions but on culture. Therefore ethnic
nationalism is the default option; it predominates when institutions collapse, when
existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs and when alternative
structures are not readily available.”
In France, in 1989, three Muslim girls in high school were expelled for wearing
headscarves. This triggered a nationwide controversy involving issues such as the
principle of secularism in schools, integration of the immigrants, and multiculturalism.
The French expect from immigrants assimilation, meaning rejection of other cultural
identity that is different from French. The far right politicians complained about the
35

(Heinz Fassman 1994, 534)
Jack Snyder as quoted in (Brown 1996, 8)
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Islamization of France. Far left politicians felt that secularism in schools was under
attack. They were joined by teachers who spoke about Muslim students who refused to
attend gym classes, philosophy, and other subjects on religious grounds. Feminists
expressed their protest against oppression of women by Islamic fundamentalism. 37
Muslims, although many opposed the wearing of headscarves, viewed this conflict as a
proof of French racism and xenophobia. They felt that the right to be different was dead
in France. A law was passed to ban the headscarf in schools, but the conflict did not
stop. It expanded to include other issues regarding the immigrants and the integrity of
French culture. Politicians will exploit any aspect of the conflict that might suit their
agenda. As a result, France and other countries in Europe have passed increasingly
restrictive laws regarding immigration.
Not all multi-national countries end up destroying one or two ethnic groups. Countries
such as Switzerland and Canada use different methods to achieve equality: democracy,
such as power sharing; greater autonomy for certain regions; and veto power for all
communities. This sort of environment encourages people to learn to live together,
despite diversity. 38 Governments in democratic states will take all necessary steps to
avoid discrimination. However, accommodation does not guarantee political stability or
prevent secession. For example, Czechoslovakia separated into two republics. 39
In conclusion, ethnic conflict is not the result of diversity. Poverty and fear for the
future provides a fertile ground for ethnic conflict. Politicians (from the far left and the
far right) use scare tactics to achieve their personal goals. They are the true instigators.
They will try through all means, including propaganda in the media, to rally people to
their cause and to polarize the nation. As their message succeeds, tension increases
between groups, communication between the groups fails, and fear dominates the minds
of the people. Taken to an extreme, morality does not apply any more to society. People
may begin to react with the belief that self-defense is justified and this requires
annihilating the other group first. Violence, cruelty and inhumane acts are accepted.
That is the beginning of genocide.
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End Note
Seeing Nagasaki:
A Tale
Fumiki Narita as interpreted and translated by Wallace Gray
This essay is remarkable for its range. It covers ground all the way from the
commonplaces of travel to the extremes of cruelty and destruction. Fumiki-san exposes
us to heroic witnesses to faith and compassion shown by the martyrs of Japanese
history. However, he also discloses a continuum stretching from war and hatred to
dreams of peace.
In between is some of the history of urban change in Nagasaki plus the recognition of a
cabdriver’s kindness and helpfulness. Throughout is a poetic appreciation of the area
and its people and history.
Fumiki is a victim of Muscular Dystrophy with parents knowledgeable and
compassionate enough to slow down the transformation of his musculature into mush.
(The whole family was featured in a series on Japanese national television to spread the
word and vision of an enlightened approach to the dread disease.) His life expectancy
was about 20 and he is 41 now, as I recall. His essay on the trip to Nagasaki is the 30th
in his collected volume named Unlimited Imagination.
His father, now deceased, taught him PC skills when he was losing the hand control
necessary for writing the complex characters. His mother became a female Samson or
Goliath; she can slip the adult (smaller than average because of deterred growth but
nevertheless a weight) on her back in difficult situations. When you try to stop her, she
ignores you with a smile and proud words, emphasized with a fist in the air, “I am a
strong woman!”
(Wallace Gray’s comments throughout are in italics.)
----------------------[Fumiki is beginning his essay with something probably drawn from folklore or literary
culture. It goes like this. . . .]
“Were the fall colors and foliage already beginning to appear in Nagasaki?”
Except on Mt. Unzen, 1 the warm weather had not yet yielded to the very cold.

1

A volcano in Nagasaki prefecture. Off and on it has been very dangerous. “In 1792, the collapse of one
of its several lava domes triggered a megatsunami that killed about 15,000 people in Japan’s worst-ever
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Our trip was a matter of sudden resolve. Mother and I were able on short notice
to acquire tickets and on November 1, 2000, to board an early-morning limited
express train operated by Japan Railways. It departed from a station in historic
Hakata near our home in Kitakyushu. 2 This latest-style white rolling-stock
named Kamome débuted around February of this same year. The JR officials
spoke proudly of it when they said, “Nowhere else has such a comfortable train
been built.”
We stepped down into the neat–as-home Nagasaki Station a little after 10 a.m.
From our rental car window we glimpsed heavy clouds hanging low, but luckily, just as
we entered the city, they dissipated. At a kiosk we bought a guidebook and soon got
into an owner-operated taxi ready to do some sightseeing.
First, at Nagasaki’s very edges, outside the district of Nishisonogi (population
about 72,000), on mountain roads that wound around and around, our drive took us
eventually to the building that was our destination, and the building was open. The sun
was setting in the open sea, and we were observing this from a hill or knoll when we
spotted from there the Literary Building named after Shusaku Endo, the famed 20th
century Catholic novelist 遠 藤周作 (Endo Shusaku in Japanese order.) 3
It seems as though, when we speak of this area as containing “deep-sea towns
and streets” in comparison to “interior oceanic towns and streets” we are speaking, in
this instance, of what we see when our eye turns in the direction of mountains. [The
grammar here was too complex for me, but I believe it refers to a similar distinction
concerning the Hawaian Island of Oahu where local people think of their four-millionyear old geological area as containing mountains, seas, winds and beaches divided
roughly into windward and leeward Oahu.--wg]
We were driven up mountain roads for about 30 kilometers (19 miles) while our
driver described events in the area at the time of World War Two. He vividly described
Nagasaki’s having an atomic bomb dropped on it; he spelled out for us what made the
bombing such a disgraceful event.
volcanic-related disaster. The volcano was most recently active from 1990 to 1995, and a large eruption in
1991 generated a pyroclastic flow that killed 43 people, including three volcanologists.”—Wikipedia the
free encyclopedia.
2

The distances on the Island of Kyushu to Nagasaki come to about 100 miles from Fumiki’s home in
Kitakyushu or about 75 from the historic port area of Hakata in the city of Fukuoka.
3
Often compared to Graham Greene in the West, Endo was a Roman Catholic writer, and a member of a
group known simply as “The Third Generation.” This refers to a generation of post-World War Two
writers. One after another these writers won the Akutagawa Prize, an esteemed Japanese literary prize.
Yet, of this it is reported that Endo said, “In those days hardly did anyone expect that we would become
great writers.”
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At the top of a steep path is the Literary Building named after the writer Endo, as
mentioned above. Some time earlier, the building was introduced to Japanese viewers
by an NHK (National TV) program. The building is so placed as to expose a superb
view, with fine positioning for both the sea and the mountains. From the observation
platform we were able to see the ocean shining with golden brilliance.
Also visible were various-sized Catholic churches in a little village. When the
sun sinks to the horizon, the sea is dyed a deep red, and until night’s curtain falls, I feel
as if a full display of the shoreline is exposed. No matter in which of the four seasons
the visitor comes, the scenic impression lingers and rings like a bell in the heart. I took
a commemorative photo of a mini-cosmos blossoming at water’s edge.
We took our time sauntering around and examining the wealth of materials
acquired and arranged for the exhibition room inside the “Endo” building. The
collection contains autographed books, handwritten manuscripts including photocopies
of children from tender ages up. A small display area had been sandwiched between
other items but, in that area, a particular picture caught my eye. A pine-covered hill was
visible in the foreground of the painting, and in the far distance, the blue-green ocean
seemed to frame the islands that dotted the scene. I remembered a poetic quotation from
an eight-volume collection of joyful, auspicious poetry. Here’s the quotation:
Toward the interior of this brightness there is a simplicity,
an artlessness as the koto is played.
The sound must emulate Autumn’s beauty.
In such stillness the koto seems to tingle.
I enjoyed this stillness while it lasted.
[Since there are fewer Japanese characters than usual in this poem and more
Japanese phonetic symbols, we may infer that the poet was a woman. Only men
were supposed to be educated enough to use Chinese characters. Some ladies knew
quite a few but were demure or canny enough not to “go public” about their
achievement. We should add that the wording of the poems is so difficult and
archaic as to suggest a quite early date in the evolution of written Japanese.]
To the Peace Park on our return to the City. . . .
[To a non-native this line looks less like a sentence than a kind of topical
announcement. Japanese is sometimes surprisingly concise because it may omit both
verbs and subjects. Though Western influence continues to modify modern
Japanese, pronouns are still often omitted. In order to express oneself more
precisely and personally, an English speaker might write, “I’d like to tell you some
things about the city of Nagasaki.”]
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When I looked up at the Peace-Prayer-Statue built on a high knoll, I saw how
solidly it was accentuated by the deep blue of its celestial backdrop. This bronze statue,
said to be the world’s largest (it is 33 ft. tall), points with the right hand skyward thus
underlining the threat from atomic bombs. The left hand is extended toward the sea and
beyond, thus symbolizing the world peace that can ensue from successful confrontation
with nuclear dangers, both in terms of civilian energy-sourcing and military threats.
There is also the subtle hint of prayer for all martyrs (even if burned or buried alive) that
they may rest in peace. In addition, the city is reminding viewers— by means of a scarf
hanging over the statue’s left shoulder—of those wounded by the bombing.
[While some details of my translation become interpretive in a 2012 postFukushima context, I am sure the original text was written to convey the powerful
impression the Peace Park 4 made on Fumiki Narita when he wrote his reflections in
2000.]
The park was thronged by crowds of sightseers. While some sought water from
the Peace Fountains, others were already lifting their cups in dedication, thus offering up
repose for the souls of those who died searching for drinkable water. It was already past
3 p.m. and powerful rays of sunshine poured in from the west creating a splendid
rainbow in the jet of water spouting from the fountain.
We passed by a place we were familiar with from The Bells of Nagasaki by
Takashi Nagai, whose important 118-page essay Nagasaki no Kane describes his
experiences, thoughts, and feelings as an A-bomb victim; though once a best seller, the
book is regrettably almost unknown to many Japanese and American readers today.
Published originally in Japanese in 1949 (Hibiya Shuppan) and in English in 1994
(Kodansha International), it has been the basis of a song by Takashi Nagai. . . . We
passed in front of the Nagai residence (not the hut he used after the bombing) and
moved on to the ruins of an historic Catholic Church in the Urakami district. . . . We
wandered into a walled area in the corner of which were preserved statues, figures, and
portraits of Holy Ones. The statues were now only heads and body parts.
In the hall that houses information about the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, we
learned details of the course of events resulting in the use of the second nuclear weapon
as well as the circumstances surrounding its first use on Hiroshima. By means of the
items on display and the history given explaining them, one easily grasps both how
nuclear weapons were developed and the whole subsequent story right up to the present.
Included, of course, is an explanation of Nagasaki’s restoration after the tragic time of
4

The Peace Park is located in the Urakami River area at the very point of detonation, the Roman Catholic
Cathedral. The church’s remains from the bombing of 1945, and perhaps from earlier deterioration, were
restored in 1959. The restoration overlooks the Glover Garden. Although I have visited there, I am a little
uncertain about the precise details of its history.--wg
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mayhem. I, who am living in the peace of the present moment, will never forget the
sight of exhibits showing nuclear destruction in such displays as those of tin roofs and
glass containers transformed, actually deformed, beyond imagination. The misery
caused by an atomic bombing stands forth as a monstrous model of horror. I shudder at
the prospect of any renewal of nuclear warfare.
[The Urakami Catholic Cathedral was destroyed at 11:02 a.m. on August 9,
1945.] Its most recent predecessor was destroyed by the bomb, except for parts of its
wall. It had been completed, I understand, in 1914 after Catholic believers had sweat
over its construction brick by brick over a period of 30 years. After the bombing it was
rebuilt in 1959, then remodeled with brick tiles in 1980 to restore its original
appearance. These facts have been difficult for me to dig out; I believe they are
generally accurate. Now I turn to a significant matter of recent history. On February 25,
1981 the pope delivered a remarkable peace appeal in Nagasaki. It was clearly intended
to turn Japanese Catholics away from a rather passive martyr complex that had arisen
from horrible persecutions endured over the centuries in this very area where he was
speaking. Many Nagasaki Christians felt that all they could do was pray for peace. The
Pope even appealed to members of large Buddhist sects to become more active in
promoting peace. In defense of his appeal he said, “War is the work of human beings,”
then added, “If war is a human activity, peace can be too.”
There is only one misunderstanding that I feel must be cleared up. Some of the
cause for passivity is blamed on Nagai’s attitude and book, The Bells of Nagasaki. Just
because he felt that God had a part in a wind diversion to where the bomb fell does not
mean he felt Christians could only be passive and prayerful, like sacrificial offerings –
sheep being led to the slaughter. On the contrary, he and those he led through the
humongous crisis rendered superhuman help to the victims, thereby saving many lives
and rendering deeds of mercy and love to those who were hopeless and dying. . . ]
About five the following morning, we first rode by car from the hotel to visit a
“Dutch trading house” — perhaps part of the foreign merchant’s plaza. [The word
“Dutch” had been stretched to include all Europeans.] Afterwards, our car passed by
the statue of a “living-water girl” representing the children who suffered and died from a
lack of drinking or living water. 5 Walking beside Dutch Hill we approached the Glover
Garden open-air museum. There were many things to see on the steep incline to the
garden, which was located on a slightly elevated hill.
The guards gave me a hand with my wheelchair, in fact they pulled me up the
slope. Stepping inside the garden we happened upon a bustling, just-arrived group of
5

People died from drinking water they knew to be dangerously polluted. A girl is quoted on the black
stone plaque commemorating her and others like her. The girl said, “There was something oily on the
surface of the water, but I wanted water so badly that I drank it just as it was.” Their choice was: thirst or
poison, death in either case.--wg
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senior high school students on a field trip. Also conspicuous were the foreign tourists.
From the observation platform we had a good look at three diamond-shaped shipdocking places. We next toured Nagasaki’s Public Hall for Traditional Arts and Crafts
and visited such sightseeing favorites as Sofuku, a historic Zen Buddhist Temple
founded by Eisai. (We also smiled about the popular two-humped bridge that resembled
the top rim of a pair of eye-glasses.)
[Buddhism has a long history in Japan dating back to its introduction from
Korea in 552, but this Sofuku temple is the first Zen Temple in Japan (now a national
treasure).] For its founding we can thank scholar Eisai, who imported from China a
great mass of data to benefit his Japanese compatriots in 1195. This process resulted in
a new version of Zen known as Rinzai Buddhism. The history of Buddhism generally is
as convoluted and mind-boggling as a Zen koan, but one summary of Eisai’s approach
by another Zen philosopher Dōgen (1200-1253) must ring true around our globe.
On one occasion Abbott Eisai used the gold from his monastery’s statue of the
Buddha to enable a poor man to feed his starving family. A disciple reprimanded him
for giving away the halo from the sacred statue: “That’s a crime, isn’t it?” to which Eisai
responded, “You are right, but just consider the will of Buddha. He sacrificed his very
flesh and limbs for the sake of all mankind. If some men are about to die of starvation,
would he not want us to give the whole Buddha figure to save them? Even if I should go
to Hell for this crime, I would want to save people from starvation.”
By afternoon we had managed to reach the railroad station with plenty of time
before our train departed, so we again flagged down a cab and decided to head for the
seaboard museum which was a memorial hall at a place dedicated to the martyrdom of
26 Japanese martyrs; a nearby waterfall sounded like a tolling bell or even someone
weeping. There is a statue dedicated to a twelve-year old boy who suffered during the
oppression of Christians. He was charged with the crime of refusing to trample on and
break into pieces a tablet bearing the image of Christ (probably a crucifix). For his
“crime,” they cut off his left ear as an example and warning to all Christians young and
old.
Nagasaki is an inconvenient city for a wheelchair. Due to the helpful placement
of an elevator at each end of the train bridge leading to the station; those of us dependent
on wheelchairs were spared the difficulty of reaching the elevated crossover road. But a
remaining difficulty was that the road from one shore to the other had nearly impossible
shoulders, either too high or too low relative to the road. Needless to say, this feature did
not make the shoulders easily accessible by wheelchair. [Somehow the Naritas
surmounted this obstacle, probably by the expedient of Fumiki’s mother physically
lifting or lowering the wheelchair and Fumiki!] Fairly recently, three distinguished
guests of Nagasaki each made his own separate sightseeing excursion through Nagasaki.
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The guests were President Gorbachev of Russia, our own Japanese Emperor, and
the Pope of Rome. All three visited the inner district of the city by automobile. They
may not have enjoyed some of the “strolling pleasures” that we two Naritas did. On the
seaboard side the elevator for the the Memorial Hall displayed beautiful decorations,
handsomely applied. Sightseeing, in the most interior part of the city, seems to have
been dominated by automobiles. The road-width in that district had been reduced
because of buildings that “invaded” the streets. Roads here have become too narrow for
normal automotive traffic. To further “modernize” would have defaced or destroyed
historic neighborhoods.
It is scary to have taxis meet each other on the streets! They either block each
other or else veer off the right of way, impinging on national treasures. The taxi-driver
on our two-day tour served us in a very kind way. The hotel in which we were lodged
was right in the heart of the city; and so we could go on short strolls at night in neonlighted quarters, and we could stop for “tea”; this involved a simple but delicious meal
at a first-rate restaurant. My parents had been discouraged from visiting Nagasaki by all
the radical changes in the traditional city; I may have been a little hesitant to tackle
Nagasaki myself. However, Mother and I decided the time was ripe for us to risk it. It
turned out that this trip inside our own country became as memorable as any of our
previous domestic journeying.
November 2000
***
By now the reader may understand some of Fumiki’s and my esthetic interests as
well as global ethical concerns, or as the America idiom puts it, where Fumiki and I are
coming from.
Some of the deepest peace insights are suggested by Fumiki’s mention of Dr.
Nagai’s heartbreaking and yet hope-building classic (The Bells of Nagasaki). Eminent
in medicine and nuclear science before the American A-bombs were dropped, Nagai
became a theologian and Catholic holy person as well, choosing to live his remaining
days in a hut or small socially-open hermitage, which he named after the Golden Rule:
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. He lived and died during this
period as a kind of Christian meditative saint, author, and conversationalist. When he
was mortally wounded in 1995, he was 37 years old. He miraculously survived for 6
more years.
The bomb intended for Nagasaki was accurately aimed at what Nagai calls the
“munitions area” of Nagasaki (perhaps more aptly described as the port for building,
launching and servicing military ships), but the bomb was blown a little north to this
Urakami river area by unexpected winds so that it fell on a hospital and medical
university where many Christians and persons dedicated to the healing arts worked,
studied and healed — nurses, doctors and experienced first-aid personnel who
alleviated much suffering and, as circumstances allowed, performed respectful burial of

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol68/iss68/12

108

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

105

the dead. Nagai writes that if what he heard was true, then “the American pilots did not
aim at Urakami. It was the providence of God that carried the bomb to that
destination.” (p. 107)
The bells of Nagasaki had fallen 50 meters from the ruined cathedral. On Christmas
night several individuals dug the bells out of the ruins and hoisted them back in place
where they rang them morning, noon, and night.
“Bong!. . . Bong! . . . Bong!”—“a message of peace and its blessings.” (p. 117) On
the last page of his book (118), Nagai summarizes the people’s prayers:
Grant that Nagasaki may be the last atomic wilderness in the history of the
world. . . .The bells continue to ring. . . . “O Mary, conceived without sin, pray for us
who have recourse to thee.”
Some of the ones who prayed crossed themselves as they finished their prayers..
***
We have sought to create a generally faithful account of the man Nagai and his
chaotic times. There is rich material available on the internet. Understandably, that
body of material is both inspiring and confusing. Nagai moved from atheism to
profound Christian faith and philosophy and from almost blind patriotism to a world
peace perspective that caught even the Pope’s attention. Profiles of him drawn from the
quite different periods of his life might confuse any potential biographer because they
are so varied they might produce contradictory images of the “real man”. . . .
Even what brought on Dr. Nagai’s death seems to be a matter of dispute. I
assumed it was the terrible trauma he went through in saving lives while nearly
bleeding to death himself, but perhaps it was from the leukemia from which he suffered
after doctoring his patients with radiation. He was a pioneer in the medical science and
treatment techniques of radiation therapy. But the radiation he had to use on his
patients was primitive enough that it may ultimately have proved fatal for him. We may
never know. There is the possibility his death may have been due to a combination of
factors. Neither our living nor our dying can be definitively reduced to any simplistic
explanation.
Wallace Gray
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Book Reviews
Robert Kagan, The World America Made. Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.
Robert Kagan is a recognized conservative historian, conservative because he has
served as an advisor to several Republican administrations. What is interesting today is
that his latest book, The World America Made, happens to be a favorite of President
Obama. This book certainly makes a case supporting the idea of American
Exceptionalism, a view more common among conservatives than liberals today, but this
view may be enjoying a general renaissance.
Kagan’s Dangerous Nation, 2006, tracked American foreign policy from the
country’s very beginnings. It contradicts the often held belief that the basic nature of
America is isolationist and inward-looking. Kagan shows that we were promoting
democracy from the start, a promotion that made us appear as a menace to the old order
in Europe even before our revolution succeeded. Our only truly isolationist time was
during the decades leading up to the Civil War, because the South wanted to expand
into the Caribbean to extend slavery, but the North saw this as detrimental to the future
of America. Once the issue of slavery was resolved, America again launched into an
ambitious foreign policy and increasingly influenced world events.
Kagan’s present work poses an important question: if the US declines in power
from its position as the hegemonic leader of a multipolar world, will the global order
survive? He makes a devastating case that what we consider the global order today is
neither inevitable nor would continue without us.
Kagan notes: “We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today--the widespread freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity (even despite the current
economic crisis), and the absence of war among great powers. In 1941 there were only
a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are over a hundred. For four centuries
prior to 1950, global gross domestic product (GDP) rose by less than 1 percent a year.
Since 1950, it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have
been lifted out of poverty.” Would any of this have happened without us?
Many analysts think that the current global order is the inevitable consequence of
human evolution. But, says Kagan, “Perhaps the progress we enjoy today was not an
inevitable evolution of the human species but rather the product of a unique and
perhaps fleeting set of circumstances…Perhaps democracy has spread to over a
hundred nations since 1950 not simply because people yearn for democracy but
because the most powerful nation in the world since 1950 has been a democracy.
Perhaps the stunning global economic growth of the past six decades reflects an
economic order shaped by the world’s leading free-market economy. Perhaps the era
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of peace we have known has something to do with the enormous power wielded by one
nation.”
Being a historian, he looks throughout history for comparable models. When
Rome, which had maintained an extraordinarily successful world order in its time, fell
to barbarian invasions and in one case, North Africa, total reversal of culture, not only
did the Roman world order collapse for centuries, but people even lost the recipe for
making cement! Without Rome, order was no longer.
In the 20th century, we saw the rise of other candidates for world order: the
Communists and the Nazis. Had either prevailed, could we imagine a world order that
would resemble the one we have today?
The elements that shape the United States are unique in the world in a number of
ways: our unique geographical circumstances (not surrounded by enemies); a
democratic form of government that has been functioning for several centuries; and
enormous military power. Together these things “have shaped a particular kind of
international order that would have looked very different had another nation with
different characteristics wielded a similar amount of influence.” Imagine if it had been
China, for example, these elements would not have been present.
Another anomaly of the American character is that despite our belligerence
(demonstrated many times since our beginnings), Americans are not eager to colonize,
unlike the European powers in the 19th century. We go to war, but we generally bear
no grudge afterwards (note Germany and Japan), and we do not really want to nationbuild. We do nation-building not well at all, unlike the British Empire, which tried to
do that. The American public can hardly wait for us to leave Iraq and Afghanistan, for
example. Because of our obvious reluctance to rule the world, other nations more or
less trust us, and expect us to be a good hegemon.
The rest of the book (actually a long essay) describes in detail the world America
made, with an analysis of just how it happened. America has demonstrated over and
over again how it believes that when other countries do well, we will do well too. This
is not a universal practice when others are the hegemons. The amazing Marshall Plan
after World War II had destroyed Europe (and its pretensions to power) enabled Europe
to not only recover, but also to thrive. Our former enemies, Germany and Japan,
became our allies, much to the benefit of the now increasing global order. Could that
have happened without us? It does not seem likely. Nor could a European Union have
emerged without specific American encouragement and help.
The danger for us is to think that the current world order is inevitable and
permanent. The early 20th century looked permanent under the hegemony of the British
Empire and the obviously increasing prosperity and technological advancements of the
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time. The world had been more or less at peace for decades, and war was unthinkable.
Unfortunately, that illusion was shattered by the horrific World War I, followed by the
even more horrific World War II, and the brooding threat of a nuclear conflict between
the West and the USSR for the next nearly half century. Without US intervention, none
of these wars would have ended as they did—with a much more ordered and hopeful
world.
Today’s world order might indeed evaporate if the US loses its position as the
exceptional hegemon. Kagan does not think that we are about to lose this position, but
much depends upon our understanding who we are and what role we play. It would be a
great folly for us to abdicate our military role in keeping the world stable. Ask any
Asian countries how they feel (especially today) about the US Navy patrolling Pacific
waters. They want us there, and they know perfectly well why they do. We play the role
there of the cop on the beat.
“What has made the United States most attractive to much of the world has not
been its culture, its wisdom, or even its ideals alone. At time these have played a part;
at times they have been irrelevant. More consistent has been the attraction of
America’s power, the manner in which it uses it, and the ends for which it has been
used.”
If we decide to drop that role, if the US looks like a less reliable defender of the
world order, that order will begin to unravel. “People might find Americans in this
weaker state very attractive indeed, but if the United States cannot help them when and
where they need help the most, they will have to make other arrangements.”
This would not be a good thing; just consider the alternate players in today’s
world and make your choice.
Laina Farhat-Holzman
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Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest. Penguin, 2011.
Ricardo Duchesne, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization. Brill, 2011.
Robert Kagan, The World America Made. Knopf, 2012.
Ian Morris, Why the West Rules – For Now. Strauss and Giroux—Farrar, 2010
During the last years there has been a growing interest in civilizational issues, and no
fewer than three large volumes have been published on civilizations and on the reasons
for the rise of the West. Niall Ferguson in his Civilization: The West and the Rest notes
that before the rise, European civilization was more of a “backwater” divided into small
competing kingdoms. In comparison Chinese civilization was strong and prospering.
The threat of the Ottomans in Eastern Europe was a matter of survival for Western
civilization.
In the 19th century things were different. Chinese civilization was in stagnation and the
Ottomans were no longer a threat to Europe. Turkey had become the “sick man” of
Europe. Europe was prospering and able to project its power in all corners of the earth.
European settlers were moving in large numbers into North and South America and
other parts of the world. In the world-encompassing British Empire, India was the
“jewel in the crown.”
There were six main reasons for the rise of the West, according to Ferguson:
1. Competition. Decentralization made nation-states and capitalism possible. It was
the intense rivalries between Western powers that gave them the edge over nonEuropeans, whose realms were vast and stagnant.
2. The growth of science, which gave the West a way of understanding and
conquering nature. One of the most important parts was a leap in military
technology.
3. Property rights defined by law. This led to stable governance that furthered
growth.
4. Western medicine, which was good for productivity and extended life
expectancy. Improving health also meant that Europeans could cope with
colonial climes.
5. A consumer society, which in turn fueled demand and economic growth.
6. Possibly the most important was work ethic. This held together society and
helped keep society together when the other five could have led to
fragmentation. The work ethic to a great degree depended on the rise of
Protestantism (Max Weber).
Ferguson, being an economic historian, forgets much of the roots of Western civilization
(he even calls the Roman Empire the first incarnation of the West), although he readily
accepts civilizations as complex systems that sooner or later, he says, succumb to
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sudden and catastrophic malfunctions. Ricardo Duchesne (The Uniqueness of Western
Civilization) has, however, shown us that we have to go back thousands of years before
Athenian democracy to find the roots of the West. He argues for more attention to our
Indo-European roots, so often forgotten today.
One of the standard assumptions of modern Western social science (history included) is
that material conditions drive historical development. All of the “Great Transitions” in
world history–the origins of agriculture, the birth of cities, the rise of high culture, and
the industrial revolution–can be associated with some condition that compelled humans
to act in new ways. Not so, says Duchesne: history is driven by creative people and their
ideas and he points to the aristocratic warlike ethos of the Indo-Europeans as a vital
contribution to the origins of Western civilization.
Indo-Europeans migrated westward into Europe over a long period from around 4000
BC to about 1000 BC and the Mycenaeans, representing a new type of warlike society,
managed to Indo-Europeanize Greece: they had ox-drawn wheeled wagons, cattle
rearing and ploughs and a more robust culture.
In the field of war they introduced chariot warfare, which resulted in military victories.
The Indo-Europeans glorified death in battle and their religion included warrior gods of
the sky. The culture was essentially warlike. The society of Mycenae was not the
society of a sacred city but that of a military society. It was driven by the ethos where
fighting and voluntarily risking one’s life was the basis of being a man of virtue.
Duchesne uses the Indo-European poetry that revolves around heroic deeds, immortality
and fame as an example of the restless ethos. The picture of the world was vital, actionoriented and linear.
The rise of Western civilization took place in Europe and the rise of poor, thinly
populated and poor in natural resources Protestant Prussia is a good example of the
importance of work ethic. Scientific revolution grew, however, throughout the east, the
south, the west and the north of the continent. Then there was the Industrial Revolution
in England, soon transferred to other parts of Europe.
Mr. Ferguson also describes in a convincing way how the countries which used Western
ideas in other parts of the world also prospered. The most important example is, of
course, Japan. It had used Western armies as models when building its own army. This
resulted in the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905. By adopting the American model
Japan built an effective Western style productive democracy after the defeat in 1945.
Another example is Israel, with its Western style structures that have made it prevail
against the Arab foe.
The challenge to the West during many decades came from within: Nazi Germany and
the Soviet Union. The latter country was built around a Eurocentric Marxist critique of
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capitalism. So the Cold War was actually a struggle between two rival Wests, a free
market one and a communist one.
Slavery in the form it took in the West was indeed a grave sin but Ferguson should have
put more emphasis on the fact that it was Western abolitionism beginning in the late
eighteenth century that was responsible for ending slavery. It had been widespread in
Africa before the Europeans arrived. When the Europeans left Africa slavery returned -of which, for instance, Sudan is an example.
It is also important to note that self-critique is a unique Western civilizational trait.
Where the West finds or brings disease in any form it also in time provides a cure.
The ISCSC conference last summer, with the title “The Coming Clash of Civilizations:
China versus the West?” held in Crystal City, Virginia, chose a very timely subject,
namely the possibility of a coming clash between the West and China. Until at least the
end of the Cold War there was no outside challenger to the West. In the 1980s,
however, China adopted a Western style capitalist system and has in a few decades risen
in wealth to become the leading challenger to the West--or so it seems.
There has been no change in the political system in China, which on the surface seems
stable. In reality the autocratic system, as all such systems, is unstable and recent events
in China have proven that. Dissidents are demonstrating the vulnerability of the system,
and corruption and internal factional strife within the Communist Party both have shown
the weakness of the power structure.
To be able to understand the challenge of China we must look to what I would like to
call American civilization. In reality today’s Western civilization is divided into a
waning European civilization and a still vital American civilization. It is not a split of
the West or two rival civilizations. America and Europe cooperate reasonably well, but
American civilization has developed into a far stronger defender of the present structure
of Western civilization than Europe.
To quote the latest book by Robert Kagan, The World America Made, the most
important features of today’s world – the great spread of democracy, the prosperity, the
prolonged great-power peace – have depended directly and indirectly on power and
influence exercised by the United States. Containment was an important geopolitical
weapon of the West against the Soviet tyranny during the Cold War. After the collapse
of the Soviet regime in 1991 there has been no challenger to Western civilization until
the rise of China and its civilization after the 1980s.
China has all the characteristics of a challenger: it is a large landmass in East Asia with
the largest population in the world; it has access to the ocean and a strong, growing
economy as well as military and the ambition to become number one. The military
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build-up has been ongoing for two decades and the regime now has access to a network
of satellites, anti-satellite weapons, a cyber warfare system, attack submarines, cruise
missiles and soon, aircraft carriers. Most importantly it is building a huge nuclear
ballistic missile force.
Furthermore, there is a strong naval build-up. Recent naval strategic thinking in Peking
has been influenced by the geopolitical ideas of American Alfred Thayer Mahan. Using
the ideas of Mahan the Chinese are studying his works on command of the sea, control
of communications at sea, and the strategic passages in the Pacific. Chinese control of
the Pacific would be a dangerous challenge to the United States.
In 2012 it became clear that the United States is taking the challenge of China seriously
and is preparing for geopolitical containment of China. It may soon be 1948 all over
again but this time in Asia. Here the thinking of Dutch-American geo-politician
Nicholas Spykman is relevant. Spykman believed the Asian “Rimland” was of great
importance for an American hegemon. He warned that China would be the strongest
power in East Asia. Already in the 1940s Spykman noted that the United States needed
to ensure that no power rose to become dominant in the Eurasian rimland.
Currently two powers along with the United States and Japan are part of the containing
of China: Mongolia in the north and India to the south. In the case of Russia we do not
really know what its China policy will evolve into. In case of a conflict between Russia
and China it is clear that Russia does not have enough military, demographic and
economic strength on the long border with China in Siberia.
At the present a breakout of China would be to the east, into the Pacific Ocean. Here are
three important barriers: US military force, Japan and Taiwan. They form a kind of
Gibraltar to the “Asiatic Mediterranean”. An American abandonment of Taiwan would
therefore be a strategic mistake for the United States and the West. Thus, a
concentration of strategic interest in Taiwan and the Malacca Strait is of utmost
importance.
Other necessary preparations would be the strengthening of U.S. nuclear deterrent forces
in East Asia, strategic cooperation with India and the securing of Afghanistan and
helping Pakistan against Jihadist terrorists. The alliances with Japan and South Korea
need to remain strong. A NATO-like organization is also needed, possibly a Pacific
Ocean Treaty Organization. Australia is of course another partner of strategic
importance in the Pacific area.
During the Cold War the United States and its allies did not exploit the weaknesses of
the Soviet Union until the 1980s, during the administration of Ronald Reagan and the
premiership of Margaret Thatcher. Containment policies in respect to China ought to
include the close watch of future domestic unrest in China and the economic instability
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of that country along with a continued ban on sale of weapons to China. The economic
development of China has been restricted to the coastal areas so that the inland masses
could be a growing potential danger to the present regime.
During 2012 there were growing signs that the United States is shifting the geopolitical
focus from the North Atlantic and Europe to the Far East and the Pacific. America is a
two ocean continent; the Pacific coast is growing in importance as what seems to be a
containment policy towards China emerges. The added focus of containment of China
is a part of the geostrategic shift to Asia and the Pacific.
The present crisis of the Eurozone makes it less likely that Europe will have a
strengthening of military forces. There has for a long time been a need for stronger
European defense commitments. The shift of focus from Europe to Asia of the United
States should mean greater responsibility of NATO’s European partners for the defense
of the own continent while the American partner concentrates more on the rimland of
Asia. Unfortunately growing European military strength seems out of the question and
will likely be postponed until the present crisis is over.
Ian Morris, a British classicist and historian, in his book Why the West Rules – For Now,
believes that what he calls “Eastern social development” will catch up quickly to the
West after 2050 but will lag behind in “war-making capacity, information technology,
and per capita energy capture.” But China has problems, Morris admits. Economic
success drives up wages. Manufacturing jobs are already leaving China for other Asian
countries that allow for even lower wages. It could be the first sign that China is losing
its edge.
Demography might be an even bigger challenge. The average age is rising faster in
China than in America. By 2040 entitlements may weigh more heavily on China’s
economy than on the United States economy. Another problem of China concerns
natural resources which may slow the economic growth, and tensions might rise
between the booming coastal cities and the languishing inner China. Popular unrest
could get out of control with ethnic revolts and growing protests against the corruption
of the party elite. Environmental catastrophe might add to the problems. China has
broken apart earlier in its history and this might occur again. The country may even
slide into civil war.
On the other hand prosperity can lead to Westernization of the East. The question then
of whether the West rules would be rendered meaningless, because the whole world will
have become Western. But will Asia really be Western? Chinese rule might lead to
Easternization and the rise of Confucian cultural traditions. We must, however,
remember that there are other cultural traditions in China than Confucianism, such as,
for instance, authoritarian legalism, which is far from the peaceful statecraft of
Confucius.
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There are many unknown aspects, however. The United States may come to dominate
new technologies as much as Britain dominated in the industrial age. The development
of the genetic, nano-technological and robotic revolutions may shift wealth and power
westward to even a greater extent than during the Industrial Revolution. The coming
technological revolutions could even make civilizational categories completely
irrelevant. Geography could be abolished. It should however be noted that Morris
never uses civilization as a category. The word “civilization” does not appear in the
index of his book.
Conclusion
Morris suggests in Why the West Rules – For Now that geography could be abolished.
As you may have noted in my text I am strongly influenced by classical geopolitical and
geostrategic thinking and I believe geography can never be abolished. It is fixed by
nature. Neither do I agree with the German-American political philosopher Eric
Voegelin that the origin and end of history can be defined by ideological constructions
found in, for instance, Hegel and Marx.
These so-called “stop history” programs claim to have discovered the ultimate meaning
of history and how history ends. History remains, I firmly believe, a mystery and its
development cannot be discovered.
It would, therefore, in my opinion be wrong to use a system of the decline and fall of
civilizations as a model for the future of Western civilization. The West is indeed
unique and differs from all earlier civilizations. It is quite possible that the ongoing
technological revolution will move wealth and power westward, not eastward. History
never stops and predictions are not possible. China is not the end of history nor is the
rise to domination of China inevitable. The second half of the twenty-first century may
very well be the finest moment of Western civilization.
Bertil Haggman
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Kit-Man Li, Western Civilization and its Problems: A Dialogue Between Weber, Elias
and Habermas. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999.
During the first phases of the rise of philosophy two opposite lines of thought
developed. They diverged as to the point of view of the origin of human knowledge.
For the rational line, the production of ideas is a creation of the mind (Plato), while for
the sensory line, the beginning of knowledge lies in the empirical experience of the
world, through the senses, (Aristotle). In its evolution philosophy shifted to the view of
an integration of both rationality and sensibility (Kant) in the production of knowledge.
It was followed by the idea that knowledge is continuously transformed in a dialectic
way, inside the movement of history (Hegel’s dialectic).
Later, the inseparable integration of subject and object was stated (Marx and historical
materialism). The Marxian theory, connected to historical materialism, defines the
economic level of social life as a deterministic level. At each historical phase it is
covered by one or another level that appears as the dominant level. The dominant level
of each moment defines the conjuncture presented at this moment.
In the case of religion, its origins were linked philosophically to rational ideas, about
supernatural rational powers. (In the case of the Bible, however, there are references
to sensory experiences, as it tells about conversations between God and chosen
personalities.) The idea of God appears in a transcendent manner which means that He
transcends nature, or in an immanent manner, which means a power rising from nature
(Spinoza). In the case of the sciences, their historical development is linked to the
increase of instruments connected to the senses.
Although sensory arguments have been introduced into theology since the Medieval
Age (Saint Dominic), religion remained linked to the rational line, while, even though
some scientists maintain religious beliefs, the progress of science cannot be separated
from life experience.
In other words, the old philosophical debate between rationalists and empiricists moved
to a higher level by questioning about a supernatural power or about nature only as an
explanation for the origin of the world – a question that still remains open for each
individual. In philosophical terms, one calls Idealists the believers in God as a rational
power preceding nature. Agnostic is the name applied to people in doubt about the
existence of a supernatural power or God. Atheist labels the nonbeliever in God.
Materialists are those who see nature at the origin of the world and of knowledge.
Historic materialists, Marxian-based, consider the real, the perceived world, as an
object of knowledge, what means built and rebuilt by the inseparable integration of
rationality and sensory experience along human history.
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During these historical developments, covering 2,600 years, the integration of rationality
and sensibility took many forms. This can be seen, for instance, in the idea that
information received by the senses has to be rationally and methodically analyzed, or in
the tendency to use rationality, methodically, in all social practice. In this way,
rationality has acquired different meanings, as an ideology, as a method, or as a form of
behaving. The true meaning of the sentence is that man is a rational being.
The observations here presented may serve as an introduction to the following review of
the book by Kit-Man Li, Western Civilization and its Problems: A Dialogue Between
Weber, Elias and Habermas. Each of the authors commented on in Kit-Man Li´s book,
Weber, Elias and Habermas, was influenced, in a particular manner, by the
philosophical lines and principles presented above. One can find in the emphases of
their statements, reproduced in the book, the role of their different ideological
affiliations. Kit-Men Li actually gives some information about the philosophical
affiliations of his subjects, but he does not go deeply into the matter.
There is not a consistent explanation about the philosophical contents behind the
positions of the three authors. Nor does the author present, prior to their statements, a
comprehensive description of the philosophies which they follow. He certainly took it
as unnecessary, considering that his readers are familiar with those questions. But the
result is that this very interesting and rich book turned to be closed to the lay reader. It
may leave the idea that the differences between the three authors are mainly due to
individual variations and that their philosophical assumptions do not play a decisive
role.
Weber, known as a straightforward believer, confesses his rationalism (in a
philosophical sense, which connects rationalism to religion). He considers “that his
diagnosis of Western civilization emerges from his own ideal-typical construction which
selectively picks out from historical reality some significant elements and conceptually
depicts the connections” (…) Moreover, Weber “assumes an unbridgeable gap between
concepts and reality.” In another place the book states that Weber´s pessimism on
Western civilization is “rooted in the process of rationalization in the West.”
Here the issue of what is rational is taken to mean a form of behaving in the lived space
(Lefébvre). For the lay reader, however, the statements reproduced above may appear
as contradictory and with no discernible meaning. This is because Weber´s sentences
presented in the book were not preceded by some explanation about the different
meanings of the term “rationalism.”
One reads in the book that Elias did criticize Weber and the mainstream of social
thought while he was alive for overlooking or evading the temporal and relational
dimensions of social phenomena. However there is no explanation in the book about the
difference between the concepts of time and history or about the concept of historical
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materialism. The difference between Elias and Habermas lies precisely in the fact that
the latter holds a Marxian formation that emphasizes historical materialism.
Thus, while Elias asks for a “good balance between involvement and detachment,” on
his side, Habermas holds the same stance. However, as a Marxian dialectician, he
cannot conceive of an absolute separation of ideology or involvement from knowledge.
He “suggests one way of understanding that consciously incorporates into it an
evaluative stance.” And he adds that there is no utopia without some involvement. KitMan Li interprets correctly both, by saying that “they have contributed [to] a more
balanced and comprehensive understanding of Western civilization.”
The book is organized in a structure that presents the approaches of the three thinkers to
a number of questions and the importance they gave to these questions. While Weber,
philosophically a rationalist, bases his thoughts on man and his brain, Elias and
Habermas “reject the solitary image of human beings (…), the Cartesian distinction
between subject and object cannot be sustained.”
One of the questions raised has to do with methodical rationality and its relation to
fragmentation and integration. Weber “equates the development of rationality per se
with that of instrumental rationality.” Habermas “shifts from a subject/centered model in
social theory to a communicative model, or a shift from the philosophy of consciousness
to a philosophy of language, or inter-subjectivity.” He distinguishes between
instrumental rationality and communicative rationality.
Another question: the power issue is treated by Weber very narrowly as associated with
decision-making processes. He is “unable to grasp the effects of power in non-decisionmaking” and how power acts “before it appears in the agendas for collective discussion
and decision making.” For Elias, human interdependency and power define each other.
Power means preparing minds, molding mentalities. But for Habermas the interest lies
in the relation between power and social development. There is no utopian project
without the use of power and he distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate
powers.
On the question of values, Weber and Elias consider them as absolutes, while Habermas
sees values in an historical, relative context.
The book deals with questions on communicative actions, systems, social differentiation
and social integration, life world, and many other matters.
Kit-Man Li makes pointed comments throughout the book while putting his subjects in
dialogue. However, one does not find a consolidated position of the author himself in
relation to the problems of Western Civilization. He presents very interesting problems
experienced by Western societies, develops philosophical thinking around them, but he
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does not present a conclusive evaluation of Western problems and needed policies. Also
there is no reference to post-modernity. One may wonder about the absence of a
conclusive chapter which would summarize the questions debated and would better
approach the title of the book.
A rich bibliography, occupying 17 pages, covers the authors analyzed in the book.
Pedro Geiger
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Frank Joseph, Advanced Civilizations of Prehistoric America: The Lost Kingdoms of
the Adena, Hopewell, Mississippians and Anasazi. Bear & Company, 2009.
First, let me confess that this is a very serious look by a dedicated author that I cannot
competently assess. It is a comprehensive but affirmably “unconventional” prehistory
that makes a number of claims about the four groups or tribes examined in detail. Those
claims are very interesting, but many are new to me. Thus it requires a real expert on
Native American cultures, which I am not. Several examples will follow briskly.
What I can do is faithfully describe Joseph’s allegations and affirm that he has done a
yeoman’s job of providing evidence to support them, including classic archaeology but
also comparative linguistics between Gaelic and Algonquian (a Plains Indian tribe) and
Zuni Indian compared with Japanese. I know none of these languages.
Second, one of Joseph’s main theses is that each of these civilizations was animated by
infusions of outsiders coming to North America, clashing, merging and no doubt
interbreeding with native peoples of longer standing here (usually) building varieties of
monumental architecture, and then each disappearing in their turn. Appendix I provides
a simple timeline that helps make some sense of his claims.
Joseph thinks that Celtic peoples migrated west from the British Isles and Ireland around
1000 BCE to create what modern archaeologists call the “Adena” who introduced
agriculture, astronomy, iron-working, road building and monumental architecture. He
claims they were refreshed by continuing migrations over long times.
He also thinks that Japanese seafarers known as the Munakata arrived on America’s
Pacific Northwest around 300 BCE, but then moved to the Midwest. That is a daunting
journey under any circumstances. There Joseph thinks they made common cause with
surviving Adena against threatening tribes of native peoples, ultimately developing huge
ceremonial centers. The resulting culture is known as the “Hopewell” today. By 400
CE the Hopewell were killed off and, Joseph alleges, around 700 CE the last of the
Adena died in battles in Kentucky.
Around 900 CE, Joseph thinks the Mayans abandoned Yucatan and Central America
following dictates of their sacred calendar, some relocating to Illinois and Eastern
Missouri where they built the megalopolis of Cahokia and the Mississippian culture.
How the Mayan calendar dictates this is not completely clear.
A century later he thinks that two peoples from Peru, the Huari and Llacuaz moved up
the Colorado River to Arizona and New Mexico, where among other notable
achievments they built the Great Houses at Chaco Canyon, NM. Conventional
archaeologists refer to these as the Hohokam and Anasazi, or “ancestral Puebloans.”
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Then, around 1240 CE, the onset of prolonged drought triggered collapse such that
within a century the Neo-Mayans left the Mississippi Valley for the Valley of Mexico,
and most Hohokam and Anasazi went to northern Mexico.
The bibliography Mr. Joseph uses to support these conclusions includes over 250
references, most quite conventional and academic. But the whole picture he presents is
so new to me, and spiced with exotic items like Japanese immigrants and long term
Celtic migrants mixing with original aboriginals and remnants of the Mayans, that I
cannot well assess it.
There is no doubt that many mysteries remain about the origins and transformations of
North American native peoples, not least the mystery of why the original Mayan
civilization collapsed and what happened to the Mississippians who seemed so
dominant over all during their time. So I appreciate that Frank Joseph has done the best
he can to present an alternative explanation for these and many other mysteries. At the
very least, he provides stimulating hypotheses that may help better scholars than I
discern the ultimate truths of our complex prehistory.
Finally, like so many other civilizational authors of our era, Joseph is worried about our
future. From his Afterword, page 263 [Is Ours the Next Lost Civilization of America?]
Joseph writes: “Seen from a wider perspective, the story of civilization in North
America, as it is everywhere, is a recurring cycle of birth, growth, expansion, prosperity,
corruption, decline, and death.”
In this respect he mirrors those who think that
civilizations cycle, including the venerable Carroll Quigley in the Evolution of
Civilizations of 1961.
Let us hope that decay phases are not inevitable, but better than hope, let us study
history to actually learn its lessons, and then work on improvements so that collapse is
not inevitable in our time or our children’s.
Michael Andregg
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Anfinset, Nils, Metal, Nomads and Culture Contact: The Middle East and North
Africa. London: Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2010.
The regions of both northeast Africa and the southern Levant witnessed a number of
major cultural changes from 5000 BC to ca. 3000 BC.
The premise of this book is that these changes must be seen in a context of the following
important factors: 1) widespread changes in animal husbandry and agriculture, 2)
expanding exchange and interaction over vast areas, and 3) the later emergence of
metallurgy. In the study of civilizations, there seems to be a relationship between the
development of social complexity and the introduction of metallurgy.
Over time, various modes of living advanced which initiated constant communication
across enormous areas between different regions where ideas diffused and commodities
were exchanged. The author proposes that pastoral nomads acted as the dynamic
component of diffusion and cultural change between different modes of subsistence.
Settled village societies had created economic surplus which made it possible to procure
metal ore from nomads.
These settled societies acted in turn as middlemen because of their position as a supply
and demand zone to the larger formative societies in Egypt and Mesopotamia. The
author bases his conclusions on archaeological sites and materials. The author, Nils
Anfinset, is a Research Fellow at the Department of Archaeology, University of Bergen
in Norway. His research interests include political archaeology and cultural heritage in
the late Neolithic and Bronze Age, and he has conducted research in Norway, Nepal,
Tanzania, Syria and the West Bank. He has taught at the University of Bergen, the
University of Oslo, and Birzeit University (Palestine).
This book is amazing in its
scope and depth. The author covers a broad geographical area and over two millennia at
the same time. Its documentation is stunning with 26 pages of references.
He deftly intertwines all the literature on a particular topic with objectivity. The book
reads like one large literature review so in this respect it is somewhat tedious but the
author’s extensive knowledge of the literature is impressive. The conclusions at the end
of each section, chapter and book itself are very valuable in providing the reader with
effective summaries. In some cases I wish the concluding remarks had been provided at
the beginning of the chapter as an introduction.
The time coverage and chronology included in this book are:
Levant
Late Neolithic
Chalcolithic
Early Bronze Age I

NE Africa/Egypt
Late Neolithic
Pre-dynastic Egypt
Nubian A Group
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During the last phase, there occurs a large increase in complexity
The book is organized by topic and is meant to build up to the conclusion, but in doing
so, the author many times refers to later chapters, which is a little disruptive. The first
chapter is an introduction and the second a discussion of perspectives and approaches.
Anfinset then provides the setting by discussing the areas of the southern Levant and
Northeast Africa for the 5th and 4th Millennia. Other chapters cover the role of nomadic
pastoralists, the role of copper, and the processes of contact, specialization, and
valuation of commodities. He discusses the secondary products of the animals such as
milk, wool, etc. that helped them survive and became commodities which the nomads
could sell or exchange on their travels.
This is known as the secondary products revolution and resulted in substantial change to
social organization, gender roles and modes of subsistence. Anfinset considers many
factors and changes in demonstrating the complexity of civilizational development in
the region discussed.
The author provides many figures which are useful. The book also includes several
maps; however some of the maps are difficult to read because of the background of the
map and the small print. The book includes a good list of figures and a valuable index.
I wish the author had included a glossary for those who are not familiar with the
terminology. As I read I often had to try to find definitions of time periods and various
words maybe mentioned briefly before and then used later without definition or context.
As the Levant is considered an important area in the development of civilization, this
book provides valuable insight into how some of this took place.
During the Late Neolithic, there seems to have been a gradual economic specialization
regarding animal husbandry and agriculture, as well as some indications of contact with
the Northern Levant. There was probably a gradual development of specialized
pastoralism in both northeast Africa (cattle) and the southern Levant (sheep and goats)
as part of the growing demands for space and secondary products. As new areas were
used, there was an increase in interaction between groups with difference economic
bases.
Contact zones between settled and nomadic societies played a significant part in the
existence of villages. It is likely that the nomads introduced metal, especially copper, to
the southern Levant and Egypt which they probably learned about from further north. It
left me wondering how metal was discovered and how metallurgy developed. More
detail about this aspect would be helpful as the author discusses the nomads as
intermediaries of this metal transportation. Copper became of value to the settled
population as the process of metallurgy produced tools, weapons, and household goods
for them. The products of both animals and metal helped increase more complex
societies and begin the development of social strata.
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The literature about this topic is quite sparse. There are a few book chapters which
discuss metallurgy in the Levant and a book on craft specialization and social evolution
in general. So this work by Anfinset is a great addition to the study of culture contact,
the importance of metallurgy and the possible mechanisms by which cultures and
civilizations developed.
Connie Lamb
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John Perlin, A Forest Journey – The Story of Wood and Civilization. The
Countryman Press, 2005
Who would ever think about the role of wood in civilization? We so take wood for
granted, yet it has played an enormous role in our cultures since the emergence of man.
John Perlin, author of A Forest Journey – The Story of Wood and Civilization, has
addressed this issue in an encyclopedic survey. Humankind has interacted with forests
for the entire existence of Homo Sapiens, forests having been our original home. Over
the last 5,000 years of mankind’s agricultural revolution, wood was essential: first as
fuel and then as building materials, from the Bronze Age through the 19th century. This
interaction has affected the demographics, politics, economy, and technology of the
great civilizations of Sumer, Assyria, Egypt, China, Knossos, Mycenae, Classical
Greece and Rome, Western Europe and North America.
Harvard University Press has selected A Forest Journey as one of the Press’s “One
Hundred Great Books” of all time.
With heat to make fire, cold climates became habitable; inedible grains were changed
into a major source of food; clay could be converted into pottery, serving as useful
containers to store goods; people could extract metal from stone, revolutionizing the
implements used in agriculture, crafts, and warfare; and builders could use wood as fuel
to produce substantial construction materials such as brick, cement, lime, plaster and tile
for housing and storage facilities. Charcoal and wood also provided the heat necessary
to evaporate brine from seawater to make salt; to melt potash and sand into glass; to
make grains into bread; and to boil materials into useful products such as dyes and soap.
Wood is so ubiquitous that we scarcely notice it any more.
Perlin paves a way for us to understand how cities or states developed thanks to their
proximity to forests. Time after time however, the forests were destroyed without
regard for the future of the forests---or society. Once the forests were depleted, society
had to reach further afield or abroad in order to purchase or lay claim to new lands with
adequate forests for its insatiable needs. Upon finding the new forest resources, those in
power built their civilization anew and the pattern was repeated.
In Perlin’s introduction, the groundwork is laid by citing ancient writers who observed
that forests always recede as civilizations develop and grow. He goes on to say that
trees have been the principal fuel and building material for almost every society for over
five thousand years, from the Bronze Age until the middle of the 19th century.
Without enough supplies of wood from forests, the great civilizations would never have
emerged. Wood, according to Perlin, is in fact the unsung hero for the technological
revolution that has brought us from a stone and bone culture to the present age.
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As Perlin describes the decline of forests, the reverse is true when society declines. For
it is then that forests tend to regenerate. Meaning, that as societies decline, their need for
and taking of the forest declines and hence, the forests are given a new life of
restoration.
The idea for Perlin’s book began when he co-authored another book, A Golden Thread,
which covered the use of solar energy throughout history. In the course of researching
that book, Perlin discovered that reliance on the sun for house and water heating
occurred when people began to run short of wood. Hence, he discovered that wood was
the principal fuel and building material of nearly every society from the Bronze Age
through the 19th century.
Perlin describes how the abundance or scarcity of wood has shaped the culture,
demographics, economy, internal and external politics along with technology of
societies. He does this through two sections of the book which are laid out in 12
chapters. The first section of the book “The Old World” takes us through the use and
impacts of wood from Mesopotamia; Bronze Age Crete and Knossos; Mycenean
Greece; Cyprus; Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic Greece; Rome; the Muslim
Mediterranean; the Venetian Republic; and England through the ages as well as
England’s departure from the wood age. “The New World” takes us to Madeira, the
West Indies, Brazil, and America.
Man’s evolved dependency on wood is linked to many topics, including one unexpected
insight into Western Hemisphere slavery. In the Indies, both natives and forests were
destroyed to create plantations. With the native populations gone, the planters lacked
hands to work their sugar mills, making it necessary to import slaves from Guinea; thus,
the African slave trade developed. Sugar was in great demand in Europe and elsewhere
and enriched those who grew it.
Plantation owners in the West Indies earned large profits from sugar and sought new
ways to maintain their operations rather than letting the diminishing wood supplies
curtail their operations. With wood supplies becoming scarce, they developed
alternatives to their operations to minimize their dependency. They converted worn out
wood rollers into iron ones and burned bruised cane in the furnaces. Even though they
could use wood substitutes in certain portions of the sugar-making process, they would
have had to stop production without a permanent supply of wood, which they found in
New England.
Yankee traders traded their wood for rum. With their cargo of rum, they would then
head to Africa to trade the rum for more slaves or sell it to European slave merchants.
Then, they returned to the West Indies with their human freight and they bartered many
of the slaves for sugar. The New Englanders then shipped the sugar to England and
traded it for goods which they sold in America. Money from those sales was used to
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purchase more timber for another round in the slave trading, goods-exchange loop.
New England merchants had no trouble in finding other markets for their timber in
newly deforested areas. The islanders of Madeira, for example, once had adequate
supplies of their own wood to build casks in which to ship their wine. By the late
1600s, most of their island was covered with vines rather than the trees of earlier times
and New England provided the needed timber. When Madeira was then no longer able
to send wood to Portugal and Spain, those countries also became dependent on New
England’s wood supply.
Throughout early America, some new leaders realized the importance of forests to the
successful development of the country. One close friend of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, Tench Coxe (author of several economic works and administrator of the
Census of 1810), said that no country was blessed with such abundance of wood and
timber as the United States. He felt the wood supply provided “an immense and
unequalled store of wooden raw materials and fuel.”
Manufacturing villages were scattered across the new country, hosting gristmills,
sawmills, oil mills, fabric mills, iron mills, sheet-iron mills, clover mills, paper mills,
and tanneries run by water power. The mills were, of course, constructed primarily of
wood. Many villages and towns grew around the mills. The first building to go up in a
wilderness was usually a saw mill. The cycle would continue whereby lumberjacks sold
their logs to the mill owner. The mill owner accumulating wealth, through his business,
would build a large wooden style house and usually open a store. In this manner, a good
portion of the surrounding countryside was eventually cleared.
From needing heat for the industrial sector, to building houses and factories,
transportation, travel, bridges, ships and boats, and railroads, Perlin illustrates the
dependency on forests and wood for their necessity, development and sustainability, at
least in the short-term. However, from the end of the Revolution to the beginning of the
Civil War, not many appreciated the role wood played in the development of the United
States, except for one well respected scientist of the time, a gentleman named Increase
Lapham.
In 1867 at the request of the legislature of Wisconsin, Lapham wrote his “Report on the
Disastrous Effects of the Destruction of Forest Trees Now Going on So Rapidly in the
State of Wisconsin” which described the “experience of other countries, ancient and
modern, whose forests have been improvidently destroyed…the effects of clearing land
of forests, upon springs, streams, and rainfall…how [forests] temper winds, protect the
earth…enrich the soil and modify the climate…the economic value of forests in their
relation to cheap houses, cheap fuel, cheap bread, cheap motive power, cheap
transportation and cheap freights…[and] the propagation and culture of trees…” .
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The book leaves off where one might wish it to further explore. There is only brief
attention given to contemporary forest policy and practices in the United States. There is
room in Perlin’s story for another edition to bring about a more full and updated global
picture.
That aside, the book is satisfying in its detail and scope. It is impressive to realize how
wood has contributed to the growth or decline of civilizations, from using it as fuel,
building material for shelter, transportation (carts, wagons, and ships) throughout the
ages, and how wood is the foundation upon which early societies were built.
Furthermore, Perlin links the history of wood with the history of civilization’s many
successes----and failures.
Quite simply, wood has always been integral to civilizations’ stability, power, and
decline as we maintain or lose access, use, deplete or sustain the supply. I recommend
this book.
Lynn Rhodes
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Andree F. Sjoberg: Dravidian Language and Culture (Selected Essays), Dravidian
University, Srinivasavanum, Kuppam, India, 2009
(Compiled by Dr. D. Balaganapathi)
Dravidian Language and Culture is a collection of 12 essays written between 1956 and
2001 by Professor Sjoberg. She received her BA degree in Geology, MA in
Anthropology and PhD in New Linguistics. Her doctoral dissertation was on the
influence of Sanskrit on the phonology of Telugu and was done under the direction of
Professor Winfred P. Lehman, who went on to become a world renowned linguist. Her
extensive research on the Dravidian languages of India along with the Turkic language
of Central Asia resulted in this volume that is compiled by Dr. Balaganapathi, a
Professor of Philosophy from the Dravidian University in Kuppam, Andhra Pradesh,
India.
Since this edited volume appears to be meant more for the scholars and less for the
general reader, Sjoberg provides a brief but useful guide to understanding the content
and structure of the work.
In the words of the author, “the first five chapters seek to answer the questions: Who
are the Dravidians? What has been their impact on the development of Indian culture?
And how are the Dravidians connected to other linguistic groups of Asia?”
The last seven chapters, which deal with “selected features of Dravidian linguistics” are
very specialized “dealing with the locative case in some of the languages, the role of
aspect in the Dravidian simple verb, and discussion of negative verb roots and similar
phenomena in other languages.”
In chapter one, Sjoberg looks at the Dravidian language group of Tamil, Telugu, Kanada
and Malayalam and places it in the larger Eurasian language group consisting of the
Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic and Japonica of Central Asia and the East. The author
believes that her topological analysis reveals the similarities but not a genetic
connection in these two groups of languages. She also asserts that her research is
pioneering because it chalks out “the place of the Dravidian in the context of the broader
Eurasian linguistic context.”
Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 make up the core of her thesis, which is that “most Indologists
have been intent upon examining the linguistic and cultural data on India through a
narrow Indo-Aryan and even Indo-European lens” by neglecting or even ignoring the
central role played by the Dravidians in “shaping Hinduism and Indian culture for more
than 3500 years.”
Out of these 12 chapters, seven are on the specialized subject of linguistics dealing with
similarities between the Altaic language group of Turkic, Mongolic, Tungusic and
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Japonica and the Dravidian language group of Tamil, Kanada, Telugu and Malayalam.
These seven essays are meant for the scholars or specialists, who should not only know
these languages well but also should understand and comprehend fully the rules of
grammar of the two language groups being compared. These seven specialized articles
are being used by the author to provide justification for her thesis in the book, which is
presented in the other five chapters.
Her thesis is that there is much more influence of the Dravidian languages and their
culture on the Indo-Aryan languages, culture and civilization of India than has been
recognized. The Indo-European scholars studying the Indian languages and culture have
taken only a myopic view. They have not given proper importance to the impact of the
Dravidian languages on the Sanskrit language and its offspring. Moreover, they have
neglected to give due weight to the “Dravidian features in the religious content of the
Indian Epics;” “The Impact of Dravidian on Indo-Aryan;” and the “Dravidian
contribution to the Development of Indian Civilization.”
All this is due to a lack of understanding among the scholars regarding “who the
Dravidians were.” Through her research, Sjoberg attempts to rectify this scholarly
lacuna about the contributions of the Dravidians. She tries to restore to the Dravidians
their rightful place by showing that the Indian culture of today owes a great deal of its
philosophical, religious and cultural content to the influence of the Non-Aryan
Dravidians. These cultural elements supplied by the Dravidians make up the
quintessential ingredients of Indian civilization.
Who were the Dravidians? Recent research points in two different directions. First, the
Dravidian who occupy the Southern states of India have “certain genetic components...
and a number of cultural features that appear to be similar to the people of southwestern
Asia and second, the linguistic evidence suggests “connections with Uralic language
family, found in northwestern Asia and parts of eastern Europe.” (p133) Sjoberg’s
research indicates that the Dravidians were an amalgam of divergent peoples and
cultures.
Because of a number of invasions and migration, the blending took place in
Northwestern India, the Near East, and Central Asia. Sjoberg further asserts that at
present though physically the Dravidian people cannot be separated from the North
Indians except that they are of darker complexion, linguistically they belong to a
separate group. The Dravidian languages are unrelated to the North Indian language
group. Though they borrowed a number of words from the influential Sanskrit language
of the North, their grammar has not changed throughout the ages.
According to Sjoberg, some of the core concepts that the Indian civilization developed
are due to the influence of the Dravidians. This impact is evident on the religious
philosophy of Hinduism as displayed in the books of the Upanishadas, the Epics, the
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Puranas and in particular the concept of Bhakti (devotion) as displayed in the Bhagavad
Gita. The Dravidians added rich content to a number of other concepts: by modifying
the meaning of Brahman as “sacred utterance” to “one ultimate principle” of creation;
Atman as “life breath” to the “subjective essence that is identical with Brahman;” and
Maya as “craftiness or deception” to “phenomenal universe which is illusory in nature.”
Furthermore, they supplied other important themes of Yoga as the technique of
controlling the body and the mind; Samadhi as the highest level of achievement in
meditation; and Tapas as one of the Yogic austerities including non-injury (Ahimsa)
towards all living beings.
They also contributed the ideas of both Siva and Shakti as the god and goddess of
fertility in addition to Siva as the perfect Yogi and Shakti as the creative mother
goddess. Furthermore, Vishnu, Krishna and other major gods like Siva, who are
regarded as possessing darker skin in contrast to less powerful deities, clearly show the
influence of the dark complexioned Dravidians. The emphasis on Bhakti (devotion) in
contrast to salvation through knowledge is also influenced by the Tamil segment of the
Dravidians.
Sjoberg argues that all of these influences on the Indian religious philosophy came from
the non-Aryans (Dravidians) with whom the Aryans had mingled for 3500 years. This
blend of Dravidian and Aryan cultures has been ignored by previous researchers
because of the strong pro-Aryan bias amongst Western Indologists. Sjoberg’s book
challenges this prejudice, which she believes is an extension of the European cultural
heritage that presumes itself to be superior to the Asian culture.
Overall, the book presented a challenge to read because of the technical material
accessible only to the linguist. As a non-specialist, I had to use the dictionary as well as
Wikipedia to understand some of the concepts and vocabulary that was associated with
the seven technical chapters. The other five chapters dealing with the Dravidians and
their influence on the Indian civilization were fun to read. Sjoberg’s book is a
pioneering attempt, which tries to restore to the Dravidians their rightful contribution to
the Indian culture and civilization. It is a must read for the scholars of Indian
civilization!
Ashok Malhotra
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